Aufrüstung zur "Förderung des Gemeinwohls". Die Quadrennial Defense Review des Pentagon untermauert globale US-Kriegsstrategie
Von Rainer Rupp *
Vor allem müssen wir uns darüber klar sein, daß wir uns im Krieg befinden – mit diesem Satz beginnt die am 1. Februar vorgestellte Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) des Pentagon an den US-Kongreß. Bei dem Papier handelt es sich um eine alle vier Jahre zu erstellende, umfassende Überprüfung der Sicherheits- und Militärstrategie der Vereinigten Staaten und ihrer Umsetzung mit Hilfe von Rüstungsprogrammen und entsprechenden Umstrukturierungen in den Streitkräften. Vom »Change«-Faktor des US-Präsidenten Barack Obama ist in der neuen QDR außer Tünche wenig zu entdecken. Zwar wurde die aggressive Rhetorik abgeschwächt, in der Sache bleibt Washington hart. Die USA bereiten sich auch weiterhin darauf vor, weltweit Kriege zu führen und zu intervenieren.
Neben der fortdauernden Anforderung an die US-Streitkräfte, gleichzeitig zwei große konventionelle Kriege in unterschiedlichen Weltregionen führen zu können, setzt die neue Defense Review die bereits unter dem damaligen Präsidenten George W. Bush begonnene Umorientierung und Umstrukturierung fort. Diese ist darauf ausgerichtet, in einer ungenannten Zahl von »Konflikten unterhalb der Kriegsschwelle« rund um den Globus simultan zu kämpfen und zu gewinnen. Diesem weltweiten, »facettenreichen, politischen und moralischen Kampf« gegen das »Al-Qaida-Netzwerk und dessen Verbündeten« gilt die höchste Priorität. Im Klartext heißt das Niederschlagung von Aufständen und Bekämpfung von »Terroristen«, die sich gegen US-Besatzer oder deren autokratischen Marionettenregime auflehnen.
Auf dem Spiel steht für die herrschende Klasse nicht weniger als »die Stärke und der Einfluß der Weltmacht USA in dem System der Allianzen und Partnerschaften, die Washington in den letzten 60 Jahren aufgebaut hat«, wie es in der Quadrenniel Defense Review heißt. Um diesen »Einfluß«, d.h. die globale US-Dominanz zu erhalten, »muß das amerikanische Militär darauf vorbereitet sein, auch mit tödlicher Gewalt in Schlüsselregionen für Stabilität und Frieden zu sorgen, notleidenden Nationen zu helfen und das Gemeinwohl zu fördern« – wie dies offensichtlich unter großen US-amerikanischen Opfern im Irak und in Afghanistan bereits geschehen ist.
Überhaupt ist in der QDR viel von der Herstellung von »Frieden« und »Stabilität« die Rede, wobei schnell deutlich wird, daß beides als Synonym für den Erhalt der globalen Pax Americana dient. Allerdings räumt der Bericht ein, daß das globale Umfeld zu deren Durchsetzung erheblich schwieriger geworden ist; erstens, weil die USA »mit einer zunehmend komplexen und ungewissen Sicherheitslandschaft konfrontiert sind, in der sich das Tempo des Wandels ständig beschleunigt«, und zweitens, weil die »Verteilung der globalen politischen, wirtschaftlichen und militärischen Macht immer diffuser geworden ist«, wofür vor allem der Aufstieg Chinas und Indiens verantwortlich gemacht wird. In dieser neuen Welt blieben zwar die USA weiterhin der »mächtigste Akteur«, aber zugleich müßten sie stärker mit ihren wichtigsten Verbündeten zusammenarbeiten, um Frieden und Stabilität aufrechtzuerhalten.
Zur rechten Motivierung für den weiteren Kampf wird erneut das bewährte Schreckensszenario einer Al-Qaida mit Zugang zu Massenvernichtungswaffen an die Wand gemalt. Dies könne durch den »Zusammenbruch eines Atomwaffenstaates«, gemeint ist Pakistan, begünstigt werden. Die Tatsache, daß Washington im Rahmen seiner sogenannten AfPak-Politik, seiner Intervention in Afghanistan und Pakistan, als Hauptakteur die Destabilisierung dort befördert, findet in dem Pentagon-Bericht allerdings keine Erwähnung.
