Verhandlungen über den Status der serbischen Provinz Kosovo stehen bevor
Zwischen Autonomie und Unabhängigkeit - Werden albanische Separatisten belohnt?
UN-Generalsekretär Kofi Annan drängt auf den Beginn von Verhandlungen über den Status der Provinz Kosovo, die seit dem NATO-Krieg gegen Jugoslawien rechtlich unter UN-Protektorat, faktisch aber unter NATO-Aufsicht steht. Am 7. Oktober 2005 wurde ein wichtiger Bericht, der sog. Eide-Report, über die Lage im Kosovo an den Generalsekretär übergeben.
Im Folgenden informieren wir über die jüngste Entwicklung im Kosovo mit folgenden Dokumenten
Verhandlungen nach Rambouillet-Muster
Von Jürgen Elsässer*
Die Verhandlungen über die endgültige Abspaltung des Kosovo stehen bevor. Am Freitag berichtete die Belgrader Tageszeitung Blic, die sogenannte Kontaktgruppe der Balkan-Aufsichtsstaaten habe sich darauf geeinigt, das Gebiet von der Größe Hessens in die »konditionierte Unabhängigkeit« zu entlassen. Den Erwartungen Belgrads, den bisher durch die UN-Resolution 1244 verbürgten Status quo erhalten zu können – die Provinz gehört völkerrechtlich zu Serbien-Montenegro, wird aber international verwaltet –, wurde damit eine Absage erteilt. Bereits am vergangenen Mittwoch hatte Karl Eide, der UN-Sonderbeauftragte für das Kosovo, seinen Abschlußbericht
über die Lage auf dem Amselfeld an Generalsekretär Kofi Annan übergeben. Auf dieser Grundlage wird der UN-Sicherheitsrat innerhalb von 20 Tagen beraten und dann offiziell zu den Gesprächen einladen.
Daß die albanischen Separatisten die Westmächte für ihre Ziele einnehmen konnten, ist umso erstaunlicher, da ihr Terror in den letzten Wochen wieder zugenommen hat. Am 27. August wurden zwei Serben in ihrem Auto in die Luft gesprengt und zwei weitere schwer verletzt. Am 28. September gab es ein Attentat auf den höchsten serbischen Polizisten in der (ansonsten von Albanern dominierten) Polizei der Provinz. Am 1. Oktober wurde eine Bombe unter einem UN-Fahrzeug in Pristina entdeckt und gerade noch rechtzeitig entschärft. Am 4. Oktober zerstörte ein Sprengsatz einen Wagen der UNO im Südost-Kosovo. Seit dem Abzug der jugoslawischen Armee und dem Einrücken der NATO-geführten »Schutztruppe« KFOR im Juni 1999 wurden etwa 2500 Serben und andere Nichtalbaner ermordet oder unauffindbar verschleppt. Über 200000 Angehörige von Minderheiten wurden im gleichen Zeitraum aus der Provinz verjagt. Für wie unsicher die Vertriebenen die Lage nach wie vor halten, zeigt der Umstand, daß sich nur 12000 von ihnen seitdem zur Rückkehr entschließen konnten, davon gerade einmal 5000 Serben.
Ahtisaari kommt zurück
Aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach werden die Endstatusverhandlungen verlaufen wie die Konferenz von Rambouillet im Februar und März 1999: Damals saßen die serbische und albanische Delegation niemals an einem Tisch, sondern westliche Unterhändler haben jeweils ihre Vorschläge von einer separaten Besprechung zur nächsten transportiert – und dabei immer mehr zu Ungunsten Belgrads draufgesattelt. Chef dieser Shuttle-Diplomatie wird aller Vorraussicht nach der Finne Marti Ahtisaari werden, der die Serben schon einmal aufs Kreuz gelegt hat, wenn auch nicht in Rambouillet: Er überredete Anfang Juni 1999 den damaligen jugoslawischen Präsidenten Slobodan Milosevic zur Einstellung der Kampfhandlungen – mit dem Argument, die Vereinten Nationen übernähmen treuhänderisch die Kontrolle über das Kosovo. Stattdessen rückte dann die NATO ein.
