Außenminister und hochrangige Vertreter aus zehn Ländern haben am Wochenende in Berlin zur beschleunigten weltweiten atomaren Abrüstung aufgerufen.
»Wir wollen, dass dieses noch junge Jahrzehnt ein Jahrzehnt der Abrüstung wird.« Unter dem macht es Bundesaußenminister Guido Westerwelle nicht, der am Wochenende in Berlin Amtskollegen und hochrangige Diplomaten aus fünf Kontinenten begrüßte. Die Regionen übergreifende Gruppe der »Freunde des Nichtverbreitungsvertrags« wurde im September 2010 auf Initiative Japans und Australiens ins Leben gerufen. Wie der Sprecher des Tokioter Außenministeriums, Satoru Satoh, vor Journalisten in der Hauptstadt erklärte, habe sein Land die Schrecken von Hiroshima und Nagasaki erlebt und daher ein besonderes Interesse daran, Atomwaffen global zu ächten. Die Gruppe versteht sich als Vorreiter für eine neue weltweite Abrüstungsdynamik.
Im Mai 2010 hatten sich die Signatarstaaten des Atomwaffensperrvertrages auf einen Aktionsplan geeinigt. Die Freundesgruppe hat nun vier Forderungen für eine rasche Umsetzung formuliert. Zentrales Anliegen ist nach Angaben des Auswärtigen Amtes die Aufnahme von Verhandlungen für ein Produktionsverbot von kernwaffentauglichem Material wie Plutonium und hoch angereichertes Uran. Notwendig dazu sei eine Wiederbelebung der Genfer Abrüstungskonferenz. Sollte dieser Weg nicht zum Erfolg führen, tritt die Gruppe für eine Initiative in der Vollversammlung der Vereinten Nationen ein.
Sie fordert zweitens die Ratifizierung des Nuklearen Teststoppvertrags durch weitere Staaten und sein möglichst baldiges Inkrafttreten. Drittens müssten die Atommächte für eine verbesserte Transparenz ihrer Nukleararsenale sorgen und ihre abrüstungspolitischen Anstrengungen verstärken. Und schließlich sollten weitere Partner das IAEO-Zusatzprotokoll ratifizieren. Nur so könne die Wiener Atomenergiebehörde die Einhaltung der Nichtverbreitung wirksam überwachen. Vom vorbehaltlosen Verzicht Berlins auf die »nukleare Teilhabe« der Bundesrepublik im Rahmen der NATO allerdings war nicht die Rede. Noch immer lagern US-amerikanische Atombomben in Europa und auf deutschem Boden, und würden im Ernstfall auch an Kampfjets der Bundeswehr zum Einsatz kommen – ein klarer Verstoß gegen den Atomwaffensperrvertrag.
D O K U M E N T I E R T
Im Folgenden dokumentieren wir die gemeinsame Erklärung der zehn Außenminister. Sie gipfelt in vier Vorschlägen für weitere Schritte auf dem Weg zu Abrüstung und Nichtverbreitung (siehe Ziffer 6). Es sind dies folgende Vorschläge:
Aufnahme von Verhandlungen über ein Produktionsverbot von spaltbarem Material. Nötig dazu ist eine Wiederbelebung der Genfer Abrüstungskonferenz. Sollte dieser Weg nicht zum Erfolg führen, tritt die Gruppe dann für eine Befassung der VN-Generalversammlung ein;
- Ratifizierung des Nuklearen Teststoppvertrags durch weitere Staaten und ein möglichst baldiges Inkrafttreten des Vertrags;
- verbesserte Transparenz der der Atommächte über ihre Nukleararsenale und abrüstungspolitischen Anstrengungen;
- und Ratifizierung des IAEO-Zusatzprotokolls durch weitere Partner - nur so kann die Wiener Atomenergiebehörde die Einhaltung der Nichtverbreitung wirksam überwachen. Alle Staaten der "Freundesgruppe" haben das Zusatzprotokoll bereits ratifiziert.
