Rüstungswettlauf wie in den schlimmsten Zeiten des Kalten Krieges
"Rüstungsausgaben steigen auf mehr als eine Billion Dollar" lautete die Überschrift zur Agenturmeldung von AP am 7. Juni 2005. Damit umschrieb AP eine der wichtigsten Kernaussagen und Sorgen des Stockholmer Internationalen Friedensforschungsinstituts (sipri), das an diesem Tag sein Jahrbuch 2005 der Öffentlichkeit vorstellte. dpa fand einen anderen Aspekt wichtiger und titelte: "USA treiben weltweite Rüstungsausgaben hoch". In der Tat: Die USA haben seit dem 11. September 2001 die weltweite Rüstungsspirale, die noch in den neunziger Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts leicht abwärts gerichtet gewesen war, wieder angeheizt: durch immer weiter steigende Rüstungsetas, militärische Forschungen und - nicht zuletzt - mit ihrem permanenten "Krieg gegen den Terror", dem bisher nicht nur Afghanistan und Irak zum Opfer gefallen sind, sondern der viele Regierungen dieser Welt veranlasst hat, ihrerseits die Rüstungsanstrengungen zu erhöhen.
Die Welt heute kann nicht sicher sein ohne Sicherheit für alle, doch die Ereignisse der letzten Jahre haben wenig dazu beigetragen, uns globalen Lösungen näher zu bringen.
Im Folgenden fassen wir zunächst auf Deutsch die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der Sipri-Pressekonferenz vom 7. Juni 2005 zusammen und dokumentieren anschließend im englischen Original:
Today’s world cannot be secure without security for all, yet the events of the past few years have done little to bring global solutions closer.
Alyson J. K. Bailes, Direktorin des Sipri
Zusammenfassung wichtiger Ergebnisse aus dem Sipri-Jahrbuch 2005
Quelle: AP, dpa, Netzeitung, alle vom 7. Juni 2005
Die weltweiten Rüstungsausgaben sind im vergangenen Jahr auf mehr als eine Billion Dollar gestiegen und haben damit fast wieder das Rekordniveau aus dem Kalten Krieg erreicht. Knapp die Hälfte davon machten mit 47 Prozent die Ausgaben der Vereinigten Staaten aus, wie das Stockholmer Institut für Friedensforschung (SIPRI) am 7. Juni 2005 in seinem neuen Jahrbuch erklärte. In den USA seien die Kosten für den Krieg gegen den Terrorismus, besonders im Irak und in Afghanistan, immens gestiegen.
Zusätzlich zu seinem Budget habe das US-Verteidigungsministeriums seit 2003 etwa 238 Milliarden Dollar für den Kampf gegen Terror zur Verfügung gestellt, hieß es in dem Bericht. Allein die zusätzlichen Aufwendungen der US-Regierung für ihren "Krieg gegen den Terror" übersteigen für die Zeit 2003-2005 mit 238 Milliarden Dollar alle Militärausgaben in Afrika, Lateinamerika und Asien (unter Einschluss Chinas, aber ohne Japan) zusammen. Das SIPRI kommt zu dem Schluss, dass der Anstieg der weltweiten Rüstungsausgaben vor allem auf die Auslandseinsätze der US-Streitkräfte und weit weniger auf den Einsatz der Koalitionspartner zurückzuführen war.
In dem SIPRI-Jahrbuch heißt es weiter, die Rüstungsausgaben 2004 hätten nur etwa sechs Prozent unter dem Rekordhoch während des Kalten Krieges 1987 und 1988 gelegen. Sie betrugen 162 Dollar pro Kopf und machten 2,6 Prozent der weltweiten Wirtschaftsleistung aus. Zwischen 1995 und 2004 legten die Rüstungsausgaben um 2,4 Prozent zu.
Die britische Sipri-Direktorin Alyson J. K. Bailes sagte zur sicherheitspolitischen Entwicklung 2004: "Das vergangene Jahr hat nach der Dominanz des Themas Irak 2003 eine eher verwirrende Lage gebracht." Die USA hätten eine in jeder Beziehung klare Vormachtstellung, im Irak ohne institutionelle Unterstützung aber nur Begrenztes erreicht. "Jetzt leidet man als Folge unter den gewaltigen Kosten", sagte Bailes.