Aus diesem Grund lehnt die serbische Regierung, so am Freitag deren Kosovo-Beauftragte Sanda Raskovic-Ivic, Ahtisaari wegen Befangenheit ab. Allerdings hat das Kabinett von Premier Vojislav Kostunica mit seinem Nonsensvorschlag, dem Kosovo könne »mehr als Autonomie, aber weniger als Unabhängigkeit« zugestanden werden, seine Verhandlungsposition ohnedies schon geschwächt, denn alles, was über Autonomie hinausgeht, ist Unabhängigkeit.
Letzte Hoffnungen von Kostunica richten sich auf ein mögliches Veto von Peking oder Moskau im UNO-Sicherheitsrat. Die Kontakte zur Volksrepublik sind gut, seit Belgrad sich gegen einen ständigen Sitz Tokios im obersten UN-Gremium ausgesprochen hat. Moskau allerdings wackelt schon: Es hat in der Kontaktgruppe dem Drängen der USA, Deutschlands, Großbritanniens und Italiens nachgegeben und der »konditionierten Unabhängigkeit« des Kosovo zugestimmt, sofern Belgrad dem beipflichtet. So schiebt es der eine auf den anderen.
* Aus. junge Welt, 10. Oktober 2005
8 October – Following Secretary-General Kofi Annan's announcement that final status talks on Kosovo should begin, the senior United Nations envoy to the province met with Serbian leaders to stress that dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade would be crucial as the political process enters its next phase.
In Søren Jessen-Petersen met Serbian President Boris Tadic, Prime Minister Kostunica and the head of the Coordination Centre for Kosovo, Sanda Raskovic-Ivic, as well as the Contact Group during a day and a half visit to Belgrade that began on Friday.
Mr. Jessen-Petersen stressed that work will continue on decentralisation and on implementing the Standards which serve as benchmarks of progress and are essential for building a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo.
“It is equally important that dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade on the important issues in Kosovo also continues,” he said.
The SRSG reiterated to both the President and the Prime Minister the need for a much more constructive engagement on the part of Belgrade in trying to deal with many practical problems that minorities, in particular the Kosovo Serbs, are facing.
Progress so far has been limited, and the Albanian-majority local government must demonstrate a stronger commitment, “but without a direct, constructive engagement on the part of Belgrade there will always be limits to how much we can do,” he added.
“We want to make it possible for all citizens, all minorities, but most importantly for the Kosovo Serbs to feel that they are safe, that they have a future in Kosovo,” he said. “That requires a constructive engagement on the part of Belgrade, so that we can get the involvement of the Kosovo Serbs. After all, it is their future and they should be involved in designing it,” he said.
During the visit, the envoy also met representatives from the families of missing persons. He reiterated his personal commitment to this issue and assured them that the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) will continues to press for answers about their loved ones.
Die Zusammenfassung des Berichts von Karl Eide in englisch:
A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo - Report
This report contains a comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo with the aim of assessing whether the conditions are now in place for initiating and conducting the future status process. The review has also been used to seek progress on the ground and to contribute to an environment conducive to taking the political process forward.
Following political stagnation and widespread frustration Kosovo has entered a new period of dynamic development. A political process is underway and is gaining momentum. It is based on a comprehensive political strategy, which includes the prospects for a future status process.
The standard implementation process is an important part of this dynamic. The record of implementation so far is uneven. Particular progress has been made in the development of new institutional frameworks. After the end of the conflict in 1999, there was a total institutional vacuum in Kosovo. Today, a comprehensive set of institutions has been established, which includes executive, legislative, and judicial bodies at the central as well as the local levels. Much progress has also been achieved in the development of a sustainable legal framework. The legislative work of the Assembly, Government and UNMIK has been ambitious and covered essential areas of public life and economy. Kosovo has also put in place systems providing public services across most of Kosovo. A civil service is taking shape. Over the last period, a significant transfer of competences has occurred. The local leaders have gradually assumed ownership of their own institutions. The development of new institutions is undermined by a strong tendency among politicians to see themselves as accountable to their political parties rather than to the public they serve. Appointments are, therefore, regularly made on the basis of political and clan affiliation rather than competence.
