Hans Blix fordert fordert Verbot aller Atomwaffen / Hans Blix: Outlaw nuclear weapons!
Kommission zur Zerstörung von Massenvernichtungswaffen legt Bericht vor - Kofi Annan: "Ein wichtiger Beitrag" / Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) launches a new report - Kofi Annan: "An important contribution"
Die weitere Verbreitung von Atomwaffen kann nach Überzeugung des schwedischen Experten Hans Blix letztlich nur verhindert werden, wenn alle Staaten auf Atomwaffen verzichten. "Solange auch nur ein Staat Atomwaffen hat, werden auch andere sie haben wollen", sagte der frühere Chef der UNO-Waffeninspektoren für den Irak und ehemalige IAEO-Generaldirektor am 1. Juni in New York.
Blix stellte einen 231 Seiten umfassenden Bericht einer von ihm gegründeten Kommission zur Zerstörung von Massenvernichtungswaffen vor ("Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission - WMDC). Dieser Kommission gehören neben dem Vorsitzenden Blix 13 Experten aus aller Welt an: Hans Blix (Chairman), Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Alexei G. Arbatov, Marcos de Azambuja, Alyson J.K. Bailes, Jayantha Dhanapala, Gareth Evans, Patricia Lewis, Masashi Nishihara, William J. Perry, Vasantha Raghavan, Cheikh Sylla, Prince El Hassan bin Talal, Pan, Zhenqiang (siehe deren Funktionen und Biografie am Ende der Seite: Commissioners’ biographies).
Als wichtige Schritte auf dem Weg zu einer atomwaffenfreien Welt nennt die Kommission einen "Weltabrüstungsgipfel", die Sicherung sämtlicher Atomwaffen und des gesamten atomwaffenfähigen Materials, die schrittweise Verringerung von Atomwaffen und die Verpflichtung der Atomstaaten, diese Waffen niemals als erste zu benutzen und sie nie gegen Länder ohne Atomwaffen einzusetzen.
"Die Erfindung von Massenvernichtungswaffen kann nicht rückgängig gemacht werden", heißt es in dem Bericht. "Aber diese Waffen können geächtet werden, wie das bei biologischen und chemischen Waffen bereits der Fall ist, so dass es undenkbar wird, sie zu benutzen."
(Quelle: APA/dpa, 6. Juni 2006)
Im Folgenden dokumentieren wir eine Pressemeldung der Vereinten Nationen zur Übergabe des Berichts an Kofi Annan sowie die im Anhang (Annex 1) des Berichts befindlichen "Empfehlungen" der Kommission (beides in Englisch).
Annan welcomes report urging broad steps to prevent terrorists from getting WMDs
1 June 2006 – Secretary-General Kofi Annan today welcomed a new report calling for broad steps to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) from falling into terrorist hands – ranging from outlawing them completely to convening a world summit on the issue – after receiving it from chief author Hans Blix, a former chief United Nations arms inspector for Iraq.
On receipt of the 231-page document produced by the Independent Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, which Mr. Blix chaired, a spokesman for Mr. Annan called it “an important contribution to the debate on disarmament and non-proliferation” and urged the international community “to study the report and consider its recommendations.”
Arguing that nuclear, biological and chemical arms are “the most inhumane of all weapons” capable of vast, indiscriminate and long-lasting destruction, the report points out that so long as any country has these weapons others will want them. “So long as any such weapons remain in any State’s arsenal, there is a high risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident,” the authors note, warning that “Any such use would be catastrophic.”
Stocks remain “extraordinarily and alarmingly high,” including 27,000 nuclear weapons, of which around 12,000 are still actively deployed.
While acknowledging that weapons of mass destruction “cannot be uninvented,” the report stresses that they can be outlawed, as biological and chemical weapons already have been, and their use made unthinkable. “Compliance, verification and enforcement rules can, with the requisite will, be effectively applied. And with that will, even the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is not beyond the world’s reach.”
In the face of a mounting loss of momentum in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts – as evidenced by the failure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference and the inability of the 2005 World Summit to agree on any WMD issue, the authors put forward a number of specific recommendations for action.
The report calls for disarmament and non-proliferation to be pursued through a “cooperative rule-based international order, applied and enforced through effective multilateral institutions, with the UN Security Council as the ultimate global authority.”