Drastisch zugenommen hat dem Bericht zufolge der Waffenhandel. Die 100 größten Waffenhersteller hätten ihren Umsatz zwischen 2002 und 2003 um rund 25 Prozent gesteigert und vor zwei Jahren weltweit Waffen im Wert von 236 Milliarden Dollar verkauft. 63 Prozent der Geschäfte gingen demnach auf das Konto der USA. Als wichtigen Trend des vergangenen Jahres nannte Sipri die zunehmende Spezialisierung großer Unternehmen, Die sei Folge der Privatisierung bzw. Auslagerung von bisher staatlichen Militäraktivitäten.
Im Internationalen Waffengeschäft liegt indessen Russland noch vor den USA. Russland exportiert Rüstungsgüter im Wert von 6,2 Milliarden Dollar, die USA brachten es auf 5,4 Milliarden Dollar. Deutschland war viertgrößter Rüstungsexporteur der Welt mit 1,1 Milliarden Dollar. Auch wenn man die letzten fünf Jahre (2000 bis 2004) zusammen nimmt, behält Deutschland Platz vier in der Ranglisten der weltgrößten Rüstungsexporteure:
Die größten Rüstungsexporteure 2000 bis 2004
(in Mrd. US-Dollar)
Quelle: Frankfurter Rundschau, 8. Juni 2005)
SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
Oxford University Press 2005, ISBN 0-19-928401-6 and 978-0-19-928401-6; c. 840 pages, £80.00
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - sipri im Internet: http://www.sipri.org
Security and conflicts
Military spending and armaments
In 2004 it became obvious that maintaining control over Iraqi territory would require capabilities other than high-intensity warfare and more manpower than in the technology-intensive phase of the war.
- Many of the conflicts that continue to produce the greatest number of deaths, casualties and suffering are wars of long duration. Far from soliciting more attention, their long-standing and recurrent nature tend to make them less visible internationally. Although the current international emphasis on the prevention of violent conflict is a positive development, it is worth considering whether the emphasis of policy and research should be directed at addressing the resolution of the world’s longest-standing major armed conflicts.
- Much of the current discussion of peace-building is focused on the macro level. What current operational experiences appear to illustrate, however, is that peace-building fails most often at the micro level, in the content and delivery of specific security, rule-of-law, economic, social and political reforms.
- Nationally led ‘coalitions of the willing’ of the kind that undertook the military actions in Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003) pose special challenges for parliamentary oversight, since the interstate component of decision making is not carried out through an established, transparent multilateral institutional process.
- Military expenditure by states in the Middle East is high and shows a rising trend since 1996. Conventional arms races are unconstrained, but developments related to weapons of mass destruction are the ones that receive international attention.
- Since the 1980s, the introduction of a more open economic model in most states of the Latin American and Caribbean region has been accompanied by the growth of new regional structures, the dying out of interstate conflicts and a reduction in intra-state conflicts.
Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament
In the new security environment, which focuses on insecurity in the South and greater global security interdependence, there is an increasing awareness of the ineffectiveness of military means for addressing threats and challenges to security and a growing recognition of the need for global action.
- World military expenditure exceeded $1 trillion in 2004. The USA accounted for 47 per cent of this spending.
- The combined arms sales of the top 100 arms-producing companies in 2003 were 25 per cent (in current dollars) higher than in 2002.
- China is almost completely dependent on Russia for its arms imports, but its relationship is changing from a recipient of complete weapons to a recipient of components and technology to be used in Chinese weapon platforms. There are indications that China is anxious to gain access to other than Russian technology, partly because that technology is becoming outdated.
Introduction. Global security governance: a world of change and challenge
Part I. Security and conflicts, 2004
In April 2004 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, an instruction to UN member states that they must legislate nationally to introduce effective controls on nuclear, biological and chemical weapon proliferation-sensitive items. The resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, leaving open the potential use of enforcement measures by the Security Council against states failing to comply with this instruction.
- The controversies over the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programmes led to renewed interest in proposals for limiting civil uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing capabilities on a worldwide basis.
- A number of official inquiries into the handling of intelligence concerning Iraq’s weapon programmes, including how it had been interpreted or presented, published reports in 2004. The inquiries found a common theme that pre-war assessments were inaccurate and unsupported by the available evidence.
- Since Libya’s policy change it has become clear that it received considerable foreign assistance to procure sensitive nuclear materials, technologies and components as well as documentation related to nuclear weapon design. However, the relatively low technical absorption capacity of its scientific–industrial base meant that these ‘short cuts’ did not bring Libya appreciably closer to achieving a nuclear weapon capability.
