SIPRI: Weltweite Rüstungsausgaben auf Rekordhöhe, 13.06.2007 (Friedensratschlag)
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Weltweite Rüstungsausgaben auf Rekordhöhe

Das Stockholmer Friedensforschungsinstitut SIPRI legt Jahresbericht 2007 vor - Deutschland drittgrößter Waffenexporteur

Im Folgenden informieren wir zunächst in einer deutschen Zusammenfassung über die wichtigsten Ergebnisse des am 11 Juni in Stockholm vorgelegten SIPRI-Jahrbuchs 2007. Im Anschluss dokumentieren wir die Presseerklärung des SIPRI sowie Zusammenfassungen ausgewählter Kapitel aus dem Jahrbuch (englisch):

Eine Kurzfassung des gesamten Berichts (ebenfalls englisch) kann hier als pdf-Datei herunter geladen werden: SIPRI Yearbook 2007 - Chapter Summaries





SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
Published in June 2007 by Oxford University Press on behalf of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
ISBN 978–0–19–923021–1, hardback 752 pp., £85


Mehr Informationen zum SIPRI-Jahresbericht 2007



Zusammenfassung

Der von den USA ausgerufene "Krieg gegen den Terror" hat die weltweiten Rüstungsausgaben auf neue Rekordhöhen getrieben. Wie das Stockholmer Friedensforschungsinstitut SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) am 11. Juni mitteilte, wurden im Vorjahr 1.204 Mrd. US-Dollar (900 Milliarden Euro) und damit pro Kopf der Weltbevölkerung 184 Dollar (137 Euro) für militärische Zwecke ausgegeben. Das waren 3,5 Prozent mehr als 2005. In den vergangenen zehn Jahren sind die Rüstungsausgaben weltweit um 37 Prozent gestiegen. Die 15 Staaten mit den höchsten Militärausgaben stehen für 83 Prozent der gesamten Weltausgaben für Militär und Rüstung.

Das meiste Militär leisten sich die USA. Die USA gaben im Vorjahr 528,7 Mrd. Dollar (396,2 Mrd. Euro) für militärische Zwecke aus und standen damit allein für knapp die Hälfte (46 %) der weltweiten Rüstungsausgaben. Bei der Steigerung gegenüber 2005 betrug der US-Anteil mit 62 Prozent sogar mehr als die Hälfte. Dabei fallen vor allem die Kriegsausgaben für Afghanistan und Irak ins Gewicht. SIPRI errechnete, dass die USA bis zum Jahr 2016 schätzungsweise 2.267 Mrd. Dollar allein für diese beiden Kriege ausgegeben haben wird. China überholte mit 49,5 Mrd. Dollar (37,1 Mrd. Euro) erstmals Japan (43,7 Mrd. Dollar) als das Land mit dem höchsten Militäretat Asiens.

Die fünf Staaten mit den größten Rüstungausgaben

Land Militärausgaben
(US-Dollar in Mrd.)
Pro Kopf
(US-Dollar)
Anteil an
Weltausgaben
1 USA 528,7 1.756 46%
2 Großbritannien59,2 990 5%
3 Frankreich 53,1 875 5%
4 China* 49,5 37 4%
5 Japan 43,7 341 4%

* Die Angaben für China sind geschätzt.

Quelle: SIPRI Yearbook 2007 (Kurzfassung)

Die 100 größten Rüstungsunternehmen der Welt (ohne China) (SIPRI Top 100) haben ihre Waffenverkäufe von 2002 bis 2005 um 18 Prozent erhöht. 2005 verkauften die Top 100 Waffen für insgesamt 290 Mrd. US-Dollar. Unter den Top 100 dominieren die US-Firmen: Sie stellten 2005 40 Unternehmen, die 63 % der Rüstungsverkäufe der Top 100 tätigten. EU-Europa ist mit 32 Unternehmen in den Top 100 vertreten; sie realisierten 29 Prozent des Rüstungsumsatzes. Dahinter rangiert Russland mit 9 Unternehmen und 2 Prozent der Rüstungsverkäufe. Unternehmen aus Japan, Israel und Indien teilen sich den Rest von 6 Prozent der Waffenverkäufe der Top 100.