Weiterhin wird die Versorgungssicherheit der USA mit Energie (Öl und Gas) vom Verteidigungsministerium als strategische Priorität gesehen, wobei dieses Mal jedoch eingeräumt wird (der Obama-Faktor), daß die Förderung von »grüner« Energie zur Deckung des Bedarfs beitragen könnte. Zugleich wird jedoch »die zunehmende Nachfrage nach Ressourcen« (Öl und Rohstoffe aller Art) als einer der »mächtigen Trends« identifiziert, der in Zukunft globale Konflikte hervorrufen könnte. In diesem Zusammenhang gibt die Tatsache zu denken, daß David Shear, Staatssekretär für ostasiatische und pazifische Angelegenheiten im US-Außenministerium, jüngst vor dem Streitkräfteausschuß des Kongresses erklärt hat, die Obama-Administration habe sich in Peking beklagt, weil China rund um die Welt »mit langfristigen Verträgen Ölreserven für sich reserviert«. Zuvor hatte der republikanische Abgeordnete Roscoe Bartlett den Chinesen vorgeworfen, »rund um die Welt aggressiv Öl aufzukaufen«, und die Volksrepublik verdächtigt, es in Zukunft nicht mit den USA zu teilen.
Wie bei derlei Dokumenten der amerikanischen Regierung üblich, so trieft auch der QDR-Bericht des Pentagon von Selbstgerechtigkeit und Heuchelei. So macht sich das US-Verteidigungministerium »große Sorgen« um die Rüstungsanstrengungen anderer Länder, weil diese Washingtons »Bemühungen um den Erhalt des Friedens und der Verhinderung eines schädlichen Wettrüstens erschweren«. Dabei sind es die USA, die für fast zwei Drittel der weltweiten Rüstungsausgaben verantwortlich sind. Sie werden bei den Militärausgaben in diesem Jahr einen neuen Rekord aufstellen und auch eine neue Rekordsumme für die Modernisierung des US-Atomwaffenarsenals ausgeben, obwohl Präsident Obama überall verkündet, er wolle alle Nuklearwaffen abschaffen.
* Aus: junge Welt, 5. Februar 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review - Report. February 2010
The mission of the Department of Defense is to protect the American people and advance our
In executing these responsibilities, we must recognize that first and foremost, the United States is
a nation at war. In Afghanistan, our forces fight alongside allies and partners in renewed efforts to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In Iraq, U.S. military personnel advise,
train, and support Iraqi forces as part of a responsible transition and drawdown. Above all, the
United States and its allies and partners remain engaged in a broader war—a multifaceted
political, military and moral struggle—against Al Qaeda and its allies around the world.
Furthermore, as a global power, the strength and influence of the United States are deeply
intertwined with the fate of the broader international system—a system of alliances, partnerships,
and multinational institutions that our country has helped build and sustain for more than sixty
years. The U.S. military must therefore be prepared to support broad national goals of promoting
stability in key regions, providing assistance to nations in need, and promoting the common
With these realities in mind, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review advances two clear
objectives. First, to further rebalance the capabilities of America’s Armed Forces to prevail in
today’s wars, while building the capabilities needed to deal with future threats. Second, to further
reform the Department’s institutions and processes to better support the urgent needs of the
warfighter; buy weapons that are usable, affordable, and truly needed; and ensure that taxpayer
dollars are spent wisely and responsibly.
The strategy and initiatives described in the QDR will continue to evolve in response to the
security environment. Using the QDR as its foundation, the Department will continually
examine its approach—from objectives to capabilities and activities to resources—to ensure its
best alignment for the nation, its allies and partners, and our men and women in uniform.
A Complex Environment
The United States faces a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change
continues to accelerate. The distribution of global political, economic, and military power is
becoming more diffuse. The rise of China, the world’s most populous country, and India, the
world’s largest democracy, will continue to shape an international system that is no longer easily
defined—one in which the United States will remain the most powerful actor but must
increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace.