- The NATO–Russia stalemate over the adapted CFE Treaty has lasted for over five years, but the second wave of NATO enlargement was accomplished despite Russia’s concerns. In Europe, the focus has shifted towards ‘soft’ measures and arrangements, such as confidence- and security-building measures for stricter control of small arms, surplus ammunition and landmines.
- International non-proliferation and disarmament assistance (INDA) is becoming a significant element of the wider anti-proliferation effort. To increase the effectiveness of this assistance, the efforts made by the G8 group of industrialized states were redesigned in 2004. Traditionally undertaken as a bilateral effort between the USA and Russia, the functional and geographic scope of INDA programmes is expected to expand in future to include projects in a wider range of countries, cover new types of sensitive material and undertake projects in new countries.
- In 2004 the EU reviewed the instruments that have been used to create an effective and modern system for controlling transfers of both conventional weapons and dual-use items. As a result of these reviews. revisions will be made to both the arms and dual-use export control systems of the EU.
- Over the years, the law of the sea has been adapted to changed priorities. Today, the general rule of flag-state jurisdiction has yielded to the universal interest of combating the slave trade, piracy and drug trafficking. In future, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may also be added to this list.
Chapter 1. Euro-Atlantic security and institutions
Chapter 2. Major armed conflicts
Chapter 3. Multilateral peace missions: challenges of peace-building
Chapter 4. Governing the use of force under international auspices: deficits in parliamentary accountability
Chapter 5. The greater Middle East
Chapter 6. Latin America and the Caribbean: security and defence in the post-cold war era
Part II. Military spending and armaments, 2004
Chapter 7. Financing security in a global context
Chapter 8. Military expenditure see SUMMARY
Chapter 9. Arms production see SUMMARY
Chapter 10. International arms transfers see SUMMARY
Part III. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, 2004
Chapter 11. Arms control and the non-proliferation process
Chapter 12. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation
Chapter 13. Chemical and biological warfare developments and arms control
Chapter 14. Libya’s renunciation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles
Chapter 15. Conventional arms control
Chapter 16. International non-proliferation and disarmament assistance
Chapter 17. Transfer controls
Chapter 18. The Proliferation Security Initiative: international law aspects of the Statement of Interdiction Principles
Annex A. Arms control and disarmament agreements
Annex B. Chronology 2004
A glossary with membership of multilateral organizations, tables, figures, data appendices and extensive documentation as well as a detailed account of the armed conflicts in 2004.
by Alyson J. K. Bailes
Today’s world cannot be secure without security for all, yet the events of the past few years have done little to bring global solutions closer. The United Nations Secretary-General was right to seek suggestions for new approaches from the High-level Panel that reported in December 2004, and right to endorse their major proposals for consideration at the 2005 UN General Assembly.
Part of the problem is that traditional means of assessing, and balancing, different actors’ power in the global system are out of date. The USA today possesses supreme power by most reckonings, but was limited in what it could achieve in Iraq without institutional backing, and is labouring under heavy costs as a result. Many other states are preferring to seek influence as well as power by pooling their resources in multilateral groupings and/or working through systems of international regulation. It would be hasty to assume that the unilateral rather than the multilateral approach to wielding power will shape the globe’s future.
Security solutions today must take account of the growing power of non-state actors: including not just terrorists, but the capacity for both good and ill of the private business sector, civil society movements, non-governmental organizations and the media. They must also tackle the challenge of a widening gap in security experience and priorities between most of the northern and most of the southern hemisphere. The greater emphasis placed recently on universal ‘transnational’ threats—as well as the growing economic clout of some ‘southern’ powers—should have underlined North–South interdependence and common interests. Sadly, many actions of the USA and other ‘northern’ powers since 2001 seem rather to have polarized attitudes further. It is, therefore, also timely that efforts should be made in 2005 to revive the UN’s ‘Millennium’ agenda, with its emphasis on universal human development and its hopes of reducing inequality.
No single principle or method of action can, in fact, tackle the full complexity of the world’s security problems. The three main methods in current use each have their strengths and weaknesses.
External intervention, which does not just take military form but includes all methods used by stronger actors to alter the internal situation of weaker ones, may have many noble motives. However, it brings unpredictable costs and risks, and places heavy responsibilities on the intervener. As the reasons or excuses for intervening multiply, the world needs more than ever an international authority and code to govern such actions, and a better system to create and deploy the optimum mixture of resources, including non-state ones, for them.