There is an urgent need to revive “meaningful” negotiations on reducing the danger of present arsenals, preventing proliferation, and outlawing all weapons of mass destruction once and for all, the report argues.
The report calls for convening a world summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction “to generate new momentum for concerted international action.”
In order to reduce the danger of present arsenals, the report calls for securing all weapons of mass destruction and all WMD-related material and equipment from theft or other acquisition by terrorists. Nuclear weapons must be taken off high-alert status to cut the risk of launching them by error, while there should be “deep reductions” in strategic nuclear weapons. All non-strategic nuclear weapons should be placed in centralized storage and withdrawn from foreign soil.
Other recommendations call for a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, a phase out of the production of highly enriched uranium, the adoption of ‘no-first-use’ pledges, assurances not to use atomic arms against non-nuclear-weapon States, and no development of nuclear weapons for new tasks.
The report further calls for bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force and reviving the fundamental commitments of all NPT parties, namely that the five (declared) nuclear-weapon States must negotiate towards nuclear disarmament and the non-nuclear-weapon States must refrain from developing nuclear weapons.
Ultimately, the report points to the need to outlaw all weapons of mass destruction “once and for all.”
In his preface to the report, Mr. Blix sounds a note of cautious optimism. “At the present time it seems to me that not only successes in the vital work to prevent proliferation and terrorism but also progress in two additional areas could transform the current gloom into hope,” he writes, calling for bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and negotiating a global treaty to stop the production of fissile material for weapons.
“In both these areas the United States has the decisive leverage,” he says. “If it takes the lead the world is likely to follow. If it does not take the lead, there could be more nuclear tests and new nuclear arms races.”
Mr. Blix echoed this point during a press conference held in New York today in conjunction with the report’s launch. “If there were to be ratification by governments of the CTBT including in the US where it was turned down by the Senate a number of years ago then this would change the atmosphere completely,” he said, adding that he didn’t see “any sign” of this happening at present.
“The US is opposed to a ratification but the reality is probably that if the US were to ratify then China would; if China did then India would; if India did Pakistan would; if Pakistan did then Iran would. So it would set in motion a good domino effect,” he said.
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) is established on an initiative by the late Foreign Minister of Sweden, Anna Lindh, acting on a proposal by then United Nations Under-Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala. The Swedish Government invited Dr. Blix to set up and chair the Commission.
UN News Service, www.un.org
Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons
1 All parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty need to revert to the fundamental
and balanced non-proliferation and disarmament commitments that
were made under the treaty and conﬁrmed in 1995 when the treaty was
2 All parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should implement the decision
on principles and objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament, the
decision on strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process,
and the resolution on the Middle East as a zone free of nuclear and all other
weapons of mass destruction, all adopted in 1995. They should also promote
the implementation of ‘the thirteen practical steps’ for nuclear disarmament
that were adopted in 2000.
3 To enhance the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, all
Non-Proliferation Treaty non-nuclear-weapon states parties should accept
comprehensive safeguards as strengthened by the International Atomic
Energy Agency Additional Protocol.
4 The states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should establish a standing
secretariat to handle administrative matters for the parties to the treaty.
This secretariat should organize the treaty’s Review Conferences and
their Preparatory Committee sessions. It should also organize other treatyrelated
meetings upon the request of a majority of the states parties.
5 Negotiations with North Korea should aim at a veriﬁable agreement including,
as a principal element, North Korea’s manifesting its adherence to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and accepting the 1997 Additional Protocol, as
well as revival and legal conﬁrmation of the commitments made in the
1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula:
notably, that neither North nor South Korea shall have nuclear weapons
or nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. Fuel-cycle
services should be assured through international arrangements. The agreement
should also cover biological and chemical weapons, as well as
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, thus making the Korean
peninsula a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.
6 Negotiations must be continued to induce Iran to suspend any sensitive
fuel-cycle-related activities and ratify the 1997 Additional Protocol and
resume full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency in
order to avoid an increase in tensions and to improve the outlook for the
common aim of establishing a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass
destruction. The international community and Iran should build mutual
conﬁdence through measures that should include: reliable assurance
regarding the supply of fuel-cycle services; suspending or renouncing
sensitive fuel-cycle activities for a prolonged period of time by all states in
the Middle East; assurances against attacks and subversion aiming at
regime change; and facilitation of international trade and investment.