Globalization has transformed the process of technological innovation while lowering entry
barriers for a wider range of actors to acquire advanced technologies. As technological innovation
and global information flows accelerate, non-state actors will continue to gain influence and
capabilities that, during the past century, remained largely the purview of states.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continues to undermine global
security, further complicating efforts to sustain peace and prevent harmful arms races. The
instability or collapse of a WMD-armed state is among our most troubling concerns. Such an
occurrence could lead to rapid proliferation of WMD material, weapons, and technology, and
could quickly become a global crisis posing a direct physical threat to the United States and all
Other powerful trends are likely to add complexity to the security environment. Rising demand
for resources, rapid urbanization of littoral regions, the effects of climate change, the emergence
of new strains of disease, and profound cultural and demographic tensions in several regions are
just some of the trends whose complex interplay may spark or exacerbate future conflicts.
America’s Global Role
America’s interests are inextricably linked to the integrity and resilience of the international
system. Chief among these interests are security, prosperity, broad respect for universal values,
and an international order that promotes cooperative action.
Consistent with the President’s
vision, the United States will
advance these interests by
strengthening our domestic
foundation and integrating all
elements of national power,
engaging abroad on the basis of
mutual interest and mutual
respect, and promoting an
international order that
advances our interests by
reinforcing the rights and
responsibilities of all nations.
America’s interests and role in the world require armed forces with unmatched capabilities and a
willingness on the part of the nation to employ them in defense of our interests and the common
good. The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale
operations over extended distances. This unique position generates an obligation to be
responsible stewards of the power and influence that history, determination, and circumstance
In order to help defend and advance our national interests, the Department of Defense balances
resources and risk among four priority objectives: prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter
conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve
and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. These priorities shape not only considerations on the
capabilities our Armed Forces need but also the aggregate capacity required to accomplish their
missions now and in the future. Our approach to achieving them must evolve and adapt in
response to a changing security environment.
Prevail in today’s wars:
We must ensure the success of our forces in the field—in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and around the world. Along with our allies and partners, we have renewed efforts to help
the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and
eliminate its safe havens within both nations. In Iraq, years of effort have helped enable that
government to take the lead in protecting its people and providing essential services. As the
responsible drawdown of the U.S. military presence proceeds, U.S. forces will continue to play
important roles advising, training, and supporting Iraqi forces. Elsewhere, U.S. forces work with
partners and allies to locate and dismantle terrorist networks.
In the near term to midterm, substantial numbers of U.S. forces will likely be operating in
Afghanistan and U.S. forces in Iraq will continue a responsible drawdown. These efforts will
substantially determine the size and shape of major elements of U.S. military forces for several
years. In the mid- to long term, we expect there to be enduring operational requirements in
Afghanistan and elsewhere to defeat Al Qaeda and its allies.
Prevent and deter conflict:
America’s enduring effort to advance common interests without
resort to arms is a hallmark of its stewardship of the international system. Preventing the rise of
threats to U.S. interests requires the integrated use of diplomacy, development, and defense,
along with intelligence, law enforcement, and economic tools of statecraft, to help build the
capacity of partners to maintain and promote stability. Such an approach also requires working
closely with our allies and partners to leverage existing alliances and create conditions to advance
Our deterrent remains grounded in land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting limited and
large-scale conflicts in environments where anti-access weaponry and tactics are used, as well as
forces prepared to respond to the full range of challenges posed by state and non-state groups.
These forces are enabled by cyber and space capabilities and enhanced by U.S. capabilities to
deny adversaries’ objectives through ballistic missile defense and counter-WMD, a resilient
infrastructure, and our global basing and posture. Until such time as the Administration’s goal of
a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabilities will be maintained as a core
mission for the Department of Defense. We will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
arsenal to deter attack on the United States, and on our allies and partners.
While U.S. forces are heavily engaged in current wars, the Department’s prevent-and-deter
activities will be focused on ensuring a defense in depth of the United States; preventing the
emergence or reemergence of transnational terrorist threats, including Al Qaeda; and deterring
other potential major adversaries. In the future, as our forces transition into a period of lessintensive
sustained operations, the Department’s force planning assumes an ability to undertake a
broader and deeper range of prevent-and-deter missions, acting wherever possible as part of a
whole-of-government approach and in concert with allies and partners.
Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies:
If deterrence fails
and adversaries challenge our interests with the threat or use of force, the United States must be
prepared to respond in support of U.S. national interests. Not all contingencies will require the
involvement of U.S. military forces, but the Defense Department must be prepared to provide
the President with options across a wide range of contingencies, which include supporting a
response to an attack or natural disaster at home, defeating aggression by adversary states,
supporting and stabilizing fragile states facing serious internal threats, and preventing human
suffering due to mass atrocities or large-scale natural disasters abroad.
In the mid- to long term, U.S. military forces must plan and prepare to prevail in a broad range
of operations that may occur in multiple theaters in overlapping time frames. This includes
maintaining the ability to prevail against two capable nation-state aggressors, but we must take
seriously the need to plan for the broadest possible range of operations—from homeland defense
and defense support to civil authorities, to deterrence and preparedness missions—occurring in
multiple and unpredictable combinations.
Operations over the past eight years have stressed the ground forces disproportionately, but the
future operational landscape could also portend significant long-duration air and maritime
campaigns for which the U.S. Armed Forces must be prepared.
Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force:
Years of war have significantly stressed our
military personnel and their families. Given the continuing need for substantial and sustained
deployments in conflict zones, the Department must do all it can to take care of our people—
physically and psychologically. For too long, the health of the All-Volunteer Force, the civilian
workforce that supports it, and the processes by which the Department provides needed
equipment and platforms have been underemphasized priorities. The prolonged wartime period
since 2001 has greatly elevated their importance, and the consequences of failure have
accordingly become more serious. To reflect the urgency that the Department’s leadership places
on these issues, the QDR has striven to include them as core components of our policy,
planning, and programming considerations.
Our preserve-and-enhance efforts will focus on transitioning to sustainable rotation rates that
protect the force’s long-term health. The Department plans that in times of significant crisis,
U.S. forces will be prepared to experience higher deployment rates and briefer dwell periods for
up to several years at a time and/or to mobilize the Reserve Component. This will typically be
necessary if the United States is engaged for long periods in more than one large operation, such
as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Department will also expand its Civilian Expeditionary
Workforce (CEW) to augment the military effort as required.
These four priority objectives are at once timely and enduring. They capture the Department’s
key priorities and drive considerations about the size and shape of America’s Armed Forces now
and in the future. Successfully balancing them requires that the Department make hard choices
on the level of resources required as well as accepting and managing risk in a way that favors
success in today’s wars.
Rebalancing the Force
In order to successfully protect and advance U.S. interests while balancing the priority objectives
outlined above, the QDR makes a series of recommendations aimed at helping to rebalance
America’s Armed Forces to better enable success in the following missions critical to protecting
and advancing the nation’s interests. Required force enhancements were identified by examining
ongoing conflicts as well as the performance of the current and planned force through
combinations of scenarios spanning the range of plausible future challenges. Significant
enhancements were directed in the following key mission areas:
Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home:
The rapid proliferation of
destructive technologies, combined with potent ideologies of violent extremism, requires
sustaining a high level of vigilance against terrorist threats. Moreover, state adversaries are
acquiring new means to strike targets at greater distances from their borders and with greater
lethality. The United States must also be prepared to respond to the full range of potential
The QDR directs a series of enhancements, including:
Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations:
Improve the responsiveness and flexibility of consequence management response forces;
- Enhance capabilities for domain awareness;
- Accelerate the development of standoff radiological/nuclear detection capabilities; and
- Enhance domestic capabilities to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
The United States
must retain the capability to conduct large-scale counterinsurgency, stability, and
counterterrorism operations in a wide range of environments. In order to ensure that America’s
Armed Forces are prepared for this complex mission, it is vital that the lessons from today’s
conflicts be further institutionalized in military doctrine, training, capability development, and
QDR initiatives include:
Build the security capacity of partner states:
Increase the availability of rotary-wing assets;
- Expand manned and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
- Increase key enabling assets for special operations forces (SOF);
- Increase counterinsurgency, stability operations, and counterterrorism competency and
capacity in general purpose forces;
- Increase regional expertise for Afghanistan and Pakistan; and
- Strengthen key supporting capabilities for strategic communication.
Since the end of World War II, DoD has worked to build the security capacity of allied and partner states and to ensure that the Armed Forces of the
United States have ample opportunities to train with and learn from counterpart forces. As ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq make clear, these dimensions of U.S. defense strategy
have never been more important.