The Kosovo Serbs have chosen to stay outside the central political institutions and maintain parallel structures for health and educational services. The Kosovo Serbs fear that they will become a decoration to any central-level political institution with little ability to yield tangible results. The Kosovo Albanians have done little to dispel it. The interests of Kosovo Serbs would be better served if their representatives returned to the Assembly. Kosovo Albanian parties should stimulate such a process. Time has also come for Belgrade to abandon its negative position to Kosovo Serb participation.
With regard to the economy, significant progress has been made. Economic structures have been established and modern legislation exists in many essential areas. Nevertheless, the current economic situation remains bleak. The unemployment rate is still high and poverty is widespread. Grave problems exist with regard to lack of public income as well as an antiquated energy sector. To improve the situation, serious efforts must be undertaken. There are, however, positive longer-term prospects. The privatization process is well underway. It could have a direct and positive impact on the economy in Kosovo as many of the socially-owned enterprises have been idle. However, the privatization process could lead to discrimination in employment along the ethnic lines and affect the sustainability of minority communities. It is important to avoid such negative effects, Kosovo also has valuable and unexploited natural resources, which would turn Kosovo into an energy exporter in an energy-hungry region.
If a future status process is launched, this will certainly have a positive effect on Kosovos economy. However, the Kosovo authorities must understand that they cannot depend on the international community to solve their problems. They must take steps to ensure that shortcomings are addressed. Investment and integration will depend not only on status, but also on a predictable and stable Kosovo, where rule of law is respected.
Today, rule of law is hampered by a lack of ability and readiness to enforce legislation at all levels. Respect for rule of law is inadequately entrenched and the mechanisms to enforce it are not sufficiently developed. The Kosovo Police Service is gradually taking on new and more demanding tasks. However, crimes of a more serious nature or with ethnic dimension remain difficult for the KPS to address. The Kosovo justice system is regarded as the weakest of Kosovos institutions. The civil justice system is of particular concern with the increasing backlog of cases, which now stands at several tens of thousands. Combating serious crime, including organized crime and corruption, has proven to be difficult for the KPS and the justice system. It is hindered by family or clan solidarity, intimidation of witnesses as well as of law enforcement and judicial officials. For inter-ethnic crime, the law enforcement mechanism is also weak.
Organized crime and corruption has been characterized as the biggest threats to Kosovos stability and the sustainability of its institutions. These are widespread phenomena, but the level is difficult to assess. The Government has not taken the necessary administrative and legislative action to fight organized crime and prevent corruption in provisional institutions.
The Kosovo police and judiciary are fragile institutions. Further transfer of competences in these areas should be considered with great caution. In a deeply divided society, which is still recovering from the post-conflict trauma, the establishment of Ministries of Justice and Interior could lead to the impression that they have fallen under the control of one political party of one ethnic group. Transfer of competencies in such sensitive areas cannot work without a firm oversight, intervention and sanctioning policy. In light of the limitations of the police and judicial systems, there will be a need for a continued presence of international police with executive powers in sensitive areas. The current ongoing reduction of international judges and prosecutors is premature and should be urgently reconsidered.
With regard to the foundation for a multi-ethnic society, the situation is grim. Kosovos leaders and the international community should take urgent steps in order to correct this picture. The overall security situation is stable, but fragile. The level of reported crime, including inter-ethnic crime, is low. However, on the ground, the situation is complex and troubling, especially for minority communities. These are frequently unreported cases of low-level, inter-ethnic violence and incidents. This affects the freedom of movement in a negative way. To correct this situation, it will be important to prosecute crime more vigorously. When perpetrators remain at large, a sense of impunity prevails. Belgrade should abstain from inflammatory comments, which could contribute to an insecure environment.
Respecting property rights is one of the most urgent challenges with regard to ensuring a truly multi-ethnic society. At present, property rights are neither respected nor ensured. A great number of agricultural and commercial properties remain illegally occupied. This represents a serious obstacle to returns and sustainable livelihoods.