7 The nuclear-weapon states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should
provide legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclearweapon
states parties. The states not party to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty that possess nuclear weapons should separately provide such
8 States should make active use of the IAEA as a forum for exploring various
ways to reduce proliferation risks connected with the nuclear fuel cycle,
such as proposals for an international fuel bank; internationally safeguarded
regional centres offering fuel-cycle services, including spent-fuel repositories;
and the creation of a fuel-cycle system built on the concept that a
few ‘fuel-cycle states’ will lease nuclear fuel to states that forgo enrichment
and reprocessing activities.
9 States should develop means of using low-enriched uranium in ships and
research reactors that presently require highly enriched uranium. The production
of highly enriched uranium should be phased out. States that separate
plutonium by reprocessing spent nuclear fuel should explore possibilities
for reducing that activity.
10 All states should support the international initiatives taken to advance
the global clean-out of ﬁssile material. Such support should encompass
the conversion of research reactors from highly enriched to lowenriched
uranium fuel, storing ﬁssile material at centralized and secure
locations, and returning exported nuclear materials to suppliers for
secure disposal or elimination.
11 All Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear-weapon states that have not yet
done so should ratify the protocols of the treaties creating regional
nuclear-weapon-free zones. All states in such zones should conclude
their comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA and agree
to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol.
12 All states should support continued efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as a part of the overall peace process. Steps can be taken even now. As a conﬁdencebuilding measure, all states in the region, including Iran and Israel, should for a prolonged period of time commit themselves to a veriﬁed arrangement not to have any enrichment, reprocessing or other sensitive fuel-cycle activities on their territories. Such a commitment should be coupled with reliable assurances about fuel-cycle services required for peaceful nuclear activities. Egypt, Iran and Israel should join the other states in the Middle East in ratifying the CTBT.
13 India and Pakistan should both ratify the CTBT and join those other
states with nuclear weapons that have declared a moratorium on the
production of ﬁssile material for weapons, pending the conclusion of
a treaty. They should continue to seek bilateral détente and build con-
ﬁdence through political, economic and military measures, reducing
the risk of armed conﬂict, and increasing transparency in the nuclear
and missile activities of both countries. Eventually, both states should
become members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile
Technology Control Regime, as well as parties to International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards agreements under the terms of the 1997
Preventing nuclear terrorism
14 States must prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons
or ﬁssile material. To achieve this, they must maintain fully effective
accounting and control of all stocks of ﬁssile and radioactive
material and other radiological sources on their territories. They should
ensure that there is personal legal responsibility for any acts of nuclear
terrorism or activities in support of such terrorism. They must expand
their cooperation through inter alia the sharing of information, including
intelligence on illicit nuclear commerce. They should also promote
universal adherence to the International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and to the Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and implementation of
UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
Reducing the threat and the numbers of existing nuclear weapons
15 All states possessing nuclear weapons should declare a categorical
policy of no-ﬁrst-use of such weapons. They should specify that this
covers both pre-emptive and preventive action, as well as retaliation
for attacks involving chemical, biological or conventional weapons.
16 All states possessing nuclear weapons should review their military
plans and deﬁne what is needed to maintain credible non-nuclear
security policies. States deploying their nuclear forces in triads, consisting
of submarine-launched missiles, ground-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles and long-range bombers, should abandon this
practice in order to reduce nuclear-weapon redundancy and avoid
fuelling nuclear arms races.
17 Russia and the United States should agree on reciprocal steps to take
their nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert and should create a joint
commission to facilitate this goal. They should undertake to eliminate
the launch-on-warning option from their nuclear war plans, while
implementing a controlled parallel decrease in operational readiness
of a large part of their strategic forces, through:
reducing the number of strategic submarines at sea and lowering
their technical readiness to launch while in port;
storing nuclear bombs and air-launched cruise missiles separately
from relevant air ﬁelds;
storing separately nose cones and/or warheads of most intercontinental
ballistic missiles or taking other technical measures to
reduce their readiness.
