G8-Staaten bewaffnen Menschenrechtsverletzer / G8 Arms Exports and Human Rights Violations
amnesty international legt brisanten Bericht über Rüstungsexporte vor
Am 19. Mai wandte sich amnesty international Deutschland mit einer Erklärung an die Öffentlichkeit, in der auf die gängige Praxis hingewiesen wird, dass die G-8-Staaten, darunter auch die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, entgegen ihren Beteuerungen alle möglichen Regime in der Welt mit Waffen versorgen, die auch zur Repression gegen die eigene Bevölkerung Verwendung finden. Die Presseerklärung stützt sich auf einen umfassenden Report von ai, in dem die Exportpolitik der einzelnen Länder detailliert beschrieben wird. Wir dokumentieren neben der Presseerklärung von ai den Teil des Reports, der sich mit der deutschen Rüstungsexportpolitik befasst. Der Report selbst ist derzeit nur in englischer Sprache zu haben.
amnesty international Deutschland
G8-GIPFEL / WAFFENHANDEL
ai-Bericht: G8-Staaten bewaffnen Menschenrechtsverletzer
Entgegen ihren Beteuerungen liefern Deutschland und weitere
G-8-Staaten Waffen an Länder mit bedenklicher Menschenrechtsbilanz /
Zwei Drittel aller Waffentransfers von G-8-Staaten / Deutschland muss
sich für rechtsverbindliche Normen auf EU-Ebene einsetzen
Berlin, 19. Mai 2003 - In einem heute veröffentlichten Bericht weist
amnesty international (ai) nach, dass Waffen aus G-8-Staaten für
Menschenrechtsverletzungen in den Empfängerländern eingesetzt wurden.
Außerdem wickeln G-8-Länder Waffenlieferungen weiterhin über
"Drittländer" mit schwächeren Kontrollmechanismen ab. Auch die
Transparenz bei Exportgenehmigungen bleibt weiterhin mangelhaft, so
dass eine angemessene öffentliche Kontrolle nicht gewährleistet ist.
ai fordert die Bundesregierung auf, sich auf EU-Ebene für rechtlich
verbindliche Regelungen von Rüstungstransfers stark zu machen.
"Die G-8-Staaten haben die Verantwortung für die Verwendung von
Rüstungstransfers zu tragen, die von ihnen initiiert, genehmigt oder
geduldet werden, und sie müssen eine angemessene Kontrolle des
Endverbleibs gewährleisten", sagte Dr. Mathias John, Rüstungsexperte
der deutschen ai-Sektion. "Wenn die G-8-Staaten eine Lehre aus dem
Irak-Krieg ziehen sollten, ist es die, dass wir der internationalen
Staatengemeinschaft nicht erlauben dürfen, Waffen in Regionen zu
liefern, in denen regelmäßig Menschenrechte verletzt werden. So lange
dies geschieht, werden Täter ermutigt und können straflos agieren."
Deutschland steht weit vorne in der weltweiten "Rangliste" der
Waffenlieferanten, zwischen 1997 und 2001 kamen rund zwei Drittel der
Großwaffenexporte aus den fünf G8-Staaten USA, Russland, Frankreich,
Großbritannien und Deutschland. Neben Großwaffen genehmigt die
Bundesregierung immer noch Kleinwaffen- und Munitionsexporte sowie
sogenannte "nicht-tödliche" Waffen wie Tränengas. Tödliche Hypothek
der Vergangenheit ist die Kleinwaffenproduktion mit deutscher Lizenz
zum Beispiel in der Türkei, Pakistan, Mexiko und Saudi-Arabien.
Waffen aus Lizenzproduktion gehen an Länder, die diese nach deutschen
Rüstungsexportrichtlinien nie hätten erhalten dürfen. Unverständlich
bleibt, dass die Türkei in der jüngsten Zeit erneut Lizenzen für
Gewehrproduktion sowie eine ganze Munitionsfabrik erhielt, auch für
Nepal genehmigte die Bundesregierung den Export einer
Produktionsanlage für Munition.