Beim internationalen Waffenhandel ermittelte SIPRI in seinem neuen Jahrbuch über Rüstung und Abrüstung einen Anstieg um 50 Prozent seit 2002. Die beiden mit Abstand größten Exporteure waren dabei erneut die USA und Russland. Beide repräsentieren jeweils rund 30 Prozent des weltweiten Waffenhandels. Die EU-Staaten zusammen genommen haben ebenfalls 30 Prozent der Waffenexporte verantwortet. Deutschland schob sich mit Rüstungsexporten von 9,2 Milliarden Dollar (6,9 Milliarden Euro) zwischen 2002 und 2006 auf den dritten Platz vor Frankreich.

Allein im Vorjahr wurden dabei aus Deutschland Rüstungsgüter für 3,9 Milliarden Dollar ausgeführt und damit mehr als doppelt so viel wie 2005 mit 1,5 Milliarden Dollar. "Die USA und die EU-Länder versorgen weiter die Nahost-Region mit gewaltigen Mengen an Waffen", sagte der zuständige SIPRI-Experte Siemon Wezeman. Unter den Top 10 der Waffeneinkäufer befinden sich fünf Länder des Nahen Ostens. China und Indien standen an der Spitze der Top 10: Sie waren 2006 die wichtigsten Käufer von Rüstungsgütern und versorgten sich vor allem aus Russland.

Die 10 größten Waffenlieferanten

Rang Land Waffenexport 2002-2006
(in Mrd. US-Dollar)
1 USA 32,1
2 Russland 30,8
3 Deutschland 9,2
4 Frankreich 8,9
5 Großbritannien 4,5
6 Niederlande 3,2
7 Italien 2,6
8 China 2,1
9 Schweden 2,0
10 Israel 1,7

Quelle: SIPRI Yearbook 2007, S. 422

Die zehn größten Importeure von konventionellen Großwaffen

Rang Land Waffenimport 2002-2006
(in Mrd. US-Dollar)
1China 14,6
2 Indien 10,2
3 Griechenland 7,2
4 Vereinigte Arabische Emirate 7,1
5 Südkorea 3,9
6 Australien 3,4
7 Israel 3,5
8 Ägypten 3,0
9 Türkei 2,9
10 Iran 2,6

Quelle: SIPRI Yearbook 2007, S. 418

Die Zahl der Kriege blieb im Vorjahr mit 17 gegenüber 2005 unverändert. Keiner dieser Kriege wurden zwischen Staaten geführt. Den heute eher "transnationalen" Charakter von Kriegen würden vor allem die Auseinandersetzungen in Afghanistan, Nahost und Somalia "überdeutlich demonstrieren", hieß es aus Stockholm. Die meisten Kriege fanden 2006 in Asien statt. Im Zehnjahreszeitraum 1997 bis 2006 aber war Afrika der Kontinent mit den meisten Kriegen.

Pst


Military spending, arms trade growing

press release, 11 June 2007

SIPRI reports that world military expenditure in 2006 was $1204 billion in current dollars, a 3.5 per cent increase since 2005. In the period 1997–2006 world military expenditure rose by 37 per cent.

The continued surge in China’s military spending—which reached an estimated $49.5 billion (in 2005 dollars)—saw it overtake Japan ($43.7 billion) to become the biggest military spender in Asia and the fourth biggest in the world in 2006. India was the third biggest spender in Asia, with $23.9 billion (in 2005 dollars). The USA spent $528.7 billion and Russia an estimated $34.7 billion (in 2005 dollars) on their military sectors in 2006.

‘It is worth asking how cost-effective military expenditure is as a way of increasing the security of human lives, if we talk about avoiding premature deaths and disability due to current dangers. For example, we know that millions of lives could be saved through basic health interventions that would cost a fraction of what the world spends on military forces every year,’ says SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme Leader Elisabeth Sköns (eskons@sipri.org).
For a copy of her study on ‘Analysing Risks to Human Lives’ in SIPRI Yearbook 2007, please contact Evamaria Loose-Weintraub (el-weintraub@sipri.org).

Almost 50 per cent more conventional weapons, by volume, were transferred internationally in 2006 than in 2002, according to data gathered by SIPRI. China and India were the largest importers of weapons. The USA and Russia were the largest weapon suppliers.