18 Russia and the United States should commence negotiations on a
new strategic arms reduction treaty aimed at reducing their deployments
of strategic forces allowed under the Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty by at least half. It should include a legally binding
commitment to irreversibly dismantle the weapons withdrawn under
the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. The new treaty should also
include transparent counting rules, schedules and procedures for
dismantling the weapons, and reciprocal measures for veriﬁcation.
19 Russia and the United States, followed by other states possessing
nuclear weapons, should publish their aggregate holdings of nuclear
weapons on active and reserve status as a baseline for future disarmament
efforts. They should also agree to include speciﬁc provisions
in future disarmament agreements relating to transparency,
irreversibility, veriﬁcation and the physical destruction of nuclear warheads.
20 All states possessing nuclear weapons must address the issue of
their continued possession of such weapons. All nuclear-weapon
states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must take steps towards
nuclear disarmament, as required by the treaty and the commitments
made in connection with the treaty’s indeﬁnite extension. Russia and
the United States should take the lead. Other states possessing
nuclear weapons should join the process, individually or in coordinated
action. While Israel, India and Pakistan are not parties to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, they, too, have a duty to contribute to the nuclear
21 Russia and the United States should proceed to implement the commitments
they made in 1991 to eliminate speciﬁc types of non-strategic
nuclear weapons, such as demolition munitions, artillery shells and
warheads for short-range ballistic missiles. They should agree to withdraw
all non-strategic nuclear weapons to central storage on national
territory, pending their eventual elimination. The two countries should
reinforce their 1991 unilateral reduction commitments by developing
arrangements to ensure veriﬁcation, transparency and irreversibility.
22 Every state that possesses nuclear weapons should make a commitment
not to deploy any nuclear weapon, of any type, on foreign soil.
23 Any state contemplating replacement or modernization of its nuclearweapon
systems must consider such action in the light of all relevant
treaty obligations and its duty to contribute to the nuclear disarmament
process. As a minimum, it must refrain from developing nuclear
weapons with new military capabilities or for new missions. It must
not adopt systems or doctrines that blur the distinction between
nuclear and conventional weapons or lower the nuclear threshold.
24 All states possessing nuclear weapons, notably Russia and the United
States, should place their excess ﬁssile material from military programmes
under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. To
facilitate the reduction of stocks of highly enriched uranium, states
possessing such stocks should sell uranium blended to enrichment
levels suitable for reactor fuel to other Non-Proliferation Treaty states
or use it for their own peaceful nuclear energy needs.
25 All states possessing nuclear weapons should adopt strict standards
for the handling of weapons-usable ﬁssile material deemed excess to
military requirements or recovered from disarmament activities, as
exempliﬁed in the US stored-weapon and spent-fuel standards.
26 The Conference on Disarmament should immediately open the delayed
negotiations for a treaty on the cut-off of production of ﬁssile material
for weapons without preconditions. Before, or at least during, these
negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament should establish a
Group of Scientiﬁc Experts to examine technical aspects of the treaty.
27 To facilitate ﬁssile material cut-off negotiations in the Conference on
Disarmament, the ﬁve Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear-weapon
states, joined by the other states possessing nuclear weapons,
should agree among themselves to cease production of ﬁssile material
for weapon purposes. They should open up their facilities for such
production to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
inspections, building on the practice of Euratom inspections in France
and the UK. These eight states should also address the issue of
veriﬁable limitations of existing stocks of weapons-usable nuclear
28 All states that have not already done so should sign and ratify the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty unconditionally and without
delay. The United States, which has not ratiﬁed the treaty, should
reconsider its position and proceed to ratify the treaty, recognizing
that its ratiﬁcation would trigger other required ratiﬁcations and be a
step towards the treaty’s entry into force. Pending entry into force, all
states with nuclear weapons should continue to refrain from nuclear
testing. Also, the 2007 conference of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty signatories should address the possibility of a provisional
entry into force of the treaty.
29 All signatories should provide ﬁnancial, political and technical support
for the continued development and operation of the veriﬁcation
regime, including the International Monitoring System, the International
Data Centre and the secretariat, so that the CTBTO is ready
to monitor and verify compliance with the treaty when it enters into
force. They should pledge to maintain their respective stations and
continue to transmit data on a national basis under all circumstances.