Trotz ihrer Selbstverpflichtung in der EU und im Rahmen der OSZE, bei
Bedrohung der Menschenrechte oder einem möglichen Beitrag zur
internen Repression keine Waffen zu liefern, haben Deutschland und
andere G-8-Staaten bisher keine verbindlichen Rechtsnormen dazu
Den ai-Bericht "A Catalogue of Failures: G8 Arms Exports and Human
Rights Violations" finden Sie unter
Auszug aus dem ai-Bericht "A Catalogue of Failures: G8 Arms Exports and Human Rights Violations", vorgelegt am 19. Mai 2003
6.1 Arms production and trade
Despite successive German government statements that regularly assert their arms export policy is very restrictive, the reality of German
arms transfers is quite different. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) aggregated export figures between
1997 and 2001 Germany was ranked fifth of the world's largest arms suppliers, having exported major conventional arms worth US$ 4,821
German arms producing companies offer nearly the whole range of conventional weapons such as war ships, particularly conventional
submarines and the MEKO class of frigates and corvettes, Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and components, artillery and other armoured vehicles.
But German companies also supply a much wider variety of military, security, police (MSP) equipment, ranging from restraint equipment,
so-called "less lethal" tear gas and stun grenades, to communication and surveillance systems and small arms - most notably the range of
small arms designed and produced by Heckler & Koch (HK). The direct export of HK weapons and the proliferation of licensed production of
such weapons are detailed later in this report.
6.2 Arms export controls
The German arms export control system does not effectively restrain arms transfers likely to contribute to human rights violations in the
recipient countries. There is also the danger that ongoing initiatives from the arms industry may further weaken the control system with
potentially serious consequences for human rights.
German arms exports legislation consists of two laws based on Paragraph 26(230) of the German Constitution ("Grundgesetz") which states
that "arms production" and "transfers of weapons designated for warfare" are under the direct and extensive control of the German
government. The Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz (KWKG, War Weapons Control Act), introduced in 1961 covers all major weapon systems and
components, from fighter aircraft and warships, to tanks, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), artillery including semi-automatic small arms.
To export arms listed in the KWKG, an export licence from the German government is obligatory. The law prohibits any export of the listed
they might be used in an action disturbing peace,
- obligations under international law would be violated, and
- good and peaceful relations with other countries would be threatened.
The second law Außenwirtschaftsgesetz, (AWG, Foreign Trade and Payments Act) was also introduced in 1961 and deals with other
weapons, ammunition, fabrication equipment, nuclear, chemical and biological goods as well as "dual use" goods and licences. The AWG
provides for similar export restrictions as those in the KWKG, but the restrictions under the AWG are not obligatory. Transfers of goods under
the AWG, listed in the accompanying decree (Außenwirtschaftsverordnung, Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance) may be restricted. Due
to arms and technology transfers to Iraq and Libya disclosed during the Gulf War in 1991, the German legislation, especially the AWG, was
changed, adding better regulations for dual-use goods (such as chemicals or insecticide plants), and more recently, Germany adopted the
common EU regulations for controlling exports of dual-use goods.
However, until 1997 neither the KWKG nor the AWG controlled the export of police and security equipment such as "non-lethal" weapons and
electroshock and restraint equipment (stun batons, hand, leg and thumb cuffs). In April 1997 the German government passed an amendment
to the export list(231) to introduce controls on electroshock equipment as well as thumbscrews and leg shackles.
6.2.1 Export Criteria
Any company wanting to export military equipment must apply for an export licence. In most of the cases, a FRG authority "Bundesamt für
Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle, (Federal Office of Economics and Export Control - BAFA- an agency of the Federal Ministry of Economics)
makes the licensing decision. In more serious or controversial cases, mostly covered by the KWKG law, such as submarines for Taiwan or
main battle tanks for Saudi Arabia, the decision is made by the government itself (usually by an intra-governmental committee). Any decisions
on arms export licence applications are supposed to take account of the 'Political Principles' governing the Export of War Weapons and other
Military Equipment. These Political Principles were introduced in 1973, and amended in 1982 and 2000 but are not legally binding.
