Die weltweiten Militärausgaben haben 2008 einen neuen Rekord erreicht / Worldwide military expenditure set new record in 2008
Sipri-Jahrbuch 2009 veröffentlicht / SIPRI YEARBOOK 2009: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
Im Folgenden informieren wir über die wichtigsten Ergebnisse des am 8. Juni 2009 in Stockholm vorgelegten SIPRI-Jahrbuchs 2009. SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) ist wohl das renommierteste Friedensforschungsinstitut weltweit. Wir beginnen mit der Presseerklärung des SIPRI, die wir deutsch zusammengefasst haben. Im Anschluss daran dokumentieren wir die Einleitung (Introduction) im vollen Wortlaut sowie die Zusammenfassungen der einzelnen Kapitel aus dem Jahrbuch (englisch).
Appendix 5A, 6A und 7A und Teil 8 enthalten außerdem interessante Tabellen.
Die weltweiten Militärausgaben haben 2008 laut SIPRI einen neuen Rekord erreicht
Die weltweiten Militärausgaben beliefen sich im Jahr 2008 auf geschätzte 1.464 Milliarden US-Dollar. Dies geht aus dem Zahlenmaterial hervor, welches das Stockholmer Friedensforschungsinstitut SIPRI bei einer Pressekonferenz am 8. Juni vorlegte. Dies bedeutet eine Zunahme von real 4 Prozent gegenüber dem Vorjahr und einem Zuwaqchs von 45 Prozent gegenüber dem Jahr 1999. SIPRI legte das Jahrbuch 2008 über Rüstung, Abrüstung und internationale Sicherheit vor.
In dem Jahrbuch wird gezeigt, dass der größte Teil des globalen Zuwachses von 1999 bis 2008, nämlich 58 Prozent, auf das Konto der USA ging. Deren Militärausgaben erhöhten sich (in konstanten Preisen) um 219 Mrd. Dollar. Trotzdem waren die USA bei weitem nicht das einzige Land, das einen solchen Kurs verfolgte. China und Russland, mit einem Plus von 42 Mrd. bzw. 24 Mrd., verdreifachten fast ihre Militärausgaben innerhalb dieses Jahrzehnts. Andere regionale Mächte wie Indien, Saudi-Arabien, Iran, Israel, Brasilien, Südkorea, Algerien and Großbritannien trugen ebenfalls substantiell zu diesem Wachstum bei.
"Die Idee vom 'Krieg gegen den Terror'" veranlasste viele Länder, ihre Probleme durch eine hochgradig militarisierte Brille zu sehen und ihre hohen Militärausgaben zu rechtfertigen", sagte auf der Pressekonferenz Dr. Sam Perlo-Freeman, der Leiter des SIPRI-Projekts "Militärausgaben". Mittlerweile haben die Kriege in Afghanistan und Irak allein die USA 903 Mrd. Dollar gekostet.
Neben den Zahlen zu den Militärausgaben erwartet die Öffentlichkeit vom SIPRI-Jahrbuch auch einen Einblick in jüngste Entwicklungen in einigen sicherheitspolitisch relevanten Feldern.
Nach den Untersuchungen des Jahrbuchs über Frieden erhaltende Operationen wurde 2008 auch ein Rekord erzielt: Das Personal bei Peacekeeping Operationen erhöhte sich auf 187.586, ein Sprung von 11 Prozent gegenüber 2007 (dem vorherigen Rekordjahr). Trotzdem haben einige besonders amitionierte Missionen wie die in den Problemgebieten Sudan und Kongo den vorgesehenen Umfang nicht erreicht. Das bedeutet harte Entscheidungen und Herausforderungen bezüglich der Personalausstattung und Dauer solcher Missionen.
Rüstungsproduktion: USA und Westeuropa führend
Das SIPRI-Jahrbuch enthält auch eine Liste der 100 führenden Rüstungsproduzenten (ohne China). Das US-Unternehmen Boeing blieb der Top Waffenproduzent 2007 (das letzte Jahr, über das verlässliche Zahlen vorliegen). Boeing verkaufte Waffen im Wert von 30,5 Mrd. Dollar. Die 20 größten Rüstungsproduzenten der SIPRI-Top-100 sind US- oder europäische Firmen. Insgesamt verkauften die Top 100 Waffen im Wert von 347 Mrd. Dollar - eine Steigerung von 11 Prozent (nominal) und von 5 Prozent (real) gegenüber dem Ergebnis 2006.
SIPRI schätzt die Anzahl einsetzbarer atomarer Gefechtsköpfe weltweit auf 8.400. 2.000 von ihnen befinden sich in ständiger höchster Alarmbereitschaft und können in wenigen Minuten gestartet werden. Zählt man Ersatzsprengköpfe hinzu, die in Depots lagern oder zur Demontage vorgesehen sind, so kommen wir insgesamt sogar auf 23.300 Nuklearwaffen. Sie befinden sich in den Arsenalen von acht Staaten: USA, Russland, China, Großbritannien, Frankreich, Indien, Pakistan und Israel.
Neben statistischen Informationen bietet das SIPRI-Jahrbuch Analysen von drängenden Problemen und Schlüsselereignissen auf dem Gebiet der internationalen Sicherheit, des Friedens, der Rüstung und Abrüstung. Zu den "Highlights" des Jahrbuchs 2009 gehört ein Kapitel von Francis Deng und Roberta Cohen, "Architekten" der UN-Politik bezüglich Binnenflüchtlingen, worin aufmerksam gemacht wird auf die zusammenhängenden Probleme der Vertreibung von Bevölkerungen und "einseitiger" Gewalt, die von bewaffneten Kräften gegenüber Zivilpersonen ausgeübt wird. Andere Kapitel untersuchen die Aussichten des Krieges in Afghanistan und Entwicklungen bei der Kontrolle von konventionellen, chemischen, biologischen und atomaren Waffen. Zum ersten Mal präsentiert SIPRI einen vom Institut für Wirtschaft und Frieden erstellten Globalen Friedens-Index ("Global Peace Index"), der 144 Länder nach ihrer relativen Friedlichkeit ("peacefulness") auflistet.
Die 10 Länder mit den höchsten Militärausgaben 2008
(Übertragung aus dem Englischen: P. Strutynski)
|Rang||Land ||2008 Ausgaben
|1|| USA ||607
|2|| China ||84.9*
|3 ||Frankreich|| 65.7
|4 ||Großbritannien ||65.3
|5 ||Russland ||58.6*
|6 ||Deutschland ||46.8
|7 ||Japan|| 46.3
|8 ||Italien|| 40.6
|9|| Saudi-Arabien ||38.2
|10 ||Indien|| 30.0
Introduction. International security, armaments and
disarmament in 2008
Assessing the past year
The past year saw increasing threats to security, stability and peace in
nearly every corner of the globe. The effects of the global financial crisis
will be likely to exacerbate these challenges as governments and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) struggle to respond with effective
resources. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq continued, with moderate
improvements to the security situation in the latter and worsening conditions
in the former. Elsewhere around the world, 16 major intrastate conflicts
raged on—in places such as Burundi, Colombia, Israel and the Palestinian
territories, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan—
with many gathering intensity over the course of 2008. Deliberate violence
against civilians perpetrated by warring parties was increasingly and
Relations between Russia and the United States, and between Russia and
many of its European neighbours, worsened considerably over the course
of 2008, highlighted most by the brief but intense conflict between Georgia
and Russia in August which left hundreds of civilians and soldiers dead
and wounded. That conflict, combined with US plans to install elements of
a ballistic missile defence system in the Czech Republic and Poland,
undermined Russian–US cooperation on a host of questions, including on
global nuclear disarmament and addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Relations between India and Pakistan remained tense in the wake of the
terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, in November—a type of attack which
looks likely to be repeated. The year ended with Israel launching one of its
most intense assaults in decades against Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the
Global military spending, arms production and the arms trade all continued
their overall upward trend while efforts to stem nuclear proliferation
made little progress. The countries that possess nuclear weapons
showed few concrete signs of disarming, indeed many took important steps
in 2008 to significantly improve their arsenals, while the countries that
aspire to a nuclear weapon capability took further steps towards that goal.