From regulating nuclear weapons to outlawing them
30 All states possessing nuclear weapons should commence planning
for security without nuclear weapons. They should start preparing for
the outlawing of nuclear weapons through joint practical and incremental
measures that include deﬁnitions, benchmarks and transparency
requirements for nuclear disarmament.
BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS
31 All states not yet party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
should adhere to the Convention. The states parties to the Convention
should launch a campaign to achieve universal adherence by
the time of the Seventh Review Conference, to be held in 2011.
32 To achieve universal adoption of national legislation and regulations
to implement the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention completely
and effectively, the states parties should offer technical assistance
and promote best-practice models of such legislation. As a part
of the conﬁdence-building process and to promote transparency and
harmonization, all states parties should make annual biological-
weapon-related national declarations and make them public.
33 States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
should enhance the investigatory powers of the UN Secretary-
General, ensuring that the Secretary-General’s ofﬁce can rely upon
a regularly updated roster of experts and advice from the World
Health Organization and a specialist unit, modelled on the United
Nations Monitoring, Veriﬁcation and Inspection Commission, to
assist in investigating unusual outbreaks of disease and allegations
of the use of biological weapons.
34 States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
should establish a standing secretariat to handle organizational and
administrative matters related to the treaty, such as Review Conferences
and expert meetings.
35 Governments should pursue public health surveillance to ensure
effective monitoring of unusual outbreaks of disease and develop
practical methods of coordinating international responses to any
major event that might involve bioweapons. They should strengthen
cooperation between civilian health and security-oriented authorities,
nationally, regionally and worldwide, including in the framework of the
new International Health Regulations of the World Health Organization.
Governments should also review their national biosafety and biosecurity
measures to protect health and the environment from the
release of biological and toxin materials. They should harmonize
national biosecurity standards.
36 At the Sixth Review Conference, in 2006, the states parties to the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention should reafﬁrm common
understandings reached at previous review conferences and take
action on all subjects addressed at Convention meetings since 2003.
They should also establish a work programme on additional topics
for future meetings. States parties should ensure more frequent
reassessment of the implications of scientiﬁc and technological
developments and reafﬁrm that all undertakings under Article I of the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention apply to such developments.
This Review Conference should reafﬁrm that all developments
in the life sciences fall within the scope of the Convention and
that all developments in the life sciences for hostile purposes are
prohibited by the Convention.
37 States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention must provide
adequate resources to ensure that there are no undue delays in the
agreed destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles.
38 The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and
states parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should continue
their efforts to secure universal adherence to the Convention. States
parties should fully implement the rules on trade and transfer of chemicals
that are precursors to chemical-weapon agents. They should
further develop regulations regarding the trade and transfer of chemicals
that can be used to produce chemical weapons. The Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and states parties
should continue to offer states positive incentives, including technical
assistance, to join and implement the Chemical Weapons Convention.
When providing such assistance or transferring relevant
technologies, they should consider steps to ensure safe and responsible
handling by the recipient.
39 States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should conﬁrm
that, like the use of riot control agents, the use of toxic chemical agents
for purposes of law enforcement is banned as a method of warfare.
Accordingly, each state party must declare any such agent under
40 States parties should ensure that the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons has the resources, experience and legal rights
needed to carry out challenge inspections in a timely and effective
manner, including for the taking of samples and removal of samples
41 Through their domestic laws and policies, all states should prohibit
the production, possession and use of toxic chemicals and technologies
for purposes that are banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
States should ensure security in and for chemical facilities
through legislation and agreement with industry. States should also
develop national means to monitor that security standards are met.
42 States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should use the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as a coordinating
centre in the development of global standards for a chemical
industry security culture. The Organisation should offer evaluation
and security assistance at declared sites. States parties should also
strengthen the capacity of the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons to provide practical assistance against chemical
weapons, for instance detection equipment, alarm systems and medical
WMD DELIVERY MEANS, MISSILE DEFENCES, AND WEAPONS IN SPACE
43 MTCR member states should make new efforts to better implement
and expand export controls on relevant materials and technology.