Following many years of campaigning by Amnesty International and other NGOs and the political change of the 1998 elections, the Social
Democratic and Green parties committed themselves to introducing a more restrictive arms export legislation incorporating a human rights
criterion for export licences. It also took another year and public pressure for the new Federal German government to adopt a new version of
the Political Principles governing arms exports. The German government has now incorporated the human rights and other criteria in the EU
Code of Conduct that must be considered for arms export licences to third countries (although not for EU, or NATO destinations), and in line
with the EU Code has also announced the publication of an annual report on arms exports to be submitted to the parliament and to the public.
6.3 Direct Exports
All planned or authorised weapon exports from Germany are considered confidential or secret. Governmental (non-commercial) transfers
such as NATO support or military/police assistance programs are also confidential but are regularly discussed by elected Members of
Parliament. However, MPs have little or no participation in decisions about arms transfers or the application of controls.
Such government secrecy and lack of transparency makes it very difficult to ensure parliamentary oversight and public accountability for the
German arms trade. German companies claim, as one has, that "Export declarations are no problem to the company - irrespective of
Germany's strict legislation - as we do not manufacture any "dual use products".(232) The company, Metallwerk Elisenhutte GmbH (MEN) is
a small arms ammunition manufacturer and its company brochure shows a world map highlighting some of its clients which it says include the
following places: Canada, USA, Latin America, Ireland, UK, France, Spain, Italy, Scandinavia, North Africa, South Africa, Pakistan, Indonesia,
Australia, New Zealand.
In 2001, the German government issued individual export licences for arms, ammunition and other military goods with a value of some 7.2
billion DM to countries all around the world including many countries with systematic, serious and widespread human rights violations. Exports
of "war weapons" alone amounted to some 718 million DM. Unfortunately, the figure for exports of "war weapons" does not include all arms,
ammunition and other MSP equipment for which the German government issued export licences. Due to this statistical gap it is impossible to
get a realistic official figure for all arms transfers from Germany.
When Amnesty International has questioned German MSP transfers to countries because of human rights concerns, the German government
answers that human rights are always "taken into account" and that arms transfers are restrictively and responsibly controlled. However, the
very limited data presented in the German governments annual reports on arms exports (233) means that it is almost impossible for Members
of Parliament or the public to assess whether human rights criteria are taken into account before arms exports are permitted. In practice, the
German government's application of arms export controls appears inconsistent.
Despite the human rights concerns raised about past arms exports, the German government continues to issue export licences for
questionable transfers such as the export of small arms components to Saudi Arabia and Mexico, and ammunition to Yemen and many other
Each year between 1999 and 2001 the German government authorised the export of equipment for the production of small calibre ammunition
to Nepal, despite the ongoing internal armed conflict and increasing human rights abuses in Nepal during this period.(234)
In 2002, the German government refused to issue an export licence for the export of H&K G36 rifles to Nepal, after Amnesty International's
German Section raised concerns about the possible impact of such a transfer on human rights in Nepal.(235)
In February 2002, Jane's Defence Weekly reported that "the Royal Nepalese Army has selected the H&K G36E 5.56mm assault rifle to fulfil a
longstanding requirement for some 65,000 weapons. The initial delivery of some 5,000 weapons is intended for this month, but German export
controls may yet block the deal. Deliveries of the full order will be phased over 10 years with the bulk obtained over the initial 2-3 year period.
All details of the contract are not yet known."(236) In 2003, Jane's Infantry Weapons reported that G36 rifles are now in service in
The German company H&K has had a long-standing licensed production arrangement with Royal Ordnance, a UK company. In 2001, the UK
government issued an export licence for the export of 6,780 assault rifles to Nepal. (238)
In the absence of meaningful transparency by the German government concerning arms export deliveries, Amnesty International has not been
able to ascertain whether these rifles were exported to Nepal directly or indirectly from Germany. However, given the serious reports of
firearms being used by the Nepalese security forces for serious human rights violations, Amnesty International is calling upon the German and
UK governments to announce a freeze on the export of such equipment to the Nepalese forces until the danger of deliberate and serious
misuse no longer exists.