The overall return process has virtually come to a halt. A general atmosphere in many places is not conducive to return. Multi-ethnicity is often not seen as a goal. While overall statistics are hard to find, it is a widespread view that currently as many or more Kosovo Serbs are leaving Kosovo than returning. A viable return process will require support and attention over a longer period of time, in particular to facilitate access to service and repossession of land. Great attention will also be needed to those who have remained.
The return process is hampered by the fact that assistance is only provided to those who return to their home of origin. A more flexible policy of assistance should be considered to support return of people to where they can live and not only where they have lived. However, it must be ensured that a more flexible policy is not misused for political manipulation.
A continued existence of camps inside Kosovo is a disgrace for the governing structures and for the international community. The Roma camps in Plementina and Zitkovac are particularly distressing. They should de dealt with on an emergency basis.
The Serbian Orthodox religious sites and institutions represent a particularly element of the spiritual fabric of Kosovo Serbs. They are also part of the world cultural heritage. The are also part of the world cultural heritage. There is a need to create a protective space around these sites, with the involvement of the international community, in order to make them less vulnerable to political manipulation.
To achieve sustainable return and viable minority communities, a wider decentralization process will be required. It could envisage enhanced competencies in areas such as police, justice, education, culture, media and the economy. It could allow for horizontal links between Kosovo Serb majority municipalities. This would also facilitate the absorption of parallel structures into legitimate entities. However, it should not endanger central institutions in Kosovo or weaken Pristinas authority. The international community must stand ready to assist in the establishment of arrangements for wider decentralization.
There will be not be any good moment for addressing Kosovos future status. It will continue to be a highly sensitive political issue. Nevertheless, an overall assessment leads to the conclusion that the time has come to commence this process. The political process, which is now underway, must continue. Based on a comprehensive strategy, it has provided Kosovo with a political perspective. Having moved from stagnation to expectation, stagnation cannot again be allowed to take hold.
Further progress in standards implementation is urgently required. It is unlikely that postponing the future status process will lead to further and tangible results. However, moving into the future status process entails a risk that attention will be focused on status to the detriment of standards. It will require great effort to keep the standards implementation progress on track. The international community will during the future status process have a strong leverage to move standards implementation forward. That leverage must be fully exploited. Provided the future status process is properly handled, it can bring about further progress.
There is now a shared expectation in Kosovo, in Belgrade as well as in the region that the future status process will start. During this comprehensive review, there has been a gradual shift in the preparedness for such a process among the interlocutors. Furthermore, all sides need clarity with regard to Kosovos future statues. It is of great importance that the future status process takes place at a time when the international community is still present in Kosovo in sufficient strength.
The future status process must be moved forward with caution. All the parties must be brought together and kept together through the status process. The end result must be stable and sustainable. Artificial deadlines should not be set. Once the process has started, it cannot be blocked and must be brought to a conclusion.
The international community will need strength to carry the future status process forward. The UN has done a credible and impressive job in fulfilling its mandate in difficult circumstances. But, its leverage in Kosovo is diminishing. Kosovo is located in Europe, where strong regional organizations exist. In the future, they -- and in particular he EU will have to play the most prominent role in Kosovo. They will have the leverage required and will be able to offer prospects in the framework of the European integration process.
A future status process should be accompanied by a clear expression by the international community that it is determined to stay and support this process as well as its outcome. The EU should in the near term consider stepping up its presence on the ground. When status has been determined, the EU will be expected to play a more prominent role in the particular with regard to police and justice and in monitoring and supporting the standards process. NATO will also have to continue its presence. A US contribution to KFOR is essential in order to provide a visible expression of continued engagement. The OSCE has a valuable asset in its field experience and expertise. This presence will continue to be required. A High Representative or a similar arrangement should be considered, firmly anchored in the EU, and with the continued involvement from the broader international community. A Bonn powers arrangement could be envisaged within areas related to inter-ethnic issues.
A roadmap for integration into international structures would provide Kosovo with real prospects for the future. Belgrade will also need incentives for integration into Euro-Atlantic frameworks of cooperation. The EU decision to start negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement represents a milestone in this respect.