States subscribing to the Hague Code of Conduct should extend its
scope to include cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. They
should establish a multilateral data exchange centre, based on the
Russian-US initiatives for the exchange of data on missile launches
from early-warning systems. Regional and international nonproliferation
measures should include information exchanges, launch
notiﬁcation, and restrictions or bans on speciﬁc items or capabilities.
44 States should not consider the deployment or further deployment of
any kind of missile defence system without ﬁrst attempting to negotiate
the removal of missile threats. If such negotiations fail, deployments
of such systems should be accompanied by cooperative development
programmes and conﬁdence-building measures to lower the
risk of adverse effects on international peace and security, including
the risk of creating or aggravating arms races.
45 All states should renounce the deployment of weapons in outer space.
They should promote universal adherence to the Outer Space Treaty
and expand its scope through a protocol to prohibit all weapons in
space. Pending the conclusion of such a protocol, they should refrain
from activities inconsistent with its aims, including any tests against
space objects or targets on earth from a space platform. States
should adapt the international regimes and institutions for space
issues so that both military and civilian aspects can be dealt with in
the same context. States should also set up a group of experts to
develop options for monitoring and verifying various components of a
space security regime and a code of conduct, designed inter alia to
prohibit the testing or deployment of space weapons.
46 A Review Conference of the Outer Space Treaty to mark its 40th
year in force should be held in 2007. It should address the need to
strengthen the treaty and extend its scope. A Special Coordinator
should be appointed to facilitate ratiﬁcations and liaise with non-
parties about the reinforcement of the treaty-based space security
EXPORT CONTROLS, INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE, AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS
47 All states should conduct audits of their export control enforcement
agencies (customs, police, coastguard, border control and military)
to ensure that they can carry out their tasks effectively. States should
seek to establish a universal system of export controls providing harmonized
standards, enhanced transparency, and practical support
for implementation. Members of the ﬁve export control regimes should
promote a widening of their membership and improve implementation
in view of current security challenges, without impeding legitimate
trade and economic development.
48 The G8 Global Partnership should expand the geographical and
functional scope of its non-proliferation assistance. The G8 should
guarantee full funding for the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium
Production (EWGPP) programme. Potential donors should consider
how technical assistance, training, equipment and ﬁnancing could
be brought to bear to help states of all regions implement UN Security
Council Resolution 1540.
49 Companies engaged in activities relevant to weapons of mass destruction
have the ability and responsibility to help prevent the proliferation
of such weapons and an interest in demonstrating that they are fulﬁlling
that responsibility, including full compliance with national and
international obligations and public transparency. Trade associations
should promote such objectives.
50 States, international organizations and professional associations
should encourage the appropriate academic and industrial associations
to adopt and effectively implement codes of practice and codes
of conduct for science and research in weapons of mass destructionrelevant
51 Governments possessing any weapons of mass destruction should
keep their parliaments fully and currently informed of their holdings of
such weapons and their activities to reduce and eliminate them.
Parliaments should actively seek such information and recognize
their responsibility in formulating policies relevant to weapons of
mass destruction issues. Greater inter-parliamentary cooperation on
weapons of mass destruction issues is needed.
52 States should assist Non-Governmental Organizations to actively
participate in international meetings and conferences, and to inform
and campaign in the weapons of mass destruction ﬁeld. Private
foundations should substantially increase their support for such
organizations that are working to eliminate global weapons of mass
53 Organizations with security-relevant agendas should re-examine the
2002 United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
Education, and should consider ways in which they could foster and
support such education and an informed public debate. Governments
should fund student internships at multilateral institutions working on
weapons of mass destruction issues.
COMPLIANCE, VERIFICATION, ENFORCEMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
54 As the strengthened safeguards system adopted by the International
Atomic Energy Agency through the Additional Protocol should
become standard for parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, supplier
states should make acceptance of this standard by recipient parties
a condition for contracts involving nuclear items.
55 Governments should instruct their intelligence authorities to assist
international inspection agencies by providing relevant information
without compromising the independence of the inspection systems.
56 The UN Security Council should establish a small subsidiary unit that
could provide professional technical information and advice on
matters relating to weapons of mass destruction. At the request of
the Council or the Secretary-General, it should organize ad hoc
inspections and monitoring in the ﬁeld, using a roster of well-trained
inspectors that should be kept up-to-date.