6.3.1 Armoured Personnel Carriers
In addition to small arms and light weapons, Germany delivered several times other equipment to countries with a poor human rights record,
such as 105 BTR-60 APCs to Turkey in 1992 or 115 Hermelin APC in 1999 and 60 BTR-70 in 1998 to Macedonia.(239)
The German company, Thyssen Henschel has exported armoured vehicles to many countries worldwide. With upgrades, such vehicles often
remain in service for decades and in many countries are used by police forces rather than by the military. For example, Thyssen has exported
UR-416 armoured personnel carriers to at least 17 countries including: Ecuador, El Salvador, Germany, Kenya, South Korea, Morocco,
Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain (National Police), Togo, Turkey, Venezuela.(240)
The UR-416 armoured personnel carrier is still in service in Venezuela. In August 2002, nine people were injured - the majority with gunshot
wounds - in violent disturbances in Caracas, Venezuela, after the Supreme Court decided not to put on trial four military officers accused of
orchestrating an uprising against President Hugo Chávez in of the same year. Pro-Chávez protesters clashed with police outside the court,
which was protected by members of the metropolitan police and troops backed by armoured vehicles and at least one tank. Three policemen
were also reportedly wounded.(241)
6.4 Indirect Exports
Recently, the German government has authorised the Fritz Werner Company to sell equipment for the construction of a munitions plant in
Turkey.(242) Since the Turkish government has a past record of tolerating its own armed forces' human rights violations, as well as a weak
practice of controlling arms exports, this factory will vastly increase the danger of munitions falling into the hands of human rights abusers
either within Turkey or its trading partners such as Indonesia.
6.4.1 Proliferation of small arms production
The ineffectiveness of German arms export controls is illustrated by the widespread proliferation and use of German designed and made
small arms in war torn countries or by human rights violators. For example Heckler & Koch (HK) G3 rifles are used in about 50 countries
including Myanmar (Burma), Turkey and Iran, while MP5 submachine guns are used in 40 countries. Human rights violations committed by
security forces using these weapons have been documented in countries ranging from Brazil, where the military police killed 111 prisoners in
October 1992 during a prison riot at Sâo Paulo(243) to Thailand where silenced MP5 submachine guns (MP5SD) delivered from Germany were
used to execute prisoners at various times during the mid-1980s.(244)
Many H&K weapons were regularly exported directly from Germany with licences issued by the respective German government. However,
more recently, these weapons have been found in countries which had never been official recipients of German arms export licences. For
example, in Sierra Leone after the horrific abuses committed in the armed conflict, the UN reported the collection of some 940 G3 assault rifles
out of a total of 12,695 small arms and light weapons collected as of May 2000.(245) Many countries have been authorised by successive
German governments to undertake the licenced production of Heckler & Koch small arms. These counties have included Turkey (G3, MP5,
HK55), Iran (G3), Pakistan (G3, MP5), Mexico (G3) and Saudi Arabia (G3). The H&K-designed weapons that reached Sierra Leone might have
come from one of these, or might have re-sold or brokered by arms dealers operating in other countries. Whatever their route, German
weapons ended up in a country which would not have been a recipient of official German arms exports.
Such uncontrolled or under-regulated licensed production has had a serious impact on the proliferation and misuse of small arms and of
production technology. More recently Iranian produced MP5 submachine guns have been reported to be in Herat, Afghanistan.(246) A 1998
Iranian Defence Industries company brochure shows photographs of arms production machines including one clearly marked "Fritz
In 1992, a top company officer from Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) in a remarkably frank interview, claimed that "we [POF] provide
end-use certificates to Germany to cover shipments to Kuwait."(248) One reason for this "service" was perhaps because arms exports to
the Middle East were illegal under German law, and frequently aroused controversy. By going through Pakistan - a legal destination - many
German companies had found a convenient route to enter the Middle East market. Some of Germany's largest weapon manufacturers have
granted production licences to the Pakistan Ordnance Factories over the years, so sales to Pakistan barely raised eyebrows in Bonn. The
same company officer said that another variation of the EUC scheme was for German companies to negotiate the contract with a Middle East
destination, and then turn it over to POF for the actual deliveries, in essence, "selling" their contract to the Pakistanis.