Key QDR initiatives in this mission area include:
Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments:
Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force
- Enhance linguistic, regional, and cultural ability;
- Strengthen and expand capabilities for training partner aviation forces;
- Strengthen capacities for ministerial-level training; and
- Create mechanisms to expedite acquisition and transfer of critical capabilities to partner
U.S. forces must be able to deter, defend against, and defeat aggression by potentially hostile nation-states. This capability is fundamental to the nation’s ability to protect its interests and to provide security in key regions.
In the absence of dominant U.S. power projection capabilities, the integrity of U.S. alliances and
security partnerships could be called into question, reducing U.S. security and influence and
increasing the possibility of conflict.
The QDR directs the following enhancements:
Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction:
Expand future long-range strike capabilities;
- Exploit advantages in subsurface operations;
- Increase the resiliency of U.S. forward posture and base infrastructure;
- Assure access to space and the use of space assets;
- Enhance the robustness of key ISR capabilities;
- Defeat enemy sensors and engagement systems; and
- Enhance the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces abroad.
The potential spread of weapons of mass destruction poses a grave threat. As the ability to create and employ weapons of mass
destruction spreads globally, so must our combined efforts to detect, interdict, and contain the effects of these weapons. Deterrence of such threats and defense against them can be enhanced through measures aimed at better understanding potential threats, securing and reducing
dangerous materials wherever possible, positioning forces to monitor and track lethal agents and materials and their means of delivery, and, where relevant, defeating the agents themselves.
Through the QDR, the Secretary of Defense directs the following:
Operate effectively in cyberspace:
Establish a Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters to plan, train, and execute WMDelimination
- Research countermeasures and defense to nontraditional agents;
- Enhance nuclear forensics;
- Secure vulnerable nuclear materials;
- Expand the biological threat reduction program; and
- Develop new verification technologies.
The security environment demands improved capabilities to
counter threats in cyberspace. In the 21st century, modern armed forces simply cannot conduct
effective high-tempo operations without resilient, reliable information and communication
networks and assured access to cyberspace. DoD must actively defend its networks.
DoD is taking several steps to strengthen capabilities in cyberspace:
Guiding the Evolution of the Force
Develop a more comprehensive approach to DoD operations in cyberspace;
- Develop greater cyber expertise and awareness;
- Centralize command of cyber operations; and
- Enhance partnerships with other agencies and governments.
In combination and over time, the initiatives described in the QDR are designed to significantly
enhance the ability of U.S. forces to protect and advance U.S. interests in both the near and
longer term. In addition to better preparing our own forces for the future, these initiatives will
improve the Department’s ability to build the capability and capacity of partners.
Changes directed under the QDR can be broadly characterized by the following trends:
U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus
on capabilities to conduct effective and sustained counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations alone and in concert with partners.
- U.S. naval forces likewise will continue to be capable of robust forward presence and
power projection operations, even as they add capabilities and capacity for working with a
wide range of partner navies. The rapid growth in sea- and land-based ballistic missile
defense capabilities will help meet the needs of combatant commanders and allies in several regions.
- U.S. air forces will become more survivable as large numbers of fifth-generation fighters
join the force. Land-based and carrier-based aircraft will need greater average range,
flexibility, and multimission versatility in order to deter and defeat adversaries that are
fielding more potent anti-access capabilities. We will also enhance our air forces’
contributions to security force assistance operations by fielding within our broader
inventory aircraft that are well-suited to training and advising partner air forces.
- The United States will continue to increase the capacity of its special operations forces and
will enhance their capabilities through the growth of organic enablers and key support
assets in the general purpose forces.
- The capabilities, flexibility, and robustness of U.S. forces across the board will be
improved by fielding more and better enabling systems, including ISR, electronic attack
capabilities, communications networks, more resilient base infrastructure, and enhanced
Of course, many of these enhancements will be costly. The QDR report describes some of the
tradeoffs that DoD’s leaders have identified to enable the rebalancing of U.S. military
capabilities. More such tradeoffs could be necessary in the future.