57 International legal obligations regarding weapons of mass destruction
must be enforced. International enforcement action should be
taken only after credible investigation and authoritative ﬁnding of noncompliance
with legal obligations.
58 In order for the Conference on Disarmament to function, it should be
able to adopt its Programme of Work by a qualiﬁed majority of twothirds
of the members present and voting. It should also take its other
administrative and procedural decisions with the same requirements.
59 The United Nations General Assembly should convene a World
Summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of
weapons of mass destruction, to meet after thorough preparations.
This World Summit should also discuss and decide on reforms to
improve the efﬁciency and effectiveness of the UN disarmament
60 The United Nations Security Council should make greater use of its
potential to reduce and eliminate threats of weapons of mass destruction
– whether they are linked to existing arsenals, proliferation or
terrorists. It should take up for consideration any withdrawal from or
breach of an obligation not to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
Making use of its authority under the Charter to take decisions with
binding effect for all members, the Council may, inter alia:
require individual states to accept effective and comprehensive
monitoring, inspection and veriﬁcation;
- require member states to enact legislation to secure global implementation of speciﬁc rules or measures; and
- decide, as instance of last resort, on the use of economic or military enforcement measures.
Before UN reform has made the Security Council more representative
of the UN membership, it is especially important that binding decisions
should be preceded by effective consultation to ensure that they
are supported by the membership of the UN and will be accepted and
Source: WEAPONS OF TERROR. Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Ed.), Stockholm 2006, (ISBN: 91-38-22582-4), p. 188-205;
Chairman of the Commission:
Before joining the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dr Blix was Associate
Professor in International Law at Stockholm University. From 1963 to 1976 he
served as the Adviser on International Law in the Ministry. In 1976–78 he was
State Secretary for International Development Co-operation and in 1978–79
Minister for Foreign Affairs. He served as Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, from 1981 to 1997 and as Executive
Chairman of the UN Monitoring, Veriﬁcation and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC) from March 2000 to June 2003. Dr Blix has written several books
on subjects associated with international and constitutional law and international
DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR
Dr Anwar is Deputy Chair for Social Sciences and Humanities at the Indonesian
Institute of Sciences. She is also Director for Research and Program at
the Habibie Center in Jakarta and a member of the Board of Directors of the
Center for Information and Development Studies. Dr Anwar held the positions
of Assistant to the Vice-President for Global Affairs and Assistant Minister/
State Secretary for Foreign Affairs during the Habibie Administration.
Dr Anwar has worked as a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian
Studies in Singapore and as a Congressional Fellow at the US Congress in
ALEXEI G. ARBATOV
Dr Arbatov is a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences
and the Director of Center for International Security at the Institute for World
Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). He is also a member of the
Advisory Council of the Russian Foreign Minister and a Professor of the
Russian Academy on Defence and Security chaired by the President of the
Russian Federation. Dr Arbatov is an associate scholar of the Carnegie
Foundation. In 1993–2003, Dr Arbatov served as a Deputy Chairman of the
Defence Committee of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the
Russian Federation. Before taking his seat in the Duma, Dr Arbatov headed the Department on Disarmament and Security of IMEMO, an institute he had originally joined as a researcher in international relations in 1973. He is a member of the Governing Board of SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) and a member of the International Advisory Council of
Geneva Centre of Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
MARCOS DE AZAMBUJA
Ambassador de Azambuja was previously Permanent Representative of Brazil
to the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and
served as ambassador in France and Argentina. Ambassador de Azambuja
has also held the position of Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign
Relations in Brazil. He served as a member of the Tokyo Forum 1998–99
which produced the report ‘Facing Nuclear Dangers – An Action Plan for the
21st Century’, with proposals on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,
which was later submitted to the UN Secretary-General.
ALYSON J. K. BAILES
Alyson J.K. Bailes is the Director of the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI). She served for 32 years in the British diplomatic
service, many of the positions involving arms control, security policy and
defence-related matters. From 1987 until 1990 she served as Deputy Head of
Mission at the Embassy in Beijing, being actively involved in the negotiations
on Hong Kong. In 1994–1996 she was head of the FCO Security Policy
Department and in 1997–2000 Political Director of the Brussels-based
defence institution Western European Union. In 2000 she was appointed
Ambassador to Finland, a position she held until 2002 when she resigned
from the diplomatic service to take up her current position at SIPRI.