6.4.2 Direct and Indirect Exports
Other German small arms companies have received government permission to directly export weapons to countries with poor human rights
records as well as to establish licenced production in other countries with weaker arms controls. For example, Mauser-Werke has licenced
SACO Defense Inc (USA) to produce the Mauser MK25 x 137mm Model E cannon for the North American market and has exported the 20mm
MK20 Rh 202 automatic cannon to the Armed forces in: Argentina, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal,
Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand and others.(249) In 2001, Carl Walther claimed to have more than 500,000 pistols in service with police and
armed forces worldwide.(250) Walther also has a co-operation agreement with Smith & Wesson (USA), with licensed production based on
the P99 pistol.
The 7.92mm MG42 and 7.62mm MG1, MG2 and MG3 machine guns, produced by Rheinmetall Industrie AG are reported to be in service with
the armed forces of Austria, Chile, Denmark, Greece, Iran, Italy, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sudan and Turkey.(251) In addition the
MG3 is made under licence in Greece, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.(252) Rheinmetall ammunition was also reportedly made under licence in
Saudi Arabia.(253) In 2002 it was reported that Diehl had tested MLRS bomblet submunitions in Slovakia and that the company had suggested
the establishment of a "a production line in Slovakia for joint procurement from this source."(254)
6.5 Security Equipment
German companies also manufacture and distribute a range of police and security equipment ranging from tear gas and stun grenades, to
electroshock weapons and restraint equipment such as leg irons and shackles.
In 2002, the UK Independent newspaper reported on a raid by US and Afghan forces on the village of Hajibirgit in Afghanistan. The report
quotes a villager who said: "the Americans were throwing stun grenades at us and smoke grenades. They were throwing dozens of them at
us and they were shouting and screaming all the time. We didn't understand their language, but there were Afghan gunmen with them too.
Afghans with blackened faces. Several began to tie up our women - our own women - and the Americans were lifting their burqas, their
covering, to look at their faces. That's when the little girl was seen running away."(255) The little girl referred to was three years old and
called Zarguna. Terrified by the use of stun grenades she ran away and fell into the village's 60ft deep well, where she drowned, her back
apparently broken during the fall. The next day the few villagers who had run away collected the stun grenades, small cylindrical green pots
with codes and names stamped on them, such as "7 BANG Delay: 1.5 secs NIC-01/06-07)". These were the stun grenades that terrified
Such stun grenades are reportedly a regular part of US Special Forces equipment and are manufactured in Germany by Nico-Pyrotechnik of
Hamburg.(256) In 1981, Nico-Pyrotechnik started the Chartered Pyrotechnic Industries Pte joint venture in Singapore together with Chartered
Industries (now known as ST Kinetics).(257) Nico-Pyrotechnik also manufactures the Tracer Impact Marker ammunition and CS/OC grenades
for the General Dynamics Armament Systems (USA) MK19 40mm Grenade Launcher which was in service during the Iraqi conflict.(258)
6.5.1 Electro-shock weapons
Since 1990, Amnesty International has documented at least 30 German companies offering electroshock equipment. Despite the introduction in
1997 of legal restrictions for the export of such equipment, several companies supply catalogues or offer electroshock weapons as well as
restraint equipment via the internet in various languages or offer their goods at so called "security fairs". In August 1998, in response to a
parliamentary inquiry, the German government reported for the first (and since then only) time some statistical data about exports covered
under number B0101 of the export list. Over the period from April to December 1997, 22 export licences worth a total of DM 167,013 (some €
80.000) were granted. Most of these licences were for the export of "electric cattle prods" or "electric pincers to stun pigs". However, in
three cases electro shock weapons for "personal protection" purposes were granted. Recipient countries included Botswana, Canada,
Czech Republic, Lithuania, Namibia, Norway, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Slovenia, South Korea, Thailand and the USA.