The regulatory or legislative approach to governing security-related phenomena has practical as well as normative advantages, not least in covering non-traditional actors. Present approaches, however, have yet to solve the challenges of universality, fairness and ownership, enforceability and enforcement.
Creating security through integration is a relatively new method pushed furthest in Europe. It can encompass most of the threat spectrum and cope with non-state actors, but has its own weaknesses and problems of popular legitimacy. Even so, several other regions are currently exploring it.
The UN stands at the centre of all these challenges and of debates on solving them. Properly understood, enhancing its role offers advantages to the strong as well as the weak. Yet the UN does not govern all (e.g., monetary and economic) dimensions of global action relevant to security, and the norms and goals it sets require the help of many others for fulfilment. All actors that have the power to respond to the proposals of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change have a shared responsibility to help realize them: ‘the buck stops here’.
by Elisabeth Sköns, Wuyi Omitoogun, Catalina Perdomo and Petter Stålenheim [ S u m m a r y ]
World military expenditure in 2004 is estimated to have been $975 billion at constant (2003) prices and exchange rates or $1035 billion in current dollars. This is just 6 per cent lower in real terms than at the 1987–88 peak of cold war world military spending. As a global average, 2004 world military expenditure corresponds to $162 per capita and 2.6 per cent of world GDP. However, there is a wide variation between regions and countries in the scale and economic burden of military spending. The average annual rate of increase in world military expenditure over the 10-year period 1995–2004 was 2.4 per cent in real terms. This average encompasses two distinct trends: first, the post-cold war reduction in military spending which culminated around 1998; second, an increasing trend since 1998, accelerating to an annual average increase of around 6 per cent in real terms over the three-year period 2002–2004.
The major determinant of the world trend in military expenditure is the change in the USA, which makes up 47 per cent of the world total. US military expenditure has increased rapidly during the period 2002–2004 as a result of massive budgetary allocations for the ‘global war on terrorism’, primarily for military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. These have been funded through supplementary appropriations on top of the regular budget. The supplementary appropriations for this purpose allocated to the Department of Defense for financial years 2003–2005 amounted to approximately $238 billion and exceeded the combined military spending of Africa, Latin America, Asia (except Japan but including China) and the Middle East in 2004 ($193 billion in current dollars), that is, of the entire developing world. Thus, while regular military spending has also increased in the USA as well as in several other countries and regions, the main explanation for the current level of and trend in world military spending is the spending on military operations abroad by the USA, and to a lesser extent by its coalition partners.
In 2004 there was a growing debate related to the sustainability of the current military efforts of the USA. Questions were raised about the contribution of military expenditure to the growing fiscal deficit and its future impact on economic growth. A related concern is whether military expenditure will crowd out non-military government expenditure. The debate has been exacerbated by uncertainties over future trends in expenditure for military operations in Iraq.
There is a recognition that security is a prerequisite for sustainable development, which has led to a debate concerning the different ways in which donors should support security sector reform. Some countries fear that extending the definition of official development assistance to cover security-related issues may diminish overall support for social and economic aid, and could even result in cold war-style assistance with the strategic interests of donors dictating the direction of their aid policy. Two ongoing support programmes for security activities in crisis-prone developing countries—US assistance to Colombia and British support for the security sector in Sierra Leone—are examples of emerging patterns of security assistance provided in the context of development assistance but which indirectly enhance security at home.
by Elisabeth Sköns and Eamon Surry [ S u m m a r y ]
New data from SIPRI shows that the value of the combined arms sales of the top 100 companies in the world (excluding China) in 2003 was $236 billion. The top 100 companies increased their combined arms sales in 2003 by 25 per cent in current dollars. Of these 100 companies, 38 are based in the USA and one in Canada. Together, these accounted for 63.2 per cent of arms sales by the top 100, while 42 European companies (including 6 based in Russia) accounted for another 30.5 per cent of sales.
The process of adaptation to the new security environment continues. In the USA the industry is adjusting to the new demands created by the ongoing transformation of the armed forces, the privatization of military services and the increasing importance of the homeland security sector. In Europe the emphasis is on intra-European consolidation and access to the expanding US ‘market’, that is, the US Government’s arms procurement budget.
The process of concentration in the arms industry has been slowing down since the late 1990s. While still significant, mega-mergers no longer dominate the pattern of acquisition. In 2003 six acquisitions took place with deal values exceeding $1 billion. In 2004 there was only one deal of this size: the buyout by Italian firm Finmeccanica of the British firm GKN’s 50 per cent stake in their joint venture—the helicopter company AgustaWestland—and related assets for €1.59 billion ($1.98 billion).