Early in the QDR and as part of the process of completing DoD’s budget submission for FY
2010, the Secretary took action to direct resources away from lower-priority programs and
activities so that more pressing needs could be addressed, both within that budget and in the
years that follow it. Those decisions included ending production of the F-22 fighter,
restructuring the procurement of the DDG-1000 destroyer and the Future Combat Systems
programs, deferring production of new maritime prepositioning ships, and stretching out
procurement of a new class of aircraft carrier. The Air Force is substantially reducing its fleet of
older fourth-generation fighter aircraft.
In addition to these steps, DoD is proposing in its budget submission for FY 2011 to shut down
production of the C-17 airlift aircraft, having completed the planned procurement of those
aircraft. DoD has also decided to delay the command ship replacement (LCC) program and to
extend the life of existing command ships, cancel the CG(X) cruiser, and terminate the Net
Enabled Command and Control program. Those actions, among others, have enabled the
Department to redirect resources into the high-priority areas outlined above.
Where it has not been possible to set in motion initiatives to meet certain future operational
needs, the Secretary has identified vectors for the evolution of the force, calling on DoD
components to devote sustained efforts toward developing new concepts and capabilities to
address those needs. Assessments of future operating environments will continue, with an eye
toward refining our understanding of future needs. At the same time, the Department will
continue to look assiduously for savings in underperforming programs and activities, divestiture,
technology substitution, less-pressing mission and program areas, and other accounts so that
more resources can be devoted to filling these gaps.
Taking Care of Our People
America’s men and women in uniform
constitute the Department’s most important
resource. Multiple long deployments are
taking a significant toll on our people and
their families, and the Department remains
focused on their health and welfare. As part
of this focus, the QDR has elevated the
need to preserve and enhance the All-
Volunteer Force and included this priority in
our force planning and in our strategy
deliberations. In order to better take care of our people, the Department is focusing on several
Wounded warrior care:
Our wounded, ill, or injured service members deserve every opportunity
to return to active duty following their recovery, or to make a seamless transition to veteran status
if they cannot be returned to active duty. Apart from prevailing in current conflicts, caring for
our wounded warriors is our highest priority, and we will work to provide them top-quality care
that reflects their service and sacrifice. The Department is improving the treatment of our
wounded warriors in many ways, which include:
Managing the deployment tempo:
Increasing funding for wounded warrior initiatives across the Military Departments;
- Improving health benefits and adding additional personnel for wounded warrior support
- Broadening the scope and quality of information sharing between the Department of
Defense and Veterans Affairs to strengthen continuity of care and benefits delivery for
Doing everything possible to better manage a complex
deployment tempo is an important aspect of the Department’s commitment to our personnel
and families. We must strive to provide them and their families with greater clarity and
predictability regarding current and planned deployments. To this end, the Department
continues to work toward increasing time spent between deployments to two years at home for
every one deployed for the Active Component and five years demobilized for every one year
mobilized for Guard and Reserve units.
Recruiting and retention:
Our recruiting efforts are long-term investments that can yield
generational gains. In this challenging wartime environment, the Department continues to meet
its recruiting and retention goals. The Department must continue developing innovative
programs to attract qualified young men and women into the Armed Forces, and to retain them.
Examples of recent efforts include:
Revising bonus policies to allow the Military Departments to pursue innovative ways to
retain quality personnel; and
- Offering more flexible ways for military personnel to serve, by implementing programs
designed to better enable transitions between Active and Reserve Component service.
We have a critical and enduring obligation to better prepare and support
families during the stress of multiple deployments. Access to robust single member, spouse, child,
and youth services is no longer a desirable option, but necessary, as these are services essential to
maintain the health of the All-Volunteer Force. Examples of recent efforts include:
Developing future military leaders:
Increasing resources devoted to institutionalizing service member and family support
programs across the Department;
- Replacing or renovating a majority of DoD Educational Activity schools by 2015; and
- Continuing efforts of the Military Departments to improve family and community
The Department will continue its work to ensure that
America’s cadre of commissioned and noncommissioned officers are prepared for the full range
of complex missions that the future security environment will demand. DoD will continue to
place special emphasis on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and the building of partner
capacity skill sets in its professional military education and career development policies. Examples
of efforts in this area include:
Developing the total defense workforce:
Building expertise in foreign language, regional, and cultural skills;
- Recognizing joint experience whenever and wherever it occurs in an officer’s career; and
- Ensuring that the Department’s educational institutions have the right resources and
faculty that can help prepare the next generation of military leaders.