Abuse of persons in custody using modern electro-shock weapons has been spreading but is often difficult to detect.(259) This is what
"Muhammad" allegedly experienced in a prison in Saudi Arabia.
" For many hours they tortured me on the soles of my feet. Being hit with an electric baton not only made me vomit, but I lost control of
everything. I lost control of my bowels, my water, I just could not control anything in my body. I was left in my own vomit and urine all night.
That is how they want you to be during a torture." (260)
6.6 Arms brokering and trafficking
In Germany, Section 4a of the 1961 War Weapons Control Act(261) requires a licence for: "(1) Anyone who intends to broker a contract on
the acquisition or transfer of war weapons located outside federal territory or to show that an opportunity exists for concluding such a
contract shall require a licence; and (2) Anyone who intends to conclude a contract on the transfer of war weapons located outside federal
territory shall also require a licence."(262) However, if a German-based arms broker does not take possession of the arms and s/he is
involved outside the territory of Germany in mediating and negotiating an arms deal, then the activity falls outside current German law.
Documents found in the offices of the ousted government of the Republic of Congo showed that, between June and September 1997, an
arms broker of German nationality and a Belgian arms broker supplied millions of dollars worth of military equipment to the forces of the
beleaguered President in Brazzaville(263). The German dealer negotiated orders totalling $42.4 million, and received $27.1 million based on
finance from Congo's oil supplies(264). The German broker operated from South Africa and Namibia using companies registered in a number
of countries, including French, Belgian and UK bank accounts(265). The dealer also used a trading company in London.(266) Arms appear to
have been shipped from South Africa and Central Asia using large Ukrainian-registered Ilyushin 76 cargo aircraft that flew via airports in
Egypt and Namibia.(267) The arms were used by government forces in the civil war during which several thousands of civilians were killed
indiscriminately and over 300,000 fled into the forests to escape violence.(268)
6.7 Specific Recommendations
The government of Germany should actively promote the development of an international "Arms Trade Treaty" with provisions for arms export
control based upon respect for international law, especially international human rights and humanitarian law. The German government should
also takes steps to strengthen efforts to address the trade in small arms, light weapons and security equipment, and to prevent the use of
indiscriminate weapons [for details on these measures, see the final recommendations at the end of this report]
In addition, the German government should:
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Improve the transparency and parliamentary scrutiny of German arms exports, particularly with regard to foreign co-production or licensed
production deals. Parliament should be provided with clear, detailed, regular and comprehensive information regarding all transfers by both
private companies and government agencies. The recent "Military Equipment Export Report" of the German government is not sufficient.
- Ensure that the export control legislation covers a comprehensive list of arms particularly small arms, "non lethal weapons" such as tear gas
and stun guns, security equipment (electro shock weapons, tear gas, rubber bullets), ammunition and "dual use" technologies.
- Regulate the activities of all German-based arms brokers and shipping agents including nationals and companies who conduct an arms
brokering deal entirely outside Germany. The government should introduce a strict "Register" for all brokers and shipping agents with all arms
brokering deals being subject to the licensed approval of the government.
- Establish effective end-use monitoring systems of German-supplied arms in order to ensure that if such arms are used for serious human
rights violations this will result in the cancellation of future contracts, and the provision of spare parts and servicing to the abusing party.
- Strictly control all foreign licensed production arrangements by German companies so that German government agreements will prevent any
arms sales or exports from foreign production facilities to recipients who are likely to use such arms for serious human rights violations.
- Prohibit the production and trade of equipment whose inherent effects result in torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and prevent
the export of all other security and police equipment in cases where there is a reasonable assumption that it will be used for cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment.
- Support the adoption of the European Council Regulation concerning the trade in certain equipment and products which could be used for
capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (COM 2002 - 770).