"... Requests Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to the Agency" / "... Ersucht den Iran, sofort und vollständig mit der IAEA zusammenzuarbeiten"
Resolution adopted on 4 February 2006 / Resolution der Wiener Atomenergiebehörde IAEA
Der Gouverneursrat der Internationalen Atomenergiebehörde (IAEA) stimmte am Samstag, den 4. Februar 2006 nach tagelangen Beratungen mit großer Mehrheit einer von Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien eingebrachten Resolution zu, nach der sämtliche Berichte und Resolutionen der IAEA über Irans Atomprogramm dem Sicherheitsrat übergeben werden. Hinter einen von den Europäern am Morgen vorgelegten überarbeiteten Resolutionsentwurf hatten sich 27 der 35 Mitglieder im Gouverneursrat gestellt. Lediglich Kuba, Syrien und Venezuela stimmten gegen den Verweis an den Weltsicherheitsrat. Algerien, Weißrussland, Indonesien, Libyen und Südafrika enthielten sich.
Eine Einigung auf den Resolutionsentwurf war bereits in der Nacht zum Samstag hinter den Kulissen erzielt worden. Unter dem Drängen der Europäer stimmten die USA nach Angaben aus Diplomatenkreisen einem Kompromiss zu, der das Ziel einer von Massenvernichtungswaffen freien Zone im gesamten Nahen und Mittleren Osten in die Resolution aufnimmt (siehe Ziffer m). Dies hatte Ägypten offenbar mit Blick auf das Waffenpotenzial Israels gefordert.
Bis der UN-Sicherheitsrat mit dem Iran-Dossier befasst, dauert es noch mehrere Wochen. Russland und China hatten ihre Zustimmung zur Überweisung des Streits an den Rat an die Bedingung geknüpft, dass das Gremium sich frühestens im März mit dem Fall befasst.
In der Resolution heißt es, die internationale Gemeinschaft habe "ernste Bedenken über das iranische Nuklearprogramm". Die Entschließung verweist auf iranische Versäumnisse und den Bruch von Vereinbarungen. Es gebe "mangelndes Vertrauen" in die Zusicherungen des Irans, sein Atomprogramm diene ausschließlich friedlichen Zwecken. IAEA-Direktor Mohamed ElBaradei wird aufgefordert, dem UN-Sicherheitsrat einen Bericht vorzulegen, welche Schritte der Iran unternehmen müsse, um das Misstrauen zu entkräften. Die Regierung in Teheran wird dem Entwurf zufolge unter anderem aufgerufen, die Urananreicherung und damit verbundene Aktivitäten auszusetzen und der IAEA stärkere Kontroll- und Untersuchungsbefugnisse einzuräumen.
Im Folgenden dokumentieren wir die verabschiedete Resolution im vollen Wortlaut. Hier geht es zu einer pdf-Version zum Herunterladen.
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
Board of Governors
GOV/2006/14
Date: 4 February 2006
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Resolution adopted on 4 February 2006The Board of Governors,
(a) Recalling all the resolutions adopted by the Board on Iran's nuclear programme,
(b) Recalling also the Director General’s reports,
(c) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty,
(d) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding safeguards issues in Iran and to verify the implementation by Iran of the suspension,
(e) Recalling the Director General’s description of this as a special verification case,
(f) Recalling that in reports referred to above, the Director General noted that after nearly three years of intensive verification activity, the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme or to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
(g) Recalling Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and the absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities, the nature of those activities and other issues arising from the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002,
(h) Recalling that the Director General has stated that Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue for the Agency to be able to clarify outstanding issues (GOV/2005/67),
(i) Recalling the requests of the Agency for Iran's cooperation in following up on reports relating to equipment, materials and activities which have applications in the conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area (as indicated by the Director General in GOV/2005/67),
(j) Recalling that in November 2005 the Director General reported (GOV/2005/87) that Iran possesses a document related to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and on the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms,
(k) Expressing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear programme, and agreeing that an extensive period of confidence-building is required from Iran,
(l) Reaffirming the Board's resolve to continue to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and
(m) Recognising that a solution to the Iranian issue would contribute to global nonproliferation efforts and to realising the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
1. Underlines that outstanding questions can best be resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's programme by Iran responding positively to the calls for confidence building measures which the Board has made on Iran, and in this context deems it necessary for Iran to:
- re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
- reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
- ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol;
- pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003;
- implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations;
3. Expresses serious concern that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has in its possession a document on the production of uranium metal hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components; and, noting that the decision to put this document under Agency seal is a positive step, requests Iran to maintain this document under Agency seal and to provide a full copy to the Agency;
4. Deeply regrets that, despite repeated calls from the Board for the maintaining of the suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities which the Board has declared essential to addressing outstanding issues, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility on 8 August 2005 and took steps to resume enrichment activities on 10 January 2006;
5. Calls on Iran to understand that there is a lack of confidence in Iran’s intentions in seeking to develop a fissile material production capability against the background of Iran's record on safeguards as recorded in previous Resolutions, and outstanding issues; and to reconsider its position in relation to confidence-building measures, which are voluntary, and non legally binding, and to adopt a constructive approach in relation to negotiations that can result in increased confidence;
6. Requests Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to the Agency, which the Director General deems indispensable and overdue, and in particular to help the Agency clarify possible activities which could have a military nuclear dimension;
7. Underlines that the Agency’s work on verifying Iran’s declarations is ongoing and requests the Director General to continue with his efforts to implement the Agency's Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to implement the Additional Protocol to that Agreement pending its entry into force, with a view to providing credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and to pursue additional transparency measures required for the Agency to be able to resolve outstanding issues and reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran's past nuclear activities;
8. Requests the Director General to report on the implementation of this and previous resolutions to the next regular session of the Board, for its consideration, and immediately thereafter to convey, together with any Resolution from the March Board, that report to the Security Council; and
9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Quelle: www.iaea.org (pdf-Datei)
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