Berlin Statement by Foreign Ministers on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates reaffirm our joint intention to work towards achieving
nuclear disarmament and a strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime, as set out in
the joint statement adopted at our first meeting in New York on September 22, 2010. Recognizing
the danger to humanity posed by the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons and the necessity to
address increased proliferation risks, to decrease nuclear arsenals, to strengthen nuclear security and
to improve nuclear safety, we consider it urgent to reduce nuclear risks and achieve tangible
progress on the path towards a world free of nuclear weapons.
2. We base our efforts on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the
essential foundation for the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the cornerstone of the global
nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the basis for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. The consensus outcome of the NPT Review Conference 2010 sets a practical agenda with an
Action plan covering all three pillars of the Treaty, as well as the objective of a Middle East free of
nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. We are determined to promote and
support implementation of the commitments made by all NPT member states, and advocate further
progress through practical contributions and proposals.
3. We welcome and support the renewed call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only
guarantee against their use or threat of use, and consequently see the need to further reduce the
numbers of nuclear weapons as well as their role in security strategies, concepts, doctrines and
policies. We are encouraged by recent developments, in particular the entry-into-force of the USRussian
New START Treaty and the stated intention of both parties to continue the process of
reductions, stressing the need to include all categories of nuclear weapons. We strongly hope that all
other states possessing nuclear weapons will follow suit, while applying the principles of
irreversibility, verifiability and transparency to the nuclear disarmament process.
4. We recognize States parties’ right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as
embodied in the NPT. We join the international call for elevating the safety of nuclear power plants
to the highest level and strengthening nuclear safety measures worldwide in view of the recent
events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. We support the discussions which have
begun already at national and regional levels as well as at international fora and organizations, in
particular the IAEA. We welcome the invitation by IAEA Director General Amano to a Ministerial
Conference on Nuclear Safety to be held in Vienna from June 20 to 24, 2011.
5. Now is the time to revitalize and reinforce multilateral efforts, recognizing that today's global
security problems more than ever require co-operative and multilateral solutions. Many items of the
agenda laid out in the Action plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference can only be implemented
through a successful multilateral effort. For more than a decade, the multilateral disarmament
machinery has not lived up to the expectations of the international community in addressing
pressing security challenges through effective multilateral arms control and disarmament, foregoing
enormous possibilities to promote international stability, facilitate development and increase
security for all. The message from the high-level-meeting convened by the UN Secretary General on
24 September 2010 in New York is clear: the international community will not accept more time
being lost. We are united in the demand to revitalize the multilateral disarmament machinery.
6. The consensus reached last year by the NPT Review Conference on the forward-looking Action
plan proves that co-operative, multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation efforts can work if
there is the necessary political will. Our objective is to maintain the momentum of that successful
outcome and to expedite its implementation. With that purpose we have adopted the following
concrete proposals for action on key elements of the Action plan.
There is consensus among NPT member states that the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons must be stopped. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) would curb the risk of
future nuclear arms races and reduce the danger of non-state actors getting such material into their
hands. Such a treaty would complement ongoing efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear material across
the globe. It is an indispensable step on the way towards a nuclear weapon free world. We are
deeply disappointed that one year after the NPT Review Conference, which called in its Action plan
for the immediate negotiation of an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament, this has not been
implemented. While acknowledging that the security requirements of all states must be addressed in
the course of negotiations, we underline that there is no reason and no excuse for further delay.
On 26 January, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called for the establishment of
informal processes to help build confidence for an FMCT and return the CD to its program of work.
We have initiated intensive efforts to overcome the current deadlock. In Geneva, in the margins of
the CD, Australia and Japan are co-hosting a series of discussions among experts to examine
technical aspects of an FMCT in order to build momentum towards negotiations. Working in
Vienna, in an effort led by Germany, we have developed a paper on the effective verification of an
FMCT, which lists questions to be addressed by scientific experts and contains input for their
deliberations. We consider that the establishment of a group of scientific experts with the
assignment to examine technical aspects of an FMCT could facilitate and contribute to the start of
Building on those initiatives we will continue to press for the immediate commencement of
negotiations. Our preference remains to negotiate an FMCT within the CD. However, if the CD, in
its 2011 substantive session, remains unable to find agreement on launching FMCT negotiations, we
will ask the UN General Assembly, which is already seized of the matter under agenda item 162
entitled “Follow-up to the high-level meeting held on 24 September 2010: Revitalizing the work of
the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations”, to
address the issue and consider ways to proceed with the aim of beginning negotiations.
Entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is another
major objective on the multilateral agenda. We call on all States which have not yet done so to sign
and ratify the CTBT. We are encouraged by the commitment expressed by the United States and by
Indonesia to ensure ratification of the Treaty. We believe that an effective end to nuclear testing will
enhance and not weaken our national as well as global security and would significantly bolster the
global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 15 years ago the Treaty was opened for signature,
and the number of signatories and ratifications has steadily increased. We are committed to
universalizing the Treaty and to promoting its early entry-into-force. Utilizing various diplomatic
opportunities we will urge states that have not done so to sign and ratify the Treaty and promptly
complete the steps necessary to bring it into force. We are committed to support the Preparatory
Commission of the CTBT-Organization in setting up an effective monitoring and verification
system and commend the work already accomplished.
At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the nuclear weapon states committed themselves
to accelerate progress on concrete steps leading to nuclear disarmament, and to report back to NPT
member states. Additionally, as a confidence-building measure, the Conference encouraged the
nuclear weapon states to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form. We are developing
a draft of a standard reporting form which could be used by the nuclear weapon states in meeting
that commitment. We will invite the nuclear weapon states to examine our proposal at their Paris
meeting in June. It sets out our expectations regarding information that we would like to see all
states possessing nuclear weapons provide. We believe that reporting on the basis of a standardized
format, as encouraged in the Action plan adopted by the Review Conference, would build
international confidence and help to create a climate conducive to further disarmament. We consider
it essential to increase transparency and accountability in the nuclear disarmament process.
We underline that an effective non-proliferation regime is a joint security interest of all
nations. We recognize the important role of the IAEA in verifying states’ compliance with their
nuclear non-proliferation obligations. We highlight the fact that with the entry into force of the
IAEA Additional Protocols for the United Arab Emirates in December 2010 and for Mexico in
March 2011, all countries belonging to our cross-regional initiative implement Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which we regard as the necessary verification
standard. We call on all states, in line with the Action Plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, to
conclude and bring into force Additional Protocols in order to give the IAEA the additional
authority it needs credibly to deter and detect violations of non-proliferation obligations. We will
continue to advocate bilaterally and multilaterally for the universal application of the Additional
Protocol in our respective regions. We offer to share experiences and best practices in the
conclusion and implementation of the Additional Protocol with all interested parties, and are ready
to provide legal, and other, assistance.
7. We will take stock of progress on today's proposals at our next meeting in the margins of the UN
General Assembly in September. The 2012 ministerial meeting of our initiative will be hosted by
We will continue to work on other key items of the Action plan adopted by the 2010 NPT Review
Conference, as identified in our joint statement of September 22, 2010. In particular, we intend to
promote the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free-zones, on the basis of
arrangements freely arrived at among states of the region concerned, and in accordance with the
1999 Guidelines of the UN Disarmament Commission, convinced that such zones strengthen global
as well as regional peace and security, reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contribute
to the achievement of nuclear disarmament. In this respect, we underline the crucial need to promote
the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the
Middle East, in line with pending requirements for the organization in 2012 of the special
conference agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
We will also work on specific actions aimed at reinforcing states’ export control systems which play
an important non-proliferation role.
We will actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, based on our conviction
that education is a powerful tool for mobilizing further disarmament and non-proliferation efforts
globally by enhancing awareness and understanding among our citizens.
8. We are encouraged by the interest our initiative has met across regions and groupings. We are
grateful to all states who want to join our efforts and support our proposals. Only such a broad effort
will succeed in building the necessary bridges and in achieving meaningful progress towards the
mutually reinforcing objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
Berlin, 30 April 2011
Quelle: Website des Auswärtigen Amtes; www.auswaertiges-amt.de