To determine Kosovos future status will in itself be a demanding challenge. The international community must do the utmost to ensure that whatever the status becomes it does not become a failed status. Entering the future status process does not mean entering the last stage, but the next stage of the international presence.
Der vollständige Bericht (englisch) als pdf-Datei:
A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW FROM THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO
Eine Kritik an den bevorstehenden Statusverhandlungen aus serbischer Sicht (englisch):
Saturday, October 08, 2005
Ahead of Kosovo Status Negotiations: Independent Kosovo 2006 - Fateful Mistake
by: Slobodan Antonic,
Senior Lecturer at the School of Philosophy in Belgrade
Serbia is entering the negotiations on Kosovo like a convict awaiting the execution of a serious and, in his opinion, undeserved punishment. The punishment being, of course, independence of Kosovo.
It is clear to everyone in Serbia that the Great Powers are preparing to grant independence to Kosovo. It is obvious from numerous statements of Atlantic officials that they are "not opposing" the independence of Kosovo (but, on the other hand, they are greatly opposed to the division of Kosovo, or its returning under the sovereignty of Belgrade). It is also obvious from statements of members of the social elite here, who have always tried to guess the wishes of the Washington or Brussels administrations, even before the officials there have had any wishes. This part of the elite has been explaining to the Serbian public for months now, through Sonja Biserko or Cedomir Jovanovic, that the independence of Kosovo was an excellent thing.
Therefore, Kosovo is moving toward independence. The foundation of this independence is, undoubtedly, the unanimous desire of the Albanian population in Kosovo no longer to live in Serbia. At the same time, the foundation of this independence is, undoubtedly, an act of violence. This act of violence was the military aggression against Serbia in 1999, and the occupation of a part of its territory. That Milosevic is to blame for much goes without saying. It also goes without saying that military operations he had undertaken in Kosovo had many elements of war crimes. All his violence, however, cannot serve as justification for the legalization of another kind of violence, the legalization of the severing of a part of a country's territory by war. It is clear to everyone in the international community that this would be a dangerous precedent, disastrous for world peace. After this, any country with a bit of "muscle" could snatch a part of territory from its weaker neighbor and proclaim an independent state there. This is why the independence of Kosovo must be made legitimate after the fact.
When NATO attacked Serbia in 1999, it did so without approval of the U.N. Security Council. Subsequently, the entire matter was made more or less legal through Security Council Resolution 1244. The resolution was brought after the Kumanovo agreement, of which Serbia was a signatory. Therefore, Serbia's consent to the arrival of NATO troops in Kosovo served as the subsequent legalization of the "Merciful Angel" -- the codename for NATO's attack against Serbia.
The same solution is obvious once again. Kosovo is practically already independent. This is clear not only from statements of Atlantic officials, but from the way UNMIK is running Kosovo. However, the independence of Kosovo will never be legitimate without Serbia's consent. Without this consent, an independent Kosovo will become a dangerous precedent, a devil in a box that could jump out any moment and hit anyone in the face. With this consent, however, the independent Kosovo will become the example of a mutually agreed and peaceful solution of territorial problems, a role model to be shown to others ("If the Serbs and the Albanians were able to agree, so will you!")
This is why strong pressure is being exerted on Serbia to "join the process of negotiations." It is also being told in advance that this process can practically have only one outcome -- an independent Kosovo. Still, the process is being presented to Serbia as very open for various gains that would be brought by this fixed outcome. Serbia is being presented with prospects for more financial aid, boost of investments from the West and, ultimately, a quicker admission into the European Union. "Kosovo will certainly be independent," it is being said. "However, it is up to Serbia to choose whether it would gain great and tangible benefits from this independence, or only damage."
"Why don't you Serbs be rational just for once?" an American friend asked me recently. "If the independent Kosovo is imminent, why don't you then draw the most you can out of it?" "Because, my friend," I replied, "for the Serbs, Kosovo is not a matter of rationality. It is a matter of identity."