‘The USA and the European Union countries continue to supply vast quantities of arms to the Middle East, despite the knowledge that it is a highly volatile region,’ comments Siemon Wezeman (swezeman@sipri.org), SIPRI Arms Transfers Project Leader.
For a copy of the SIPRI Yearbook 2007 chapter ‘International Arms Transfers’, which includes sections on arms transfers to the Middle East and the origins of the weapons used by Hezbollah, please contact Evamaria Loose-Weintraub (el-weintraub@sipri.org).

A world of risk

In its overview of developments in the world of peace and security, armaments and disarmament during the past year, SIPRI Yearbook 2007 highlights the need for a new broad and comprehensive approach to providing human security in view of the diversity of risks to security in the world today. SIPRI staff comment on some of the issues covered:

On energy and security:
‘Seeing how energy could become a weapon or new conflicts could be caused is the obvious part: finding new ways to cooperate on the threats and hardships that will hit all humanity is tougher but ultimately more worthwhile,’ says SIPRI Director Alyson Bailes (director@sipri.org).
For a copy of the chapter ‘Energy and Security: Regional and Global Dimensions’ by Kamila Proninska in SIPRI Yearbook 2007, contact Evamaria Loose-Weintraub (el-weintraub@sipri.org)

On international terrorism and armed conflicts:
‘In the early 21st century, when most forms of armed political violence appear to be either declining or stabilizing, terrorism, in contrast, is clearly on the rise,’ says SIPRI Project Leader Ekaterina Stepanova (stepanova@sipri.org).

On democratic accountability of intelligence services:
‘Good intelligence has always been vital to security and to be good today, it needs more than ever to be impartial and professional. Controls are needed not just in case the agencies have their own agenda, but to deal with the apparently more common problem of their targets and findings being skewed for political purposes’, says SIPRI Director Alyson Bailes.
For a copy of the study on ‘Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services’ by Hans Born and Ian Leigh in SIPRI Yearbook 2007, contact SIPRI Public Affairs Coordinator Evamaria Loose-Weintraub (el-weintraub@sipri.org).

World nuclear forces
According to SIPRI’s annual inventory of world nuclear forces, the USA, Russia, France, the UK and China together held more than 26 000 nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2007. Although the total number of warheads is gradually being cut, all five countries are undertaking or planning major programmes to update their nuclear weapon arsenals.

‘The decisions taken by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council will keep nuclear weapons in their arsenals beyond 2050,’ says Ian Anthony (anthony@sipri.org), Leader of the SIPRI Nonproliferation and Export Control Project.


Chapter Summaries /Ausgewählte Kapitelzusammenfassungen (englisch)

Introduction. A world of risk

Alyson J. K. Bailes

Security analysts, commentators and policymakers have increasingly employed the language and concept of ‘risk’ in place of the more traditional, and narrower, concept of ‘threat’. Risk embraces a wide range of problems for human security and survival. Public policies that take into account the whole spectrum of risk have more chance of correctly assessing priorities. Risk-based analysis also helps to underline the fact that risks result partly from a country’s—or an individual’s—own choices.

However, for both objective and subjective reasons, it is difficult to compile and compare all the risks facing a country. All relevant attributes of risk—not just impact and probability, but also domino effects and susceptibility to human influence—need to be assessed and compared across fields as diverse as conflict, terrorism, natural disaster and economic or social vulnerability. Subjectivity adds many distortions, including those caused by the observer’s own agenda and sense of responsibility. Comparing the views on risk hierarchies of government, private business and social actors might help to offset such biases. The focus of technical models for comparing and forecasting risk should be expanded in order to cover the transnational, often global, diffusion of many major risk factors today and to assess the vulnerabilities or resilience of the world system as a whole.

It is tempting to act to pre-empt, as well as limit and eliminate, risk. In traditional warfare or power play, the costs of this and the ways to reduce possible backlash are relatively well understood. The post-cold war environment has facilitated many kinds of interventionist action (not just military) but has made the consequences harder to assess and to master—especially when confronting non-state actors. Views on targets and the legitimacy of various methods vary widely around the world. Forceful approaches such as the USA’s military ‘pre-emption’ efforts can bring a stronger backlash than anticipated from stubborn opponents, the domestic audience and world opinion. Risk may also be ‘displaced’, so that the consequences affect innocent parties or rebound on the initiator by another route. Fundamentally, it is futile to address a risk without considering how one’s own behaviour may generate or aggravate it. Thus, risk-based security analysis may actually be a useful brake on potential recklessness.