Ambassador Dhanapala was UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament
Affairs in 1998–2003 and the President of the 1995 NPT Review and
Extension Conference. Ambassador Dhanapala joined the Sri Lanka Foreign
Service in 1965 and has served in London, Beijing, Washington, DC,
and New Delhi. In 1984 he was appointed Ambassador to the United Nations
in Geneva and in 1987 left the Foreign Service to head the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). In 1992 he returned to the
Foreign Service as Additional Foreign Secretary before taking up the position
of Ambassador to the United States. He has also served as Commissioner in
UNSCOM, the Head of the Special Group visiting the Presidential Sites in
Iraq, and a member of the 1996 Canberra Commission on the Elimination of
Nuclear Weapons. Ambassador Dhanapala has published four books and
several articles and is the recipient of four honorary doctorates and several
Gareth Evans has been President and Chief Executive of the Brussels-based
International Crisis Group since January 2000. An Australian Senator and
MP from 1978 to 1999, and a Cabinet Minister for 13 years (1983–96), as
Foreign Minister (1988–96) he played prominent roles in developing the UN
peace plan for Cambodia, concluding the Chemical Weapons Convention,
founding the Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and initiating
the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. His
many publications include Cooperating for Peace (1993) and the articles
‘Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conﬂict’ (Foreign Policy, 1994) and
‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (Foreign Affairs, 2002). He served as Cochair
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
and was also a member of the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change.
Dr Lewis is Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research (UNIDIR). Formerly she was the Director of the Veriﬁcation Technology
and Information Centre (VERTIC) in London from 1989 to 1997. Dr
Lewis was appointed UK Governmental Expert to the 1990 UN study on the
role of the UN in veriﬁcation and also worked as a consultant on conventional
forces veriﬁcation with the UK Foreign Commonwealth Ofﬁce. She served as
a member of the Tokyo Forum in 1998–99 and an external reviewer for the
1996 Canberra Commission. Dr Lewis holds a BSc in physics and a PhD in
Dr Nishihara is currently Director of the Japanese Research Institute for
Peace and Security. Until March 2006, he was President of the National
Defence Academy. Prior to that he was Professor of International Relations
at the Academy. He has also served as Director of the First Research Department
of the National Institute for Defence Studies in Tokyo.
WILLIAM J. PERRY
Dr Perry was United States Secretary of Defense from February 1994 to
January 1997. Prior to that he served as Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Dr Perry is currently professor at Stanford University with joint appointment
in the School of Engineering and the Institute for International Studies, and
is co-director of the joint Harvard-Stanford Preventive Defense Project.
V. R. Raghavan is the Director of the Delhi Policy Group, and President, Centre
for Security Analysis, Chennai. A retired Lieutenant-General, Mr Raghavan is
a Council Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.
Ambassador Sylla serves as Senegal’s ambassador to Burkina Faso. He has
served as Commissioner to the UN Monitoring, Veriﬁcation and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC). Ambassador Sylla was a member of the Group of
Experts which drafted the Treaty of Pelindaba – making Africa a nuclear-
weapon-free zone and also a member of the Group of Experts to carry out the
UN Study of Nuclear Weapons in All Their Aspects.
PRINCE EL HASSAN BIN TALAL
Prince El Hassan is Chairman of the Arab Thought Forum, President of the
Club of Rome, Moderator of the World Conference for the World Intellectual
Property Organization, Founding Member, Vice-Chairman of the Foundation
for Interreligious and Intercultural Research and Dialogue. He is also
Member of the Board of Trustees of the International Crisis Group and cochair
of the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues.
Mr Pan, Zhenqiang is Vice-President of the China Foundation for International
Studies and Academic Changes. A retired Major-General of the
People’s Liberation Army, he is also former Director of the Institute of
Strategic Studies, National Defence University of China, Beijing. He is active
in the Pugwash movement.
THÉRÈSE DELPECH, Director for Strategic Affairs at the Atomic Energy
Commission, Paris, was a member of the Commission January 2004–August
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