True, the majority of the Serbs have never been to Kosovo. They neither have relatives, nor acquaintances there. And most of them will tell you: "Who cares for Kosovo. Just let our lives be better. Let there be more work and let our children not be hungry." Still, the map of Serbia without Kosovo would horrify the majority of Serbs. At the first next wedding, or funeral, or a sports match, the Serbs will remember what they have lost. And, if their wallets are thicker because of it - "My God, you have sold Kosovo. You have sold Christ! You have sold your own child!" they will tell their elite. And there would come the wrath of thousands of Serbs in the streets: "Judas! Traitors! Money lovers!"
"There can be no democratic Serbia with an independent Kosovo," Vojislav Kostunica once said. And that is completely true. No Serbian government, democratically elected, would sign the document on Kosovo's independence nowadays. One could imagine Cedomir Jovanovic signing that document. One could imagine Goran Svilanovic signing it. One could also imagine Sonja Biserko signing it. But none of them could ever be voted to power in Serbia at democratic elections. He who says otherwise, either knows nothing about the Serbs, or has bad intentions, dangerous for all of us.
Thus, if the great powers want Serbia to consent to Kosovo's independence, they could get it in four ways. The first would be to bring Jovanovic and the rest in power in Belgrade. However, this would only be possible with American tanks, not with ballots. This way is certainly the quickest and seems as the simplest solution. But, I am not sure that the expenses it would bring would be acceptable for anyone. The other way of obtaining Serbia's consent for the independent Kosovo would be for the Serbs to gain more than money in exchange for Kosovo. If they were to keep even the smallest piece of its territory, or the least bit of sovereignty, even symbolic -- this would be enough for the Serbs. They would no longer have the bitter feeling of having swapped their relic for cash. However, almost everyone in the international community are certain, for the time being, that they do not want this solution.
The third way would be for the Serbs to receive no money in exchange for Kosovo. They would then be unable to blame themselves for selling it. And their consent would be forced by new sanctions. That is not a bad option, either. Serbia is tired of wars and pressure. It has delivered Milosevic, it has delivered the generals, it will deliver Kosovo. Only, one should be careful that Serbia does not deliver democracy together with Kosovo. "The West is not against Serbia because it hates Milosevic. It is against Milosevic because it hates Serbia," Milosevic explained to the nation just before his downfall. If the democratic Serbia experiences sanctions too, like the one under Milosevic, the majority of the Serbs would have no option but to believe that the old dictator was right, after all. And when they do, they would no longer have confidence in the West or in democracy. If the West was to make the democratic Serbia give up Kosovo, it would in many ways be similar to making the democratic Czechoslovakia give up the Sudetes. Democracy in Czechoslovakia has even survived for a while after that. In Serbia, it will certainly not survive that long.
Finally, there is the fourth option, the most complex and time-consuming. To change the Serbian identity. No Serb would find this easy to say. This means to admit defeat. This means one facing the fact that one's arm has been amputated. This means to learn to live without Kosovo. This means to have a bloody hole in one's chest instead of a heart -- until another heart is found. A new identity: how painful that is. A new identity: how difficult that is. And how this is by no means just a Serbian problem. Serbia needs help, not only from the West, but from Kosovo, as well. Serbia does not need money to buy a prosthetic device or a wheelchair. Serbia needs understanding and time, time to renew the feeling of self-respect and dignity.
Independent Kosovo 2006 -- that is a fateful mistake. This is a completely unnecessary violence, which Serbia will simply not survive. And why so much rush, anyway? If you do not want to give Serbia anything else, give it some time, at least. Time needed by its democratic forces to create some kind of identity. With this new identity, Serbia might just even survive the independence of a democratic Kosovo -- in 20 or 30 years. But, before that, Kosovo must be democratic. Serbia must be democratic, too. Unfortunately, neither Serbia, nor Kosovo, can reach this democratic identity in 2006. In 2006, Kosovo can accomplish independence. But, neither Kosovo, nor Serbia, nor the Balkans, would thus reach what all of us have been longing for the most -- lasting peace. Much more time and patience is needed for building its foundations.
Quelle: Kosovoreport, im Internet: http://kosovoreport.blogspot.com
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