The demands of a complex and uncertain security
environment require the Department to assess whether it possesses the right workforce size and
mix of military, government civilian, and contractor personnel. As part of these efforts, DoD will
take the following steps:
Improve the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, which provides deployable civilian experts
to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other theaters; and
- Work to reduce the number of support service contractors, thereby helping to establish a balanced workforce that appropriately aligns functions to the public and private sector.
Achieving the Department’s strategic objectives requires close collaboration with counterparts at
home and with key allies and partners abroad. Through its foreign defense relationships, the
United States not only helps avert crises but also improves its effectiveness in responding to
them. Moreover, by integrating U.S. defense capabilities with other elements of national
security—including diplomacy, development, law enforcement, trade, and intelligence—the
nation can ensure that the right mix of expertise is at hand to take advantage of emerging
opportunities and to thwart potential threats. The Department will take the following steps:
Strengthening key relationships abroad:
America’s power and influence are enhanced by
sustaining a vibrant network of defense alliances and new partnerships, building cooperative
approaches with key states, and maintaining interactions with important international
institutions such as the United Nations. Recognizing the importance of fostering and improving
military and defense relations with allies and partners, the Department continues to emphasize
tailored approaches that build on shared interests and common approaches.
Evolving U.S. global defense posture:
The United States is a global power with global
responsibilities. Including operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, approximately 400,000 U.S.
military personnel are forward-stationed or rotationally deployed around the world. The United
States will continue to tailor its defense posture to enhance other states’ abilities to solve global
security problems, and to address challenges including ongoing conflicts, the proliferation of
nuclear technology and theater ballistic missiles, anti-access and area-denial capabilities, and
maintaining secure access to the global commons.
Improving unity of effort:
The Department remains committed to further improving a whole-ofgovernment
approach to national security challenges. From improving our partnership with the
Department of State in conflict zones, to our enduring relationship with America’s intelligence
community, to supporting civil authorities at home through our partnership with the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense will closely cooperate with other
U.S. departments and agencies to better protect and advance America’s interests.
Reforming How We Do Business
Years of war have demanded that America’s Armed Forces rapidly innovate and adapt—the
Department’s institutional base must do the same. The QDR highlights several issues requiring
Reforming security assistance:
Despite the recognition that our security is increasingly tied to
building partner capacity, our security assistance tool kit has not kept pace. America’s security
assistance efforts remain constrained by a complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls
in resources, unwieldy processes, and a limited ability to sustain long-term efforts. The
Department is working to improve its internal efforts, ensure that urgent warfighter needs are
met—through such means as the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, the Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund, and the Iraq Security Forces Fund—and work with interagency partners to
create new and more responsive mechanisms for security assistance.
Reforming how we buy:
The conventional acquisition process is too long and too cumbersome to
fit the needs of the many systems that require continuous changes and upgrades—a challenge
that will become only more pressing over time. The Department will improve how it matches
requirements with mature technologies, maintains disciplined systems engineering approaches,
institutionalizes rapid acquisition capabilities, and implements more comprehensive testing. We
must avoid sacrificing cost and schedule for promises of improved performance. Our efforts must
also include reforming the U.S. export control system for the 21st century, and spurring
continued improvements in the provision of rapid logistical support to our forces abroad.
Strengthening the industrial base:
America’s security and prosperity are increasing linked with
the health of our technology and industrial bases. In order to maintain our strategic advantage
well into the future, the Department requires a consistent, realistic, and long-term strategy for
shaping the structure and capabilities of the defense technology and industrial bases—a strategy
that better accounts for the rapid evolution of commercial technology, as well as the unique
requirements of ongoing conflicts.
Reforming the U.S. export control system:
Today’s export control system is a relic of the Cold
War and must be adapted to address current threats. The current system impedes cooperation,
technology sharing, and interoperability with allies and partners, hindering U.S. industrial
competitiveness. The Department will work with interagency partners and with Congress to
ensure that a new system fully addresses the threats the U.S. will face in the future.