In the past decade the top arms-producing companies have grown enormously in size, primarily through acquisitions. They are now comparable in economic importance to many other multinational corporations and, like them, the largest arms-producing companies have sales of a magnitude that make them major economic entities, not only in their domestic environment but also globally. The value of their arms sales exceeds the GDP of most low-income countries and their total sales compare to the GDPs of medium-sized developed or industrializing countries. A comparison for the entire group of top 100 companies shows that the value of their total sales in 2003 is roughly equal to the combined national output of all 61 low-income countries in 2003.
With the increasing outsourcing of services from defence ministries and armed forces to the private sector, a growing number of the top 100 companies specialize in services. This trend is most pronounced in the USA, but exists also in West European industry.
Consolidation of the European military shipbuilding industry continued in 2004. These efforts were focused on two initiatives: to create a naval counterpart to what EADS represents in aerospace, and to consolidate and develop an industrial strategy for the British shipbuilding industry. However, little progress was made and the future structure of the European shipbuilding industry remains uncertain.
The war in Iraq has increased the share of the arms industry held by companies providing services and has reinforced the focus on new military technologies. There is only limited transparency in the contracting process for work in Iraq. What transparency there is depends on NGOs compiling information about the size and content of contracts and about the companies that are awarded them.
Company reporting on the military share of their sales is rare and incomplete, and reporting on the military share of their exports and research and development is almost nonexistent. Of the 150 companies included in a table on arms industry data transparency, only 41 can be described as having fully and completely disclosed the extent of their arms sales in a company document.
Only limited information is available on commercial arms sales worldwide. This lack of data makes it difficult to establish a firm foundation for political and public discussion of issues relating to arms production and arms sales. Pressures on companies to report their arms sales are weak and current reporting relies entirely on voluntary disclosure of information by the companies themselves. Comprehensive, regular and standardized reporting can be achieved only through internationally harmonized legal requirements for companies to report.
by Siemon T. Wezeman and Mark Bromley [ S u m m a r y ]
The trend in transfers of major conventional arms, as measured by the SIPRI trend-indicator value, is apparently changing from a downward trend since 1997 to a more or less stable trend for 2000–2002 to a slightly upward trend in 2003–2004. Financial data from national export reports show a more or less similar change. However, it is too early to judge if this is really a trend or only a matter of annual fluctuations.
Russia established itself as the main supplier of major conventional weapons for the five-year period 2000–2004, replacing the USA which was the main supplier for many years. However, even Russian officials expect a decline in Russian sales in the near future since Russian equipment is mainly based on old technology and Russian military research and development is lagging far behind. Together, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the USA made up 81 per cent of all deliveries in 2000–2004. The combined deliveries of all 25 EU states to non-EU states made up some 19 per cent of all deliveries in 2000–2004, making the EU the third largest exporter.
China and India were the two main recipients of major conventional weapons in 2004. China is almost completely dependent on Russia for its arms imports, but its relationship is changing from a recipient of complete weapons to a recipient of components and technology to be used in Chinese weapon platforms. There are indications that China is anxious to gain access to other than Russian technology, partly because that technology is becoming outdated. India is also a major Russian client, but here Russia faces strong competition from France, the UK and other European suppliers, as well as from Israel and most recently from the USA.
EU–US relations became strained in 2004 over the issue of technology transfers. The USA has been reluctant to share technology with close European allies even in joint ventures such as the F-35 JSF combat aircraft.
The EU’s plans to lift its arms embargo against China further strained relations. The non-binding and loosely drafted embargo was established in 1989 in reaction to Chinese human rights abuses. Today, many EU governments consider the embargo outdated and a barrier to improving Chinese–EU relations. The embargo has not stopped several European countries from supplying military technology to China, and most EU member states have argued that lifting the embargo would not mean increases in arms sales. Many EU governments feel that there should still be clear and strong limitations on the arms trade with China, either by keeping the embargo or by improving the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The USA strongly opposes lifting the embargo in order to prevent a Chinese military build-up and has threatened the EU with sanctions if the embargo is lifted.
Public transparency in arms transfers increased again slightly, mainly in the EU where several countries improved their reporting and where 10 new EU members are now obliged to report under the EU Code of Conduct. At the international level, man-portable air defence systems and light artillery were added to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.
Source: Sipri Press Release: http://yearbook2005.sipri.org
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