Awareness of these complications could lead to decisions simply to live with some risks and focus on resilience and recovery. It also provides an argument for intensifying multilateral cooperation to seek shared solutions to shared risks—and to share the inevitable costs of tackling them. The modern concept of a ‘risk society’ may, thus, lead back to the older vision of a ‘global society’ with common security governance.

Chapter 2. Major armed conflicts

Sara Lindberg and Neil J. Melvin

Transnationalism has been recognized as an important aspect of international relations for several decades. It has recently also become an important factor in the analysis of conflict, helping to provide explanations for and definitions of conflict that link local incidents of violence to broader social, political and economic developments in the world order. Important transnational aspects of collective armed violence are population displacement and the role of diasporas; state-based transnational conflict networks; and international terrorism and crime.

Three conflict areas that claimed international attention in 2006 and most starkly demonstrate transnational dimensions of modern conflict are Afghanistan, the Middle East and Somalia.

In Afghanistan the main transnational element of the conflict was the Taliban’s ability to operate from bases in neighbouring Pakistan—an allegation that has been contested by the Pakistani Government but is otherwise generally accepted as fact.

The conflict involving Israel, the Palestinian territories and Lebanon illustrated the greater role of regional and transnational conflict networks and the link between state and non-state actors, as both Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon received political, ideological and practical support from states such as Iran and Syria. Recognition was given to the interlinked nature of the conflicts in the Middle East by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in his call for a ‘Whole Middle East Strategy’ to resolve the problems of the region.

In Somalia violent battles and humanitarian crises caused scores of civilian casualties and led to widespread population displacement. The inability of the Transitional Federal Government to extend its control throughout the country enabled the Union of Islamic Courts to broaden its influence, at first challenged only by US-supported Mogadishu warlords. Devoid of any state authority to impose internal order and to counter destructive external influences, Somalia provided a base where transnational criminal and terrorist interests could intersect. The international Somali diaspora continues to affect the conflict in various ways, and large Somali refugee populations outside the country may also be a destabilizing factor.

A growing awareness of the transnational character of security issues in 2006, the urgent need to counter the negative aspects of this phenomenon and the potential for making positive use of transnational actors and influences to promote conflict resolution and peacebuilding all suggest that, in the future, finding ways to address transnational aspects of conflict will be high on the international policy agenda.

Chapter 8. Military expenditure

Petter Stålenheim, Catalina Perdomo and Elisabeth Sköns

World military expenditure in 2006 is estimated to have reached $1204 billion in current dollars. This represents a 3.5 per cent increase in real terms since 2005 and a 37 per cent increase over the 10-year period since 1997. Average spending per capita increased from $173 in 2005 to $184.

World military expenditure is extremely unevenly distributed. In 2006 the 15 countries with the highest spending accounted for 83 per cent of the world total.

The large increase in the USA’s military spending is to a great extent due to the costly military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Most of the increase resulted from supplementary allocations in addition to the regular budget. Between September 2001 and June 2006, the US Government provided a total of $432 billion in annual and supplemental appropriations under the heading ‘global war on terrorism’. This increase in US military spending has contributed to the rise in budget deficits, government debt and outlays on servicing these debts since 2001. Taking both immediate and long-term factors into account, the overall past and future costs until year 2016 to the USA for the war in Iraq have been estimated at $2267 billion.

In 2006 China’s military expenditure continued to increase rapidly, for the first time surpassing that of Japan and hence making China the biggest military spender in Asia and the fourth biggest in the world. Amid intense discussions, Japan decided, for the fifth consecutive year, to reduce its military spending in 2006 and to focus its military budget on missile defence.