Crafting a strategic approach to climate and energy:
Climate change and energy will play
significant roles in the future security environment. The Department is developing policies and
plans to manage the effects of climate change on its operating environment, missions, and
facilities. The Department already performs environmental stewardship at hundreds of DoD
installations throughout the United States, working to meet resource efficiency and sustainability
goals. We must continue incorporating geostrategic and operational energy considerations into
force planning, requirements development, and acquisition processes.
Balancing for a Complex Future
The priorities advanced in the QDR, coupled with both the FY 2010 and FY 2011 budgets
reflect the Secretary’s consistent emphasis on ensuring the Department does everything possible
to enable success in today’s wars while preparing for a complex and uncertain future. This QDR
report and the preceding months of deliberation served two purposes: first, to establish the
Department’s key priority objectives, providing context and recommendations regarding
capability development and investment portfolios; and second, to communicate the Secretary’s
intent for the next several years of the Department’s work. The QDR thus serves as a critical
capstone document, shaping how the Department of Defense will support America’s men and
women in uniform today, and building the policy and programmatic foundation for security in
the years to come.
Source: Full text (pdf-file)
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Main Elements of U.S. Force Structure
Taking into account the demands of a dynamic and complex security environment, the
requirements of U.S. defense strategy, the need for enhancements to key capabilities
across a wide range of missions, and the need for forces with sufficient aggregate
capacity to meet the criteria laid out above, DoD has determined that U.S. forces, for
the duration of the FY 2011–15 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), will conform
to the general parameters outlined below. Where ranges of force elements are provided,
these reflect variations in force levels that are planned across the FYDP.
Department of the Army:
4 Corps headquarters
18 Division headquarters
73 total brigade combat teams (BCTs) (45 Active Component [AC] and 28 Reserve
Component [RC]), consisting of:
40 infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs)
8 Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs)
25 heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs)
21 combat aviation brigades (CABs) (13 AC and 8 RC)
15 Patriot battalions; 7 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries
Department of the Navy:
10 – 11 aircraft carriers and 10 carrier air wings
84 – 88 large surface combatants, including 21 – 32 ballistic missile defense-capable combatants and Aegis Ashore
14 – 28 small surface combatants (+14 mine countermeasure ships)
29 – 31 amphibious warfare ships
53 – 55 attack submarines and 4 guided missile submarines
126 – 171 land-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft (manned and unmanned)
3 maritime prepositioning squadrons
30 – 33 combat logistics force ships (+1 Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)
17 – 25 command and support vessels (including Joint High Speed Vessels, 3 T-AKE
Class dry cargo/ammunition ships, 1 mobile landing platform)
51 roll-on/roll-off strategic sealift vessels
The formations and platform types shown here generally encompass only the major combat elements
of each of the military departments. Nuclear forces, which will be detailed in the report of the
Nuclear Posture Review, are not shown here.
3 Marine expeditionary forces
Department of the Air Force:
4 Marine divisions (3 AC and 1 RC)
4 Marine aircraft wings (6 fixed-wing groups, 7 rotary-wing groups, 4 control groups,
11 infantry regiments
4 artillery regiments
4 support groups)
4 Marine logistics groups (9 combat logistics regiments)
7 Marine expeditionary unit command elements
8 ISR wing-equivalents (with up to 380 primary mission aircraft)
30 – 32 airlift and aerial refueling wing-equivalents (with 33 primary mission aircraft per wing-equivalent)
10 – 11 theater strike wing-equivalents (with 72 primary mission aircraft per wingequivalent)
5 long-range strike (bomber) wings (with up to 96 primary mission aircraft)
6 air superiority wing-equivalents (with 72 primary mission aircraft per wing-equivalent)
3 command and control wings and 5 fully operational air and space operations centers (with a total of 27 primary mission aircraft)
10 space and cyberspace wings
Special Operations Forces:
Approximately 660 special operations teams (includes Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha[ODA] teams, Navy Sea, Air, and Land [SEAL] platoons, Marine special operations teams, Air Force special tactics teams, and operational aviation detachments [OADs])
3 Ranger battalions
165 tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and fire support primary mission aircraft
The above parameters rightly reflect the heavy demands being placed on portions of the force by today’s wars. As these demands evolve, so too may the appropriate size and mix of forces.