One of the world’s most sophisticated and acclaimed conventional arms
control agreements, the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty, was in abeyance throughout 2008 because of Russia’s unilateral
decision in December 2007 to suspend its participation in the treaty.
The past year saw some promising developments. High expectations—
probably overly so—generated by the election of Barack Obama as US
President carried with them hopes for a sound exit strategy from Iraq,
stabilization in Afghanistan and changes in the way that the USA engages
with the international community. Expectations are also high that the new
US President will seek to rebuild transatlantic relations, establish more
productive relations with Russia, reach out to the Muslim world and—with
the appointment of special envoys to address developments in Afghanistan,
the Middle East and Pakistan, and regarding Iran—devote more time and
energy to improving the security situation in these regions.
Elsewhere in the world, the election in March 2008 of the Kuomintang
leader Ma Ying-jeou as President of Taiwan significantly improved relations
between mainland China and Taiwan and the two sides expressed
their intentions to introduce more confidence-building measures (CBMs)
into their relationship. In other CBM-related moves, China established
bilateral military hotlines in 2008 with the Republic of Korea (ROK, or
South Korea), Russia and the USA. Also in 2008, the leaders of 12 South
American countries agreed to establish a new regional organization, the
Union of South American Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas,
UNASUR), to include a South American parliament, with the intention of
deepening political and economic integration in the region.
In one of the most positive developments of 2008, 94 states signed the
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in Oslo in December, including
18 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The CCM
prohibits the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions.
In addition, the goal of nuclear disarmament continued to receive seniorlevel
attention and endorsement from high-ranking former officials and
serving political leaders in Europe and the USA.
Key themes of SIPRI Yearbook 2009
In this volume, the 40th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook, the contributors
delve into these issues and more in such areas as international and regional
security, peace operations, multilateral security institutions, military
expenditure, military industries, arms trade, non-proliferation and arms
control. Drawn from more than a dozen countries, the 2532 contributors to
SIPRI Yearbook 2009 represent some of the world’s leading experts in their
The core of the volume is comprised of 12 chapters divided in to three
themes: international security, armaments and disarmament. The first part
sets the broad context of international security, presenting and examining
some of the fundamental developments that define the international security
scene. The second part of the Yearbook provides information and analysis
on global, regional and national trends in armaments, including on
military spending, arms production, the arms trade and nuclear forces. The
third part focuses on disarmament, providing an account and explanation
of the past year’s developments related to nuclear non-proliferation and
arms control, reducing the threat posed by chemical and biological materials,
conventional arms control, and controlling the transfers of other
security-related goods and technologies.
The 2009 edition of the SIPRI Yearbook also includes vast amounts of
data and analysis on all of these issues, as well as extensive annexes that
catalogue international arms control and non-proliferation agreements,
multilateral security institutions and a chronology of major events in arms
control, non-proliferation and international security in 2008.
Three important themes emerge from the research and findings in SIPRI
First, the international security situation is increasingly characterized by
the diffusion and fragmentation of violence, perpetuated by more and more
actors, who exact a progressively more dreadful toll on the lives of civilians
and render the task of conflict management and resolution by global security
institutions more difficult and challenging. The deteriorating situation
in Afghanistan illustrates this trend all too well.
Second, the trends in military spending, arms production and the arms
trade are all on a continued upward trajectory, driven primarily by the USA
and its decisions and policies related to the conflicts in Afghanistan and
Iraq. At the time of writing, the global financial crisis that took hold at the
end of 2008 had not yet had a significant impact on these overall rising
trends. Nuclear weapons, while fewer in number worldwide, remain central
to the strategic security of their possessors, with more than 23 300
warheads in the hands of the known and suspected nuclear weapon states.
Third, international institutions and other mechanisms to reduce the
threats posed by the proliferation of weapons and weapon technologies are
struggling to fully meet their goals or adjust to new challenges, even as key
non-proliferation and disarmament milestones—such as the May 2010
review conference for the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—draw
II. Highlights and findings of SIPRI Yearbook 2009
Security and conflicts
The first four chapters of SIPRI Yearbook 2009 address and analyse emergent
challenges of contemporary conflict: mass displacement of persons,
one-sided violence against civilians, the legitimacy of peace operations and
weakening international security institutions in Afghanistan.
In the opening chapter of the volume, two of the world’s foremost
experts on internally displaced persons (IDPs), Roberta Cohen and
Francis M. Deng, provide an in-depth study of the challenges posed by the
mass displacement of civilians as a result of violence. The chapter details
the traumatic scale and impact of violence-related mass displacement,
which is an increasingly common feature of contemporary conflict. The
authors report that there are 26 million IDPs in the world and also demonstrate
the weaknesses of the international community in responding effectively
to the massive displacement of persons as a result of violence.
Cohen and Deng stress the need for peace accords to take into account
and resolve the root causes which led to the mass displacement of civilians
in the first place, in order to assure the safe and secure resettlement of displaced persons to their homes. In doing so, the displaced persons themselves
should be consulted and involved in post-conflict peace processes.
Cohen and Deng also argue that governments must take effective responsibility
for their displaced citizens and cooperate more closely with the
international community. The United Nations, too, must strengthen its
institutions that are responsible for alleviating the plight of IDPs, and the
international community should be more willing to conduct discussions
with insurgent groups, which often control areas where large numbers of
IDPs live. Finally, the authors argue, the international community must
build a stronger consensus on the need for intervention if and when mass
atrocities are about to be or are being committed against innocent civilians.
Chapter 2, which tracks trends and data related to armed conflicts worldwide,
focuses this year on the issue of one-sided violence against civilians.
While there have been some positive trends related to armed conflicts
since the 1990s, one-sided violence—the deliberate perpetration of armed
force against civilians by a government or a formally organized group—
continues largely unabated. The main patterns of one-sided violence in
contemporary armed conflict are also detailed and specific cases of onesided
violence are analysed with reference to the conflicts in 2008 in
Colombia, Georgia, Somalia and Sri Lanka. The chapter reaches the key
conclusion that one-sided violence is increasingly perpetrated by non-state
actors that often enjoy strong government ties and support. The rise in onesided
violence by non-state actors follows the overall rise in the diversity
and role of non-state actors in armed conflicts, particularly in weak and
Chapter 2 is followed by two important appendices. One, prepared by the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, presents data and analysis on the patterns
in major armed conflict from 1998 to 2008, including information on onesided
violence in the context of armed conflict. The other appendix presents
the Global Peace Index (GPI) for the first time in the SIPRI Yearbook.
The GPI is a scoring mechanism that was recently developed by the Institute
for Economics and Peace in cooperation with the Economist Intelligence
Unit. The GPI employs 23 indicators to rank 144 countries by their
relative state of peace.
Chapter 3 provides extensive analysis and data on key developments in
multilateral peacekeeping operations, including an in-depth and highly
detailed appendix that presents information and insights on the 60 multilateral
peace operation in 2008. This year the chapter takes up widespread
concerns that peacekeeping is facing a systemic crisis and the role that the
issue of legitimacy may play in this crisis. Over the course of 2008, events
in such places as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), Georgia and Sudan—including problems in managing ‘spoiler
groups’, misconduct by peacekeepers, political deadlock and deployment
paralysis—arguably placed the future of peacekeeping in jeopardy.
The chapter discusses the political, legal and moral factors that define
the legitimacy of peace operations and then examines the role that legitimacy
(or the lack thereof) played in a number of peacekeeping missions in
2008. A number of ongoing missions are analysed, including the South
Ossetia Joint Peacekeeping Forces, the European Union (EU) Rule of Law
Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), the EU Military Operation in Chad
and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), the UN Mission in
the DRC (MONUC) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
Chapter 3 concludes by drawing a strong link between the political, legal
and moral legitimacy of a given peace operation and its ultimate effectiveness.
Missions that are perceived locally as lacking an appropriate mandate
or that engage in illegal activities and other misbehaviour (arms trafficking
and sexual exploitation, for example, as alleged against members of
MONUC) will not be able to execute their mandates effectively. In an era
when the demand for effective peacekeeping far outpaces supply, the UN
and other organizations that deploy peace operations must improve decision
making, oversight and training not simply to ‘make the numbers’, but
to ensure that the missions enjoy full political, legal and moral standing,
and legitimacy in order to have the most positive impact possible.
Chapter 4 analyses the security situation in Afghanistan. In particular, it
examines the role and challenges of the principal international institutions
tasked with bringing greater security and stability to Afghanistan: the UN,
the EU, NATO and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
In detailing these roles and challenges, the chapter emphasizes that, as a
result of difficult political, economic, infrastructural and physical conditions
in Afghanistan and a lack of understanding about the country, international
efforts in Afghanistan are fragmented, duplicative and often of
poor quality—a view similar to that expressed by the outgoing EU envoy to
Afghanistan in 2008. Among other coordination challenges, the chapter
notes that the Government of Afghanistan tries to work with approximately
60 donor countries, 41 troop-contributing countries and hundreds
of NGOs. Within ISAF and NATO, questions arise about command, burden
sharing and coordination across some 26 diverse and geographically dispersed
provincial reconstruction teams contributed by 15 countries. These
and other challenges are a factor in, and are exacerbated by, the deteriorating
security situation in the country.
Chapter 4 concludes soberly by arguing that, while the role of international
institutions will be crucial to the security, reconstruction and
development of Afghanistan as a viable state, current conditions and prospects
do not bode well for the effectiveness of these institutions. The
contributions of individual states will be hostage to the vagaries of
domestic politics and, as such, the institutions in which they serve will face
continuing divisions given their members’ differing interests, capabilities
and agendas. Afghanistan’s future in the next few years will remain
troubled and tenuous at best.
Military spending and armaments
The four chapters in part II of this volume offer authoritative and comprehensive analysis and data on military spending, arms production, the arms
trade and nuclear forces. SIPRI Yearbook 2009 documents continued
upward trends for military spending, arms production and the arms trade.
The chapter on nuclear forces outlines the continuing modernization of the
world’s nuclear arsenals and notes that thousands of nuclear weapons
remain on high alert today—particularly those in the hands of Russia and
Chapter 5 provides a rich and detailed discussion of trends in military
spending region by region around the globe. The chapter’s appendices
provide military spending data for 168 countries for the period 1999–2008
and disaggregated data on military spending on equipment and personnel
by members of NATO. In addition, the chapter focuses on military spending
by the USA in 2008, with a special emphasis on spending related to the
‘global war on terrorism’. It also provides one of the first systematic calculations of spending on the Iraqi security forces.
Among its principal findings, the chapter notes that Eastern Europe saw
the greatest increase—174 per cent—in military spending between 1999 and
2008, most of it accounted for by Russia. Military spending in the USA—
which grew by 66 per cent between 1999 and 2008—has risen to its highest
level in real terms since World War II. Unlike past practice in funding
wars, the USA pays for the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq through emergency
supplemental appropriations, financed by borrowing.
Chapter 5 concludes by noting that the average annual rate of growth in
military spending has been nearly 4 per cent over the past 10 years and that
this rate is likely to continue in the near term even as the global financial
crisis takes hold. Such growth in military spending is also likely to continue
despite a non-binding UN Security Council statement in November 2008
that stressed ‘the importance of appropriate levels of military expenditure
in order to achieve undiminished security for all at the lowest appropriate
level of armaments’ and appealed for increased spending on development.
Trends and key developments in global arms production are detailed and
analysed in chapter 6, which also includes the SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing
companies for 2007 and an appendix listing the principal acquisitions
by arms producers in 2008. In step with the continuing increases in
military spending noted in chapter 5, global arms production also continues
to rise. Arms sales by the 100 largest arms-producing firms rose by 11 per
cent in nominal terms, to nearly $350 billion in 2007. The chapter details
some of the principal sources of growth in the industry, discusses the major
merger and acquisition deals and briefly considers the early impact of the
global financial crisis on global arms production.
Chapter 6 finds that the growth in arms production results from the continuing
rise in US military spending, expenditure that benefits British and
US companies for the most part. A notable trend is the increased activity of
British firms, such as BAE Systems, which have established a stronger
presence in the US market through mergers and acquisitions. Manufacturers
of armoured vehicles—such as BAE Systems, Navistar and Force
Protection—benefited considerably from the increase in demand for mineresistant
ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles for US and other forces in
Iraq. The chapter also documents the success of military services companies,
particularly those engaged in providing information and communications
technology support. In spite of the ongoing global financial crisis, it
appears that continued high US military spending and at least stable European
spending, combined with the lengthy lead times required for major
weapon purchases, mean that larger arms producers will probably be able
to sustain strong sales in the near to medium term. For now, the chapter
concludes, most of the world’s major weapon manufacturers will continue
to enjoy sales equalling or exceeding those at the height of the cold war.
Chapter 7 provides SIPRI’s annual in-depth measurement and analysis of
the international arms trade. The chapter analyses the main exporters—the
USA, Russia and certain EU states—and the principal arms importers, in
particular China and India, while also taking up arms transfers to Sri
Lanka, scene of one of the most intense conflicts in 2008. The chapter also
addresses the impact of the global financial crisis and lower oil prices on
the international arms trade. Extensive appendices provide data and information
on the recipients and suppliers of major conventional weapons, on
the financial value of the arms trade and on the current mechanisms—such
as the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)—that seek greater
transparency in the arms trade.
The chapter documents the continuing upward trend in the volume of
arms deliveries worldwide. It notes that, since the end of the cold war, the
USA and Russia, followed by Germany, France and the United Kingdom,
have been the top five arms exporters, accounting for about three-quarters
of global arms exports over that period (and 78 per cent from 2004 to
2008). From 2004 to 2008, the five largest weapons importers were, in
rank order, China, India, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea and
Chapter 7 concludes that, while the global financial crisis and the fall in
oil prices will probably reduce arms transfers somewhat in coming years,
the major suppliers still have large back orders to fulfil, especially the USA.
On the other hand, the second largest arms exporter, Russia, may see a
downturn in its weapon exports. Chinese imports from Russia have come
to a nearly complete stop in the past year with no major new orders currently
pending. Russia is also likely to face stiff competition in the years
ahead from US and European suppliers for the Indian market, the other
major destination for Russian arms exports in recent years.
Chapter 8 takes an in-depth look at nuclear forces in eight states: the
USA, Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Pakistan and Israel. The chapter
presents several tables on current arsenals and delivery systems and an
appendix, prepared by the International Panel on Fissile Materials, tallying
global stocks of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium. At the
start of 2009 eight states possessed nearly 8400 operational nuclear
weapons, with some 2000 of them kept on a high operational alert. Counting
all nuclear warheads, including those in operation, spares, those in
storage and those intact warheads slated for dismantlement, these eight
countries possess a total of more than 23 300 warheads, about 90 per cent
of which are in the hands of Russia and the USA. The chapter also offers an
assessment of the nuclear weapon development programme of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea).
The chapter discusses each of these states’ nuclear force levels and
posture, research and development programmes, and doctrinal debates.
Among other important findings, the chapter concludes that all five of the
legally recognized nuclear weapon states, as defined by the NPT, appear
firm in their determination to continue developing their nuclear weapon
capabilities for the foreseeable future and to maintain these capabilities as
a central aspect of their respective security strategies. China, France and
the UK have all made recent statements announcing their intentions to
deploy new nuclear weapon systems. In addition to these states, India,
Israel and Pakistan continue to develop and deploy new nuclear-capable
It is true that Russia and the USA are taking steps to reduce the number
of operational nuclear weapons under the auspices of the 1991 Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START Treaty) and the 2002 Treaty on Strategic
Offensive Reductions (SORT). However, it is unclear at the time of writing
whether there will be a new US–Russian nuclear arms reduction agreement
to replace the START Treaty, which expires in December 2009. Moreover, Russia, in the face of the growing conventional superiority of the USA and its NATO allies and having enjoyed growing financial resources in recent years, has given nuclear weapons a more central place in its security strategy. In the USA, the dismantlement of warheads has slowed compared to rates in the 1990s as priority is given to extending the lives of those warheads that will make up the so-called ‘enduring stockpile’.
Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament
In part III, SIPRI Yearbook 2009 turns to the principal ongoing efforts to
reduce the threats posed by weapons and weapon technology worldwide,
with individual chapters focusing on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation,
chemical and biological materials, conventional weapons,
and the trade in security-related items.
Chapter 9 takes up the major developments in nuclear arms control and
non-proliferation in 2008. A particular focus is given to developments over
the past year in three countries. First, the chapter reviews developments
related to Iran’s nuclear programme and describes findings by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran’s past and ongoing nuclear
activities. Second, the chapter reviews the series of disputes—particularly
over the establishment of a verification regime acceptable to North Korea
and the USA—which undermined and derailed full implementation of the
February 2007 action plan for denuclearizing North Korea. Third, the
chapter details the findings of an IAEA inspection of a suspected nuclear
reactor site in Syria. Major developments in Russian–US nuclear arms control
discussions and other multilateral arms control and non-proliferation
mechanisms are also covered by the chapter.
The chapter concludes by noting that, in spite of greater attention to strategic
arms control between the Russia and the USA and renewed calls for
nuclear disarmament by senior political leaders and well-known former
officials, the controversies and unanswered questions surrounding the
nuclear programmes of Iran, North Korea and Syria underscore the weaknesses
of the non-proliferation regime. Iran’s ability to defy the UN Security
Council’s clear insistence that it halt its uranium enrichment programme
calls into question the capacity of the Security Council to enforce
the will of the international community in support of the non-proliferation
regime. Israel’s attack on the suspected nuclear site in Syria demonstrates
the lack of confidence that some states have in the regime’s ability to stem
proliferation. The success of the Six-Party Talks was also called into question
in 2008 as the denuclearization of North Korea was once again at an
Chapter 10 delves into the efforts over the past year to reduce potential
threats posed by chemical and biological materials. It includes an in-depth
review of developments in the implementation of the 1972 Biological and
Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), including progress in the destruction of chemical weapon
stockpiles and facilities.
The chapter details the growing and complex challenge of preventing the
misuse of chemical and biological materials: thousands of chemical toxins
and pathogenic agents could theoretically be used for malign purposes.
Moreover, most threat assessments foresee the misuse of such materials
not by states, but by non-state actors, further complicating preventive and
remedial measures. In addition, ongoing industrial and bioscientific
advancement—a welcome development overall—may add to the lethality
and availability of materials that could be misused. The chapter also
reviews chemical and biological weapon-related allegations in 2008 and
summarizes and analyses the investigation in the USA into the anthrax
letter attacks of 2001.
Chapter 10 concludes by pointing to a number of positive developments
in the efforts to prevent the misuse of chemical and biological materials.
These steps include more effective national regulations and prevention
strategies, an increase in regional awareness-building workshops and training
activities, and stepped-up attention and action under the auspices of
UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons, the EU and within the framework of the 2006 UN
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. In addition, laboratory and institutional
bio-safety and bio-security practices receive greater and greater
attention. Nevertheless, the authors reach the realistic conclusion that realizing ‘absolute security’ is not possible, and significant concerns and uncertainties about chemical and biological threats will persist.
Chapter 11 examines developments in conventional arms control and discusses
the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the CFE Treaty, conventional
arms control in the Western Balkans and confidence building among the
participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE). The chapter paints a mixed picture for institutions and
agreements that attempt to reduce threats from conventional arms.
On the one hand, 2008 saw some important breakthroughs, the most
significant being the successful negotiation of the CCM, a legally binding
instrument to prohibit the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster
munitions, which was signed by 94 countries in December 2008. On the
other hand, the situation for European conventional arms control remained
troubled. With Russia’s decision in December 2007 to suspend its participation
in the CFE Treaty—a longstanding cornerstone of European security—
the agreement was in abeyance throughout 2008. Russia has put forward
a number of factors to justify its decision to rethink its participation
in the treaty: NATO enlargement efforts, including membership bids by
Georgia and Ukraine and invitations to join being extended to Albania and
Croatia; US plans to introduce missile defence units in the Czech Republic
and Poland; Ukraine’s demand that Russia remove its Black Sea Fleet from
Sevastopol by 2017; and NATO’s growing ‘out of area’ activities such as
those in Afghanistan. As a result, the quality of information exchanged
among the parties has declined and the collapse of the treaty is possible.
One of the key conclusions of the chapter is that with the CFE’s continuing
erosion, and in the absence of its robust regime of transparency and
verification, a growing environment of mistrust and risk could develop in
Central and Eastern Europe, akin to that in the cold war. On the other
hand, this impasse could catalyse some rethinking about security mechanisms
relevant to the new realities of European security.
Chapter 12 focuses attention on a range of other security-related transfers
and gives special attention to important developments in 2008,
including those in the principal multilateral export control regimes, the
decisions to open civil nuclear cooperation with India taken within the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), changes in military- and dual-use export
control policies in the EU, and steps taken to liberalize the trade in military
equipment and technologies among allies and other trusted partners. An
appendix includes data, information and analysis on the 27 mandatory
multilateral arms embargoes in force during 2008.
Among other key findings, the chapter details the continuing trend for
export control regimes to move away from the principle of universal application
and towards a system of ‘tailoring and targeting’ that treats individual
countries differently depending on political, security and other considerations.
The chapter also notes that the NSG’s decision to grant a
country-specific exemption to allow for civil nuclear cooperation with
India will, in turn, raise questions about the political ‘price’ that countries
would pay for proliferation activities and stimulate a new debate on the
role and value of export controls in stemming nuclear proliferation.
The 12 chapters of SIPRI Yearbook 2009 provide a comprehensive and
in-depth assessment of developments in international security, armaments
and disarmament over the past year. Broadly speaking, the contributors
describe and analyse a world facing increasingly difficult and unrelenting
security challenges from intensifying intrastate conflicts to proliferation in
weapons, and the weakening ability of international institutions to address
these challenges. Among the few bright spots in 2008, the security situation
in Iraq became steadily better—although far from stable—and most of the
international community was able to come together to ban the manufacture
and use of cluster munitions.
There are high expectations that the new administration in the USA will
succeed in its efforts to achieve progress across a number of these security
challenges. However, looking ahead, SIPRI Yearbook 2009 underscores just
what a difficult task that will be. The fragmentation of violence in weak
states of the developing world appears set to continue and carry with it
protracted suffering for vulnerable civilians and further regional instabilities. The security situation in Afghanistan is likely to worsen further
before long-hoped-for stability and development can be achieved for that
war-torn country, with the security situation in neighbouring Pakistan—
arguably a more important long-term concern for regional and global
security—also taking a turn for the worse. Russia and the USA may be able
to improve relations quickly in the coming year, including cooperation on
arms control and non-proliferation. Nonetheless, a successful NPT Review
Conference in 2010—and with it progress on disarmament and tightened
controls against would-be proliferators—seems far from certain at the time
of writing, even as a range of high-profile efforts are mobilized to assure
such progress. Attacks by non-state actors with chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons remain an ominous prospect. These and other
challenges may well be exacerbated by the effects of the world financial
crisis as key countries find it difficult to muster the necessary political and
economic will to collectively address global and regional security problems.
Chapter 1. Mass displacement caused by conflicts and one-sided violence: national and international responses
ROBERTA COHEN AND FRANCIS M. DENG
Massive displacement of people within countries and across borders has become a defining feature of the post-cold war world. It is also a major feature of human insecurity in which genocide, terrorism and egregious human rights violations wreak havoc on civilians. The underlying causes of mass displacement are conflicts over power, wealth and resource sharing. Opportunities therefore exist for both national and international authorities to address the deeper structural divisions in societies when trying to end conflict and displacement through peace processes.
The need of internally displaced persons (IDPs) for international protection was one of the factors that prompted a shift in global policy and thinking on state responsibility. Over the past two decades, a state-centred system in which sovereignty was absolute has evolved into one in which the behaviour of states towards their citizens has become a matter of international concern and scrutiny. The human rights movement has long championed the view that the rights of people transcend frontiers and that the international community must hold a government to account when it fails to meet its obligations. The deployment of more humanitarian and peacekeeping operations to protect civilians reflects this new reality as do preventive and peacebuilding efforts.
Nonetheless, concepts of sovereignty as responsibility and the responsibility to protect (R2P) remain far ahead of international willingness and capacity to enforce them. The failure of states to protect their citizens has often met with a weak international response. It is critical that the United Nations, concerned governments, regional bodies and civil society (a) assist states in developing their own capacities and (b) press for the development of the tools needed to enable the international community to take assertive action when persuasive measures fail and masses of people remain under the threat of violence and humanitarian tragedy.
Recent peace agreements have made some provisions for the return, resettlement and reintegration of those uprooted. Involving IDPs and returning refugees in discussions can avert violence, prevent continued exploitation and abuse, create greater trust and promote the recovery of local economies.
Governments must assume their responsibility towards IDPs, and the UN Peacebuilding Commission should work more actively with them to ensure secure and sustainable returns, eliminate the marginalization of different groups and address the root causes of disputes by redressing past injustices.
Roberta Cohen is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Senior Adviser to the Brookings–Bern Project on Internal Displacement, SeniorAssociate at Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of International Migration, and Senior Adviser to the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons.
Francis M. Deng (Sudan) is the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.
Chapter 2. Trends in armed conflicts: one-sided violence against civilians
In contrast to battle-related violence that may harm civilians indiscriminately, much ‘one-sided’ violence against civilians takes place in the context of armed conflicts and targets civilians directly and intentionally. Although it may be hard to establish the intent behind the violence and, sometimes, to distinguish between one-sided and indiscriminate violence, data shows that campaigns of one-sided violence have significantly increased since the early 1990s. In contrast, the number of armed conflicts declined in the same period.
The scale, motivation and type of perpetrator of massacres, terrorist attacks and other acts of one-sided violence vary in the conflicts in 2008 in Somalia, Sri Lanka, South Ossetia (Georgia) and Colombia. The cases of Somalia and Sri Lanka reaffirm the dominant pattern of one-sided violence in armed conflicts: constant, almost routine, violence against civilians that falls short of mass atrocities but is perpetrated by all armed actors, including government forces, non-state actors and others. Even when fatalities number in the low hundreds, as in the conflict over South Ossetia, a combination of indiscriminate attacks by governments with incidents of one-sided violence, especially by irregulars, may result in disproportionately large-scale displacement of civilians. Colombia, on the other hand, shows signs of a reversal of its embedded pattern of one-sided violence.
These cases illustrate that indiscriminate violence is more deadly when perpetrated by government forces. However, fatalities from one-sided violence by states have been in relative decline in the present decade, as compared to the 1990s. This trend is partly counterbalanced by:
increasing reliance in state counter-insurgency campaigns on government-aligned militia—a form of ‘outsourcing’ direct violence and abuses against civilians;
- the growing role of rebels in causing civilian fatalities through one-sided violence, including terrorist attacks, which are increasingly employed as a tactic in asymmetrical confrontation with the state.
- the fact that in the broader context of the fragmentation of violence and the diversification of armed actors—especially in weak and dysfunctional states—some of the worst violations against civilians may be committed by local power brokers, armed irregulars and criminal gangs with no explicit political agendas.
If a relative decline of one-sided violence in specific cases is not a short-term effect of mass displacement it is more likely to result from the rise of minimally functional local governance structures, often with questionable human rights record, than from the parties’ compliance with the norms of international humanitarian law.
Dr Ekaterina Stepanova (Russia) is the Leader of the SIPRI Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme.
Chapter 3. The legitimacy of peace operations
Sixty years after the launch of the first United Nations peacekeeping operation, there are concerns that peacekeeping is headed into crisis. Questions over the legitimacy of peace operations are important factors in these problems.
Perceived shortfalls in an operation’s legitimacy can seriously undermine its effectiveness. Legitimacy comprises three interlinked and mutually reinforcing elements: political consensus, legality and moral authority.
Political consensus refers to agreement, or acquiescence, among external actors and the host government that a peace operation is required and appropriate.
- A mission’s legitimacy is widely seen as determined by political consensus and international legality.
- The conduct of its personnel largely determines the moral authority of a peace operation.
The legality of the European Union (EU) Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) was seen as directly linked to Kosovo’s disputed independence. EULEX Kosovo testifies to the centrality of political consensus surrounding an operation’s legality and its legitimacy. Conversely, the experience of the EU military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) underscores how the appropriateness and execution of a mandate determine the mandate’s legitimacy, and how this can be undermined by political compromise—international or local.
The cases of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) show that the moral authority of an operation is crucial to securing local legitimacy. If an operation is perceived to lack moral authority, this may affect countries’ decisions to deploy personnel. Reluctance to provide the reinforcement requested by MONUC at the end of 2008 was probably influenced by the misconduct scandals that have surrounded the mission.
The demand for effective peacekeeping outstrips the availability of human and other resources. In 2008, 23 UN missions fell around 22 800 personnel short of authorized strength. Ensuring that missions enjoy sound political, legal and moral standing should be a priority. Legitimacy is desirable in principle and fundamental to the ability of multilateral peacekeeping to promote and secure sustainable peace.
Sharon Wiharta (Indonesia) is a Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme.
Chapter 4. Security and politics in Afghanistan: progress, problems and prospects
The debate about Afghanistan’s future takes place against a backdrop of increasingly confident insurgent attacks, slow political and economic progress and negative perceptions about the country’s prospects. Although the efforts and commitment of international organizations remain crucial for Afghanistan, their lack of coordination and strategy hampers progress and frustrates the Afghan Government and people. In 2008 there was a significant media and analytical shift towards perceiving the war as ‘unwinnable’. The long-term prospects for Afghanistan continue to look bleak.
It is encouraging that the international community, and the United States in particular, is reassessing motivations, goals and resources. The sense of international war-weariness and willingness to compromise on expectations appear strong. Despite optimism following the election of US President Barack Obama, judgement is only being temporarily suspended. The ‘new’ strategy looks very similar to old ones and much depends on how effectively the Obama Administration can apply itself over the next year or two, before individual states start to withdraw their troops.
The wavering commitment of the international community is not going unnoticed by the Afghan Government, the Afghan people and, perhaps of most concern, the insurgents. The next two or three years may well see a redefinition of ‘success’ that will enable international forces to start to pull out. A rushed declaration of Afghan Government and security force capability followed by a hasty international exit would risk leaving behind a dangerously messy political and security situation.
Regrettably, Afghanistan’s fate over the next few years still looks to be finely balanced. Progress will continue to be slow, flawed and fragile. Any number of factors, such as a political assassination, a mass-casualty incident (whether caused by the International Security Assistance Force or Afghans) or a shift in warlord allegiances, could individually or in combination quickly cause progress to unravel. Although much of the Obama Administration’s encouragingly ‘regional’ thinking on Afghanistan hinges on Pakistan, there are arguably even greater problems in that country.
Perhaps the only real guarantee for the new US strategy, based on the international community’s experience over the past seven years, is that future political, military and development efforts in and around Afghanistan will be more complex, will take longer and the results will be more fragile than the original expectations.
Tim Foxley (United Kingdom) is a Researcher with the SIPRI Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme.
Chapter 5. Military expenditure
SAM PERLO-FREEMAN, CATALINA PERDOMO, ELISABETH SKÖNS AND PETTER STÅLENHEIM
Global military expenditure in 2008 is estimated to have totalled $1464 billion. This represents an increase of 4 per cent in real terms compared to 2007, and of 45 per cent since 1999. Military expenditure comprised approximately 2.4 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008. All regions and subregions have seen significant increases since 1999, except for Western and Central Europe.
During the eight-year presidency of George W. Bush, US military expenditure increased to the highest level in real terms since World War II, mostly due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This increase has contributed to soaring budget deficits. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have been funded primarily through emergency supplemental appropriations outside the regular budgetary process and have been financed through borrowing. The use of supplemental appropriations has raised concerns about transparency and congressional oversight. These conflicts will continue to require major budgetary resources in the near future, even supposing early withdrawal of US troops from Iraq.
In Western and Central Europe spending remained fairly flat in 2008, although some recent and prospective NATO members increased military spending substantially. In Eastern Europe, Russia continued to increase spending and is maintaining plans for further increases despite severe economic problems.
Spending increased across most of Asia. China, India, South Korea and Taiwan accounted for the bulk of the increase.
Algeria’s spending increased by 18 per cent in real terms to $5.2 billion, the highest in Africa, driven by strong economic growth and a growing insurgency.
In South America, Brazil continued to increase spending as it seeks greater regional power status.
Military spending in the Middle East fell slightly in 2008, although this is probably temporary, with many countries in the region planning major arms purchases. In contrast, there was a large rise in Iraq, whose 2008 military budget was 133 per cent higher in real terms than its 2007 spending. While previously most funding for the Iraqi security forces came from the United States, this has been increasingly replaced by domestic funding. Iraq remains highly dependent on the USA for arms supplies, with numerous major orders planned.
Dr Sam Perlo-Freeman (United Kingdom) is a Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.
Catalina Perdomo (Colombia) was a Researcher with the Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme until March 2009.
Elisabeth Sköns (Sweden) is the Leader of the Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.
Petter Stålenheim (Sweden) was a Senior Researcher with the Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.
Appendix 5A. Military expenditure data, 1999–2008
PETTER STÅLENHEIM, NOEL KELLY, CATALINA PERDOMO, SAM PERLO-FREEMAN AND ELISABETH SKÖNS
Appendix 5A contains tables of military expenditure by region, country and income group, in local currency and constant dollars, and as a share of GDP for the period 1999–2008.
SIPRI military expenditure figures are based on information available in open sources, primarily supplied by governments. They represent a low estimate; the true level of military spending is certainly higher, due to omitted countries and items of spending. Nonetheless, SIPRI estimates capture the great majority of global military spending and accurately represent overall trends.
Military expenditure, by region, 2008
2008 ($ b.)
|Africa|| 20.4|| +40
|Americas|| 603|| +64
| Caribbean ||..||..
| Central America || 4.5|| +21
| North America|| 564|| +66
| South America|| 34.1||+50
|Asia and Oceania|| 206|| +52
| Central Asia|| ..|| ..
| East Asia|| 157|| +56
| Oceania|| 16.6|| +36
| South Asia|| 30.9|| +41
|Europe|| 320 || +14
| Eastern|| 43.6|| +174
| West and Central||277|| +5
|Middle East || 75.6|| +56
|World total || 1226 || +45
To allow comparison over time, the above spending figures are in US dollars at constant (2005) prices.
The top 10 military spenders, 2008
[ ] = SIPRI estimate. The spending figures are in current US dollars.
|Rank || Country || Spending ($ b.) || World share (%)
| 1 || USA || 607 || 41.5
| 2 || China ||[84.9] ||[5.8]
| 3|| France|| 65.7||4.5
| 4 || UK || 65.3 || 4.5
| 5|| Russia|| [58.6]|| [4.0]
| 6 || Germany ||46.8|| 3.2
| 7 || Japan|| 46.3|| 3.2
| 8 || Italy || 40.6 ||2.8
| 9 || Saudi Arabia|| 38.2 || 2.6
|10 || India ||30 || 2.1
| || World total|| 1464|| +45
The 10 biggest spenders in 2008 are the same as in 2007, although some rankings have changed. In particular, in 2008 China was for the first time the world’s second highest military spender and France narrowly overtook the UK.
SIPRI uses market exchange rates to convert national military expenditure figures into US dollars, as this provides the most easily measurable standard by which international comparisons of military spending can be made. An alternative would be to convert figures using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. If GDP-based PPP rates were used in the above table, Russia would move up to third place, India to fourth and Saudi Arabia to sixth, after the UK. While the USA would still be far ahead, its relative dominance would diminish.
Chapter 6. Arms production
Global arms production continued to increase in 2007. The combined arms sales of the SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing companies reached $347 billion, an increase of 11 per cent in nominal terms and 5 per cent in real terms over 2006. Since 2002 the value of the Top 100 arms sales has increased by 37 per cent in real terms.
Forty-four US companies accounted for 61 per cent of the Top 100’s arms sales in 2007, while 32 West European companies accounted for 31 per cent of the sales. Russia, Japan, Israel and India accounted for most of the rest.
Thirty companies increased their arms sales by more than 30 per cent. Most fell into one of three groups:
providers of armoured vehicles, heavily in demand by the United States and other overseas forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and especially producers of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles;
- British-owned companies that have greatly expanded their US presence through acquisitions; and
- companies providing outsourced military services, as well as some military electronics companies.
The US presidency of George W. Bush—during which US military expenditure increased sharply—was a period of continuity in the arms industry. This followed a period of rapid consolidation in the 1990s and early 2000s. Indeed, the level of concentration in the industry, as measured by the share of the Top 100 arms sales accounted for by the top five companies, has gradually declined since 2002.
The global financial crisis has yet to have an impact on major arms companies’ revenues, profits and order backlogs, which generally continued to increase in 2008. However, their share prices have fallen in line with the major stock markets. Arms companies may face reduced demand in the future if governments cut military spending in response to rising budget deficits. Russian companies have experienced particular cash-flow difficulties and are receiving government aid.
The two largest acquisitions of arms-producing companies in 2008 were the acquisition of the IT services company EDS by Hewlett-Packard for $13.9 billion, and the $5.2 billion acquisition of the US military electronics firm DRS Technologies by Finmeccanica of Italy. The latter of these was the first major acquisition of a US company by a continental European company. British companies also made numerous US acquisitions. Most major British arms companies now have a significant US presence, and several now have more assets and employees in the USA than in the UK.
Dr Sam Perlo-Freeman (United Kingdom) is a Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.
Appendix 6A. The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing companies, 2007
SAM PERLO-FREEMAN, PETTER STÅLENHEIM AND THE SIPRI ARMS INDUSTRY NETWORK
The SIPRI Top 100 ranks the largest arms-producing companies in the world (outside China) according to their arms sales. It includes data on their size and profits.The 10 largest companies in 2007 are listed below.
The 10 largest arms producing companies, 2007
Companies are US-based, unless indicated otherwise. The profit figures are from all company activities, including non-military sales.
| || Company|
| Arms sales|
| 1||Boeing|| 30 480 ||4 074
| 2||BAE Systems (UK) || 29 850|| 1 800
| 3||Lockheed Martin||29 400|| 3 033
| 4||Northrop Grumman|| 24 600|| 1 803
| 5|| General Dynamics|| 21 520|| 2 080
| 6 || Raytheon|| 19 540|| 1 474
| 7|| EADS (West Europe)||13 100|| -610
| 8||l-3 Communications ||11 240|| 756
| 9|| Finmeccanica (Italy)||9 850||713
|10|| Thales (France)||9 350||1 214
Eight companies entered the Top 100 in 2007, seven of them for the first time. The same five companies have appeared at the top of the SIPRI Top 100 since 2002, only the order has changed. The only change in the top 10 companies since 2002 has been the replacement of United Technologies by L-3 Communications. This is a symptom of the high degree of continuity that has prevailed in the structure of the Euro-Atlantic arms industry in recent years.
National or regional shares of arms sales for the SIPRI Top 100 for 2007
Figures for a country or region refer to the arms sales of Top 100 companies headquartered in that country or region, including those in its foreign subsidiaries, and thus do not reflect the sales of arms actually produced in that country or region.
| No. of|
|USA || 44|| 212.4
|Western Europe ||32 || 107.6
|Russia || 7 || 8.2
|Israel|| 3 || 5.0
|Japan || 4 || 4.8
|India || 3 || 3.7
|South Korea || 4 || 2.9
|Singapore || 1 || 1.1
|Canada || 1 || 0.6
|Australia || 1|| 0.5
|Total || 100|| 346.9
Chapter 7. International arms transfers
SIEMON T. WEZEMAN, MARK BROMLEY AND PIETER D. WEZEMAN
Since 2005 there has been an upward trend in deliveries of major conventional arms. The annual average for 2004–2008 was 21 per cent higher than for 2000–2004.
The United States and Russia remained by far the largest exporters, followed by Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Together these five countries accounted for 79 per cent of the volume of exports for 2004–2008. They have been the top five suppliers since the end of the cold war and have accounted for at least three-quarters of all exports annually.
East Asia, Europe and the Middle East continued to be the largest recipient regions for 2004–2008, each accounting for about 20 per cent of all imports. China remained the single largest recipient for the period 2004–2008, followed by India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), South Korea and Greece.
China has been a major recipient of weapons since the early 1990s and has been the largest importer for several years. Most Chinese arms imports originate from Russia. However, Russian deliveries to China dropped significantly in 2007 and 2008. China has used its access to Russian technology to develop indigenous weapons, in some cases using illegally copied Russian components. Both countries agreed in 2008 to abide by intellectual property laws specifically for military equipment.
India is seen as probably the most important single country market for weapons in the near future. A large part of Indian arms imports also originates from Russia. Based on current orders Russia will remain India’s most important supplier. However, Russian demands for increased payments for weapons on order and quality problems with delivered weapons have soured relations. Unlike China, India has the option of using other suppliers, such as France, Israel or the UK. Recently, relations with the USA have improved and two large orders for high-tech US weapons were signed in 2008.
The war between the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) demonstrates how even small deliveries of weapons and ammunition can have a major negative impact. Acquisition of a few maritime systems gave the government the ability to stop arms smuggling by the LTTE. Together with imports of stocks of ammunition this changed the military balance in favour of the government to the extent that it could decide to aim for a military solution, leading to one of the bloodiest conflicts of 2008.
Siemon T. Wezeman (Netherlands) is a Senior Fellow with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.
Mark Bromley (United Kingdom) is a Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.
Pieter D. Wezeman (Netherlands) is a Senior Researcher with the SSIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.
Appendix 7A. The suppliers and recipients of major conventional weapons
THE SIPRI ARMS TRANSFERS PROGRAMME
Appendix 7A provides data on the suppliers and recipients of major conventional weapons and the size of the international arms trade.
The five largest suppliers of major conventional weapons, 2004–2008
(share of supplier's)
|USA||31||South Korea (15%)
|Russia|| 25|| China (42%)
|Germany|| 10|| Turkey (15%)
South Africa (12%)
|France|| 8|| UAE (32%)
|UK|| 4|| USA (21%)
The five largest recipients of major conventional weapons, 2004–2008
|Recipient || Share of|
| Main supplier
(share of recipient's)
|China || 11 || Russia (92%)
|India || 7 || Russia (71%)
|UAE || 6 || USA (54%)
|South Korea || 6 || USA (73%)
|Greece || 4 || Germany (31%)
Chapter 8. World nuclear forces
SHANNON N. KILE, VITALY FEDCHENKO AND HANS M. KRISTENSEN
In January 2009, eight states possessed a total of more than 23 300 nuclear weapons, including operational warheads, spares, those in both active and inactive storage, and intact warheads scheduled for dismantlement.
The five legally recognized nuclear weapon states, as defined by the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—China, France, Russia, the USA and the UK—are all either deploying new nuclear weapon systems or have announced their intention to do so in the future. At the same time, Russia and the USA are in the process of reducing their operational nuclear forces from cold war levels as a result of the 1991 START Treaty and the 2002 SORT Treaty. Russia and the USA have also announced their intention to negotiate a new agreement that would bring about deeper reductions.
India and Pakistan, which along with Israel are de facto nuclear weapon states outside the NPT, continue to develop new missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons and are also expanding their capacities to produce fissile material. Israel appears to be waiting to assess how the situation with Iran’s nuclear programme develops. North Korea is believed to have produced enough plutonium to build a small number of nuclear warheads, although it is unclear whether it has manufactured an operational weapon.
Deployed warheads, January 2009
All estimates are approximate.
|Country || Strategic|
| Non strategic|
|USA || 2 202 || 500 || 2 702
|Russia || 2 787 || 2 047|| 4 834
|UK || 160 || - || 160
|France || 300 || -|| 300
|China || 186|| .. || 186
|India ||-|| - || 60–70
|Pakistan || - || - || 60
|Israel || - || - || 80
|Total || || || 8 392
North Korea conducted nuclear test explosions in October 2006 and May 2009. It is not publicly known whether it has built nuclear weapons.
Shannon N. Kile (USA) is a Senior Researcher and Head of the Nuclear Weapons Project of the SIPRI Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme.
Vitaly Fedchenko (Russia) is a Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme.
Hans M. Kristensen (Denmark) is Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).
Chapter 9. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation
SHANNON N. KILE
In 2008 Iran’s nuclear programme remained at the centre of international controversy. Iran continued to install gas centrifuges at its main uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz, leading the United Nations Security Council to adopt two new resolutions, 1803 and 1835, demanding that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) made efforts to investigate allegations of research and other activities that point to a possible military dimension to Iran’ nuclear programme. The resulting impasse highlighted shortcomings in the IAEA’s power to investigate suspected nuclear weaponization activities.
The year ended with a breakdown of the agreement reached in the Six-Party Talks—between China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and the United States—on a multi-phase plan under which North Korea would shut down and disable ‘for the purpose of eventual dismantlement’ its nuclear facilities in return for economic and political benefits. A dispute arose between North Korea and the USA over measures to verify North Korea’s declaration of its plutonium production programme. It centred on whether inspectors would be allowed to visit sites not included in North Korea’s declaration and to use environmental sampling and other forensic techniques. Controversy continued over US and Israeli allegations that North Korea had provided covert technical assistance to Syria for building an undeclared nuclear reactor.
Elsewhere, Russia and the USA continued preliminary talks on a new bilateral nuclear arms reduction agreement to succeed the 1991 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty) and the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT). The START Treaty, which contains the verification provisions by which the USA and Russia monitor each other’s strategic nuclear forces, is scheduled to expire in December 2009. The two sides continued to disagree over rules for limiting warhead deployments on long-range missiles and aircraft and over the status of warheads removed from operational deployment.
A resurgence of interest in nuclear disarmament continued in 2008 as leading former statesmen in the UK and Germany urged action towards creating a nuclear weapon-free world. The re-emergence of nuclear disarmament as a topic for mainstream public debate helped to spur the launching of several new initiatives by governments, some in conjunction with leading non-governmental organizations, to promote progress towards nuclear disarmament.
Shannon N. Kile (USA) is a Senior Researcher and Head of the Nuclear Weapons Project of the SIPRI Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme.
Chapter 10. Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials
JOHN HART AND PETER CLEVESTIG
In 2008 policymakers continued to broaden prevention and response measures against perceived chemical and biological warfare (CBW) threats. These threats have been addressed by overlapping initiatives and measures, including attempts to define those posed by bioterrorism and chemical terrorism.
The parties to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) held the second political and expert meetings under a 2007–10 inter-sessional programme agreed in 2006. The Second Review Conference of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was also held in 2008. For the first time the Conference of the States Parties was unable to agree a final document by consensus.
The US Government announced that a US defence establishment scientist, Bruce E. Ivins, was solely responsible for the 2001 anthrax letter attacks. He committed suicide shortly before he was to be arrested and some analysts and former colleagues expressed doubt that Ivins was responsible or had acted alone. The case highlighted the importance of microbial forensics in support of criminal investigations.
The trend towards more comprehensive international reporting and tracking of information on the activities of non-state actors, including within the framework of the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, continues. Recommendations have been made that the Financial Action Task Force shut down terrorist financing, that further port and airport security be developed and that the International Maritime Organization should develop a new mandatory long-range tracking and identification system to follow and register ships globally.
CBW prevention strategies include the establishment of effective national implementation, codes of conduct and chemical and pathogen security regulations, and awareness-raising activities. This has been reflected by an increasing number of regional activities, workshops and training activities.
The BTWC and CWC are moving closer to achieving greater universality, but some states continue to refuse to join. The increase in membership reflects the increased recent focus on establishing and implementing national legislation to prohibit CBW as a means of raising barriers against CBW terrorism. These efforts have been carried out partly under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, various action plans, European Union joint actions, government-to-government contacts, and regional workshops and seminars on effective national implementation of laws prohibiting CBW.
John Hart (United States) is a Senior Researcher and Head of the Chemical and Biological Security Project of the SIPRI Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme.
Dr Peter Clevestig (Sweden) is a Senior Researcher with the Chemical and Biological Security Project of the SIPRI Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme.
Chapter 11. Conventional arms control
ZDZISLAW LACHOWSKI AND SVENJA POST
The effort to control ‘inhumane weapons’ at the global level achieved a remarkable breakthrough in 2008. The Oslo process, which was launched in 2006 to stigmatize and effectively tackle cluster munitions, resulted in a legally binding convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Despite continued claims of the military usefulness of cluster munitions and the limited effect of the convention due to the non-participation of major users, producers and stockpilers, it is hoped that the CCM will contribute to the moral and political stigmatization of cluster munitions to such an extent that governments which are not party to the convention will be increasingly reluctant to use such weapons.
The situation in European conventional arms control in 2008 remained troubling. After Russia’s decision to ‘suspend’ its participation in the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) in December 2007, the treaty was in abeyance during 2008. The Western states’ ‘parallel actions’ proposal remained on the negotiating table, while Russia sent vague signals about a broader European security treaty. All of the CFE states parties except Russia have thus far fully implemented the treaty’s provisions but, despite goodwill on their part, the treaty’s continuing erosion risks reaching a point of no return. On the other hand, the current crisis creates an opportunity to rethink the pertinence of the CFE regime to the new realities of European security. A future conventional arms control regime, if it is to be relevant, will demand much improved security cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area, which is currently lacking.
In contrast to the plight of the CFE Treaty regime, the subregional arms control framework in the Western Balkans continued to operate smoothly. Confidence- and security-building measures in Europe are now focused on select areas, while similar initiatives elsewhere have not progressed satisfactorily. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) community strives to counter multidimensional threats, increasingly of a non-state nature. The practical assistance given to the OSCE participating states through the implementation of projects on small arms and light weapons and on stockpiles of conventional ammunition as well as the updating and streamlining of the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security are considered a key component in the improvement of security and stability in the OSCE region.
Dr Zdzislaw Lachowski (Poland) is a Senior Fellow with the SIPRI Euro-Atlantic Security Programme.
Svenja Post (Germany) was an intern with the SIPRI Euro-Atlantic Security Programme in 2008–2009.
Chapter 12. Controls on security-related international transfers
IAN ANTHONY AND SIBYLLE BAUER
States meet in various forums to discuss how to maintain effective export controls on items that may be used in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and missile delivery systems for them. The main export control regimes are:
the Australia Group (AG),
- the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
- the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and
- the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies (WA).
In 2008 the NSG modified the way in which supplier guidelines are applied to exports of controlled items to India by stepping back from its previous agreement that the application of comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards would be an objective condition of supply.
These decisions and initiatives are eveidence that export controls are gradually evolving away from a system based on clear rules for general application and towards a system in which the controls are tailored for different categories of countries. The most powerful participating states in the NSG believe that there is a political imperative to strengthen ties with India and most countries with leading nuclear industries are convinced that there are compelling economic and environmental arguments for engagement and cooperation with India.
In 2008 the European Union (EU) finally adopted an updated and strengthened version of the politically binding 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports as a legally binding common position. The decision incorporates several important changes into a set of Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment that EU member states are obliged to implement nationally. These changes to EU export control rules and procedures inside the EU in 2008 highlight the general importance of dedicating sufficient resources to implement and enforce export controls across the EU.
Several initiatives to develop simplified procedures to facilitate the movement of defence goods and articles within trusted communities have been made in recent years. The first is the development of new rules to facilitate the movement of defence goods inside the EU. The second is the attempt, so far unsuccessful, to bring into force bilateral treaties that have been signed between Australia and the USA and between the UK and the USA. These treaties require ratification in the US Senate before entry into force.
Dr Ian Anthony (UK) is SIPRI Research Coordinator and Leader of the SIPRI Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme.
Dr Sibylle Bauer (Germany) is Head of the Export Control Project of the SIPRI Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme.
Appendix 12A. Multilateral arms embargoes
PAUL HOLTOM AND NOEL KELLY
There were 27 mandatory multilateral arms embargoes in force in 2008, directed at a total of 15 targets. Twelve of the embargoes were imposed by the United Nations and 15 by the European U.
For the second year in a row, the UN Security Council did not impose any new arms embargoes. The UN arms embargo on non-governmental forces in Rwanda was lifted in 2008 and significant amendments were made to the UN arms embargoes on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iran and Somalia. The UN extended its arms embargoes on al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, Côte d’Ivoire, non-governmental forces in the DRC, Iran, Liberia, and Somalia.
Nine of the 15 EU embargoes are straightforward implementations of UN arms embargoes. The EU did not impose any new arms embargo in 2008 but it did repeal and replace its arms embargo on the DRC as a result of changes to the UN arms embargo. It also extended its arms embargoes on Côte d’Ivoire, Myanmar and Uzbekistan.
During 2008 UN arms embargoes were explicitly threatened against Georgia and Zimbabwe by at least one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. For only the second time since the end of the cold war, a permanent member vetoed a draft UN Security Council resolution proposing the imposition of an arms embargo: China and Russia both vetoed the imposition of a UN arms embargo on Zimbabwe.
Multilateral arms embargoes in force during 2008
United Nations arms embargoes
European Union arms embargoes
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated individuals and entities
Democratic Republic of the Congo (NGF)
Iran (technology related to nuclear weapon delivery systems)
Sierra Leone (NGF)
NGF = non-governmental forces.
Dr Paul Holtom (United Kingdom) is the Leader of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated individuals and entities
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Sierra Leone (NGF)
Noel Kelly (Ireland) is Research Assistant with the SIPRI Military Expenditure, Arms Production and Arms Transfers projects.
Zu weiteren Beiträgen über Rüstung und Rüstungsexport
Zurück zur Homepage