In a comparison of government spending priorities between samples of countries in different per capita income groups, the ratio of military spending to social spending was found to be highest in those countries with the lowest per capita incomes. However, between 1999 and 2003, the share of military expenditure in GDP stayed at a constant level in the high- and middle-income country sample and decreased somewhat in the low-income sample. At the same time social spending as a share of GDP increased in the high- and low-income groups and remained relatively stable in middle-income countries.

Chapter 9. Arms production

Elisabeth Sköns and Eamon Surry

The arms sales of the 100 largest arms-producing companies in the world apart from China in 2005—the SIPRI Top 100—increased by 3 per cent in real terms over the arms sales of the Top 100 for 2004 and by 18 per cent over those of the Top 100 for 2002. US companies dominate the SIPRI Top 100: 40 US firms accounted for 63 per cent of the combined Top 100 arms sales of $290 billion in 2005. Some 32 West European companies accounted for another 29 per cent and 9 Russian companies for 2 per cent. Companies based in Japan, Israel and India, in descending order, accounted for most of the remaining 6 per cent of world arms sales. Four US companies, one British company and one Italian company increased their arms sales by more than $1 billion in 2005 and 11 companies increased their arms sales by more than 30 per cent. Of these, four were Russian companies and five were companies that increased their arms sales in the areas of information technology and services. Most of these sharp increases were the result of acquisitions of other companies (or parts of other companies) rather than of organic growth.

Parts of the US arms industry have benefited substantially from the USA’s post-September 2001 policies, particularly the increased demand for new equipment generated by the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. These policies have also stimulated strong growth in government expenditure on homeland security, thereby increasing demand in the broader security industry.

A major factor behind current developments in the arms industry has been the high and rising fixed costs of advanced weapon systems. Companies use mergers and acquisitions to achieve economies of scale, but the increased concentration of production can also lead to reduced competition and thus remove incentives to keep prices down and innovation up. Government strategies to deal with this economic dilemma have included international collaboration and arms exports; using commercial technology in weapon systems; and outsourcing, privatization and partnerships with the private sector. However, most governments still cannot afford to maintain their current levels of arms procurement and have had to make choices affecting their defence policies and the structure of their arms industries. The debate in the UK in 2006 over a new defence industrial strategy provided a good illustration of the challenges confronting the European arms industry. One of the tasks of the European Defence Agency, established in 2004, is to achieve cost savings, primarily by promoting European collaboration in armaments development and production.

Chapter 10. International arms transfers

Siemon T. Wezeman, Mark Bromley, Damien Fruchart, Paul Holtom and Pieter D. Wezeman

There has been an almost 50 per cent increase in the volume of major conventional arms transfers over the past four years, reversing a downward trend after 1997. The USA and Russia were the largest suppliers in the five-year period 2002–2006, each accounting for around 30 per cent of global deliveries. Exports from European Union (EU) members to non-EU countries accounted for just over 20 per cent of global deliveries. Because of its very limited internal market, the Russian arms industry remains heavily dependent on exports—most newly produced weapons in Russia are exported—to maintain an arms industry and fund development of new weapons and technology. This limits the possibility that Russia will exercise restraint in its arms exports. The arms industries of the USA and EU members are in general far less export dependent.

China and India remained the largest arms importers in the world. Also among the top 10 importers were five Middle Eastern countries. While much media attention was given to arms deliveries to Iran, mainly from Russia, deliveries from the USA and European countries to Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were significantly larger. Especially worrisome are deliveries of long-range conventional strike systems to these states and the effects this may have on regional stability.

Because the development of large weapon systems is becoming increasingly costly, nearly all countries have become or soon will become dependent on other countries for weapons or weapon technology. This could lead to mutual dependency—as in US–Europe relations—or to one-sided dependency, as is the case for most developing countries. Some countries may be unwilling to accept dependency or be unable to access arms and technology. They may try, at high economic cost, to become autonomous in arms production or may focus on relatively cheap alternative weapons such as weapons of mass destruction, or war-fighting strategies such as terrorism and IT warfare.

The problem of controlling state supplies of weapons to rebel groups, while not new, was highlighted in 2006 by the arsenal acquired by Hezbollah from Iran and used in its war with Israel, and by serious breaches by state actors of the UN arms embargo on Somalia.

Transparency in arms transfers, which in the 1990s saw significant improvement, with more and better national export reports, has remained stagnant in